Zbigniew Parafjanowicz: Ukraine did not follow Belarus’ path. Putin failed to do the same thing with Yanukovych

15.01.2025 0 By Writer.NS

Zbigniew Parafjanowicz, a journalist for Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, a reporter, writer, and author of books on Ukraine, including Poland at War (2023), spoke about the political basis of Polish-Ukrainian relations and their impact on the current challenges in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role Radosław Sikorski played with concern to Ukraine.

Former Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski built semi-private relationships to use them in a critical situation. The Orange Revolution was not the first opportunity. Earlier, Kwasniewski supported Kuchma in the Kolchug scandal, that is, during the period when Ukraine was accused of exporting weapons to Saddam Hussein. This happened at the height of the war on terrorism. For Ukraine, such accusations were politically fatal.

Then came the Orange Revolution.

The second round took place thanks to the Ukrainian judiciary, which made a political decision. However, Kwasniewski played a very important role in creating the atmosphere around the need for a second round, which Yanukovych manipulated. This was facilitated by the same semi-private relationship with Kuchma and the Polish president’s realization that the crisis should be resolved politically, and not by force, as Yanukovych’s entourage wanted.

A significant part of the oligarchs also did not want bloodshed. They did business abroad in the West. They wanted to continue doing so and not find themselves in isolation. Kuchma’s son-in-law was Viktor Pinchuk, an oligarch who was perceived as a representative of Western-oriented business. The Russians still repeat the thesis that Kwasniewski brought an American warning to Ukraine for Yanukovych and his entourage. This warning contained information about their foreign accounts and investments. They would lose them if they continued to escalate.

In 2004, Putin lost in Ukraine, and Kwasniewski always reminded us of this. Yanukovych left as part of a compromise. He returned to politics in 2007 as Prime Minister. Later, in 2010, he won the presidential election of Ukraine in a democratic manner and without fraud. A compromise was reached then. Moreover, even before the Orange Revolution, the first serious attempt was made to drown the Ukrainian elites in blood. This was an attempt to poison Yushchenko during the 2004 campaign. But it did not work. In the end, Yushchenko won, but over time, disappointment with the Orange Maidan led to the return of Yanukovych, who went towards authoritarianism.

And here it is worth remembering Sikorsky, his lobbying, together with Carl Bildt, for the conclusion of an Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. The topic of NATO was closed, but integration with the EU was not frozen. Until the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, Sikorski remained a staunch supporter of Ukraine’s rapprochement with the Alliance. With the window of opportunity closing, he focused on efforts to get closer to the EU. But Yanukovych joined these negotiations, and supposedly led them, while at the same time taking revenge on his political opponents: he imprisoned former Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko and former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. Kwasniewski returned to the game and, together with Pat Cox, created a European Parliament mission. Talks began about the release of political prisoners.

So, on the one hand, negotiations are ongoing on the association agreement, and the other, on the release of political prisoners.

Before the Ukraine-EU summit in November 2013, Viktor Yanukovych suspended the process of preparing for the signing of the association agreement with the European Union. He claimed that this happened due to the deterioration of trade relations with Russia.

This summit lasted two days and was intended to discuss certain controversial issues. However, Yanukovych came to Vilnius under the pressure of Russian blackmail. We are talking about the meeting in Sochi, which took place before Vilnius. The meeting between Putin and Yanukovych was reported by Yanukovych’s former ally, People’s Deputy from the Party of Regions Inna Bogoslovskaya. According to her, he came out looking like a dead man. Most likely, Putin then threatened Yanukovych with the annexation of Crimea. In the end, President Yanukovych refused to sign the agreement with the EU and people took to the Maidan. The bloodshed continued, Yanukovych was compromised, and Ukraine was on the brink of existence. The president lacked the courage and intelligence to stay and seek a compromise. He is afraid. He is running away. And Putin is annexing Crimea and creating separatism in the Donbas.

Berkut disappeared. The Maidan elites took power. Ukraine went West. The Association Agreement was signed. I was in Kyiv on the Maidan. I was also there in the first days after the Maidan victory and during the annexation of Crimea. This was the only moment when Putin could have conquered Ukraine, at least the left bank of the Dnieper. At that time, the country had no army or armed forces at all. Everything was stolen. The annexation of Crimea is the result of the complete collapse of the army. The collapse of the army and the penetration of Russians into the special services became a fact.

The entire SBU staff in Simferopol supported Russia and joined the FSB. All without exception. And Putin hesitated, he did not take the risk of a full invasion. He was not ready, but separatism was provoked. Donetsk and Luhansk were occupied, and for a while even Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Poroshenko managed to return these territories, which also indicates that the Russians were not as strong as they seemed. Mariupol was held, despite repeated artillery and ground attacks. The city was held. However, all this indicates a certain continuity of Putin’s escalation ladder.

Regarding Petro Poroshenko and Leszek Balcerowicz relations. Poroshenko offered him the post of Prime Minister. Leszek Balcerowicz confirmed this in a conversation with me. According to Poroshenko, Balcerowicz was supposed to become a shield in negotiations with the IMF. For many years, the Ukrainian budget was hanging on credit lines from the International Monetary Fund. The thing is that the state is struggling with constant problems: security, corruption, and public finances. So Balcerowicz was supposed to guarantee that Ukraine implements reforms by the will of the IMF. Balcerowicz refused. And that’s good because he would probably be a piece on the chessboard.

Traditionally, the government in Ukraine is just a pawn in a sheepskin coat. A center that administers, but doesn’t set policy directions. Now it’s the same: Shmyhal is a figurehead for Zelensky. He is not independent. So Balcerowicz refused, but earlier there was a question about ministers in the Ukrainian government. And this is what Duda and Poroshenko agreed on with the participation of Krzysztof Szczerski.

The right is still convinced that Poroshenko treated PiS as a seasonal party from the very beginning. Duda stopped trusting Poroshenko. He had his reasons.

Central European countries such as Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and particularly Poland, protested in 2023 against Ukraine’s agricultural and transport policies. Farmers and transporters also spoke out against EU decisions on environmental protection and against pressure on the market through imports of Ukrainian agricultural products. Ukraine wants to have the widest possible access to the single market. But I have the impression that Polish elites – regardless of their color – understand the consequences of this access.

The free movement of goods across the border, the development of border infrastructure, and energy cooperation. We agreed to resume intergovernmental consultations. I am grateful for the support for Ukraine’s intentions to become a member of the EU and NATO as soon as possible,” Denys Shmyhal wrote about relations with the new Polish government.

Perhaps, from Shmyhal’s point of view, Donald Tusk’s visit to Kyiv was a reset. From Poland’s point of view, it is not necessarily so. There is continuity in the policy towards Kyiv. The narrative does not change and will not change. The conflict of economic interests will generate tension. We cannot continue to use the argument that Poland is holding Ukraine hostage. Or the argument that protests on the border are blocking the supply of aid. When I recently returned from eastern Ukraine, I saw with my own eyes how life is becoming more difficult on the border with Poland for NGOs that were delivering medical aid to the front. But the cause of the problems was Ukrainians, not Poles.

Poland helps Ukraine and actively supports it in its security policy. However, we have our interests. Recently, one of the politicians of the Ukrainian government spoke about the need to resume humanitarian aid to Ukraine, namely to the Kharkiv region. This was immediately after the opening of the Russian offensive near Kharkiv. In my opinion, this aid can begin an hour after the exhumation of Polish victims in Ukraine is unblocked. I am convinced that Poland is ready for this.

The United States perceives Germany on the international stage primarily now, after Germany became involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, due to the potential of this country. Because of Germany’s position and the role that the United States has assigned to Germany since the late 1980s.

This is the famous concept of “leadership partnership”, formulated by George Bush Sr. in Mainz in 1989. He meant handing over to Germany the management of the transformation process in Central Europe after the fall of communism. And now it concerns Ukraine. Sullivan wrote the same thing in his program texts on policy towards Ukraine and Germany.

The Ramstein syndrome means that the United States will not give up Germany. They will not give up, because they are counting the gains and losses. This is a pragmatic approach. The PiS team made a mistake by completely ignoring this aspect. And they lived in the confidence that we could achieve something by isolating ourselves from Germany. Of course, the fault was not only on the Polish side. In many cases, Germany itself froze relations with Poland. There are objective conflicts of interest between Ukraine and Poland that we cannot overcome.

Ukrainians prefer to resolve disputes with Poland through the European Commission, which is more favorable to Ukraine than the Polish government. How can Poland react to such situations? The right way is to introduce unilateral protectionist decisions, for example, an embargo on Ukrainian grain. In general, the problem of Ukrainian grain in this second part of the trade fight between Poland and Ukraine has a much broader and deeper context. This is not just a question of Ukrainian grain, but of general trends in grain prices in the world.

The Russians have captured many markets in the Middle East and Africa. They have taken advantage of the blocking of the Black Sea routes. They have forced Ukrainians out of these markets. In the spring, the price of wheat sometimes fell below $200 per ton. However, there is a narrower context. Polish farmers had the impression that Ukrainians were brutally entering the single European market. This was without the transitional periods that were natural for Central European countries during their integration with the European Union.

President Zelensky said in 2023 that “only 5% of Ukrainian agricultural exports cross the Polish border, so this situation is not about grain, but politics.”

At the same time, he did not provide data on how much grain enters the market and how this affects the price of agricultural products. He did not mention agrarian products such as sugar, eggs, or poultry. The liberalization of EU markets for Ukraine has certainly created new conditions for Polish agriculture – less favorable ones. The Polish state is obliged to protect Polish farmers and is obliged to use protectionist methods. Most likely, there is no painless solution here. This dispute can be resolved in one day if one party gives in and suffers losses.

Everyone has some plans for the production of ammunition. But no one has implemented it effectively or efficiently. Tusk’s package is the will to sell military equipment on credit. The Americans are pressuring Poland to find some post-Soviet equipment that can be transferred to the Ukrainians for free. And here we are talking about two battalions of T-72 tanks. They are in terrible condition, but they can be repaired. Poland has 12 Mi-24s left, which are also in terrible condition, but they can be a source of spare parts for Ukrainian attack helicopters. There was also talk of KUB anti-aircraft systems, which will be equipped with NATO-made missiles. And this is the military contribution that we could still make to help Ukraine.

Ukraine’s position on the front could now be improved by long-range missiles. This could change the situation on the front. We are talking about the loss of Avdiivka and the offensive on Pokrovsk. The loss of 40 square kilometers in the direction of Kupyansk.

The European Union has approved 51 billion euros in aid. They will go to the Ukrainian budget. The pillar of EU military aid is causing controversy and resistance, from Hungary. If we look at the amounts from bilateral guaranteed agreements, they are significantly less than what the Americans are giving. The UK has allocated 2.5 billion pounds for this year. France about 3 billion euros. Germany is the same. This is about 10 billion euros or one-sixth of Biden’s package. His program costs 61 billion dollars.

This allows you to keep the war on a drip but does not allow for breakthroughs. If we talk about Russian assets, then it is realistic to get profits from frozen money. The West will probably not go for the maximum option, that is, transferring all frozen assets to Ukraine. Fears about the confiscation of Western property in Russia will prevail. On the one hand, of course, we have anti-Putin and pro-Ukrainian narratives, but on the other – also calculate profits and losses. Recently, we had the example of Ecuador. The country was supposed to join the global program of collecting weapons for Ukraine. The country withdrew from it at the last minute after it began to be blackmailed with export restrictions to Russia.

Brutally speaking, effective defense against Russia means proving to it that we are ready to fight in masse. Then we can talk about effective deterrence. This is an example of the Scandinavian countries that follow this model. On the one hand, they have professional armed forces, and on the other, the ability to mobilize a huge number of citizens. And this force of resistance, in addition to the modernization of the armed forces, has a deterrent effect.

«Ковальчук»Contributed by Maryna Kovalchuk, deputy editor-in-chief (Central Europe and Canada), head of the V5 Media project

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