Elections after the war: 60% for Zelensky, but Ukrainians don't want to vote under missiles
11.12.2025Ukraine is being asked to vote under sirens, but the majority clearly answers: first survive, then choose
When US President Donald Trump accuses Ukraine of “covering up war” to avoid holding elections, it’s like someone in a bomb shelter being advised not to forget about party decorations.1 2 Polls by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) and Info Sapiens show: Volodymyr Zelenskyy still remains the favorite in a hypothetical race, but the vast majority of Ukrainians do not want any elections while a full-scale war is ongoing1 3 The irony is that a country that daily demonstrates its commitment to democratic values is forced to explain the obvious to its allies: democracy is not about putting polling stations next to Russian missile craters.1 4 .
What exactly did the poll show: who is leading and by what margin?
The autumn survey by KIIS showed that about 60% of Ukrainians still trust Volodymyr Zelensky, despite war fatigue, economic losses and political conflicts1 5 Another study — this time by Info Sapiens — showed that in a hypothetical presidential election, approximately 20–23% of voters would support Zelensky, making him the frontrunner, but no longer a political monopolist.1 3 The paradox is simple: people largely trust Zelensky, but are no longer ready to automatically grant him another term — at least in theory, because in practice, elections are not even on the agenda right now.1 5 .
Among Zelensky's potential competitors, the first place is taken by former commander-in-chief Valeriy Zaluzhny, who, according to the Info Sapiens poll, is gaining about 19–20% of the vote in a hypothetical first round.1 3 . In third place is the head of military intelligence, Kirill Budanov, with support of just over 5%; he has never publicly stated his desire to enter politics, but voters do not seem to care much about it.3 . Old-style political parties — such as European Solidarity — in these studies appear more like a backdrop for new figures without extensive party structures, but with distinct military or security experience.5 .
Zelensky: from 90% support at the start of the war to a complex geometry of trust
At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Zelensky had an almost caricatured high level of support — about 90% trust, which turned any opinion poll into a formality.1 5 Before the war, in February 2022, he was trusted by only about 37% of citizens, but the first months of resistance, public stance, and personal stay in Kyiv under shelling radically changed the picture.1 5 Over time, however, a difficult reality set in: a protracted war, mobilization, economic pressure, corruption scandals, and disputes over reforms — all of this inevitably reduced the level of emotional trust.5 6 .
Recent studies — both by KIIS and other sociological services — show that the level of trust in Zelensky is currently around 60%, which is still a high figure for a country at war.1 5 However, the “aura of inviolability” of the first months of the invasion has noticeably dissipated: more and more Ukrainians are separating their assessment of Zelensky’s role in the war from their desire to see him as president after victory.4 5 That is why in polls a significant proportion of respondents simultaneously say: “Yes, he should stay in office now” and “No, after the war I would not vote for him.”4 5 .
Zaluzhny and Budanov: when the military turns into political players, even if they don't want to
Valeriy Zaluzhny, who currently heads the Ukrainian Embassy in the United Kingdom, remains in the minds of many citizens primarily as the general who organized the defense in the first, most critical months of the invasion.1 3 Despite the transition to the diplomatic sphere, his name continues to appear in polls as one of the main potential presidential candidates in the upcoming elections: various studies give him about 19–20% support in the first round, and in simulated second rounds he may be ahead of Zelensky.1 3 6 This does not mean that Zaluzhny is already running for president - rather, it indicates a demand from society for figures associated with defense and strategic stability.4 6 .
Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Main Intelligence Directorate, consistently has a more modest but indicative 4–6% support3 At the same time, he does not show any signs of political ambitions, which only fuels interest: in a major war, people trust those who produce results on the front or in intelligence, not those who skillfully perform on talk shows.3 4 It is significant that both Zaluzhny and Budanov are actually turning into political symbols, despite their own public rhetoric, in which they emphasize the priority of their current functions, rather than election slogans.4 .
Why 63% of Ukrainians don't want elections until the war is over
Despite loud statements by some foreign politicians about the need to “return to the electoral process as soon as possible,” recent polls indicate the opposite: about 63% of Ukrainians believe that elections should be held only after the war ends.1 4 Only about 12% support elections during a full-scale invasion, while another 22% allow them after a conditional ceasefire with real security guarantees.1 And this is not about “fear of democracy”, but about very simple risk arithmetic: hardly anyone seriously believes that holding a vote during shelling and constant power outages will make the results more legitimate in the eyes of citizens.4 .
The Constitution of Ukraine expressly prohibits holding national elections during martial law imposed after February 24, 2022.4 To change this norm requires either complex constitutional maneuvers or questionable interpretations that risk undermining public confidence in the election results.4 Therefore, most politicians, even those critical of the current government, publicly admit: the temptation to "play the election under the sirens" can cost legitimacy dearly even after victory.4 .
Pressure from outside: Trump, the West and "paper" arguments
Donald Trump, by saying that Ukraine is “using the war as an excuse not to hold elections,” added another layer of political theatrics to an already complex debate.1 2 The logic is simple: if at the rhetorical level Kyiv can be portrayed as “not very democratic,” then the issue of aid soon begins to be presented not as a defense against aggression, but as a “complex domestic political history.”2 In response, Zelensky publicly stated that he was personally ready for the elections and could theoretically organize them within 60–90 days — provided that partners would help ensure security and finance the process, because elections under missiles are not a cheap pleasure.1 4 .
Western think tanks and media generally demonstrate greater restraint than individual politicians: research by leading expert platforms shows that Ukrainians are not abandoning democracy, but categorically do not want it to be turned into a formality under the sights of Russian missiles.4 According to a series of polls, most citizens consider fair elections after the war to be more democratic than an imitation of democratic procedures in a country where part of the population lives under occupation, millions are abroad, and others vote between air raids.1 4 .
Trust rating and electoral rating: why these numbers don't match
One of the biggest confusions in the public debate is the confusion between Zelensky's trust indicators and his electoral rating.5 Trust is the answer to the question “do you think this person is generally acting correctly,” while electoral rating is a choice between specific names on the ballot.5 Polls by KIIS and other services show about 60% of citizens generally trust Zelensky, but at the same time only about 20% are ready to vote for him in a hypothetical election right now.1 3 5 .
Another telling point: some respondents have a "combined" view - they believe that Zelensky should remain president until the war is over, and after that his role in politics should be reconsidered.4 5 This may mean either a desire to renew the political system after victory, or a desire to avoid the “lifelong” personalization of power, which for Ukraine, with its experience of authoritarian neighbors, seems too dangerous.4 . In this picture, there are no simple headlines like “Zelensky is still the king of the ratings” or “Zelensky lost everything” — but there is a living, complex society that knows how to think in several planes at the same time4 5 .
The post-war agenda: do Ukrainians really dream of "getting rid" of Zelensky?
Some foreign commentators like to take out of context a phrase from polls where a significant portion of Ukrainians express the opinion that Zelensky should leave office after the war.5 If read in full, the context is much more complicated: some respondents believe that he can remain in politics, but no longer in the presidential position; others speak of the need to limit the political powers of any one leader after such a traumatic war.4 5 This is more of a discussion about rebooting the political system after victory than a personal verdict on one person.4 .
It is also indicative that among those who do not trust Zelensky, there is a significant percentage of people for whom the problem is not so much the surname, but the model of power in wartime conditions.4 5 They fear that the “war vertical” could grow into peacetime and create the temptation of authoritarian drift, even if the current president does not seek it.4 . Therefore, the demand for elections after the war is not about “anti-Zeleno” sentiments, but about an attempt to lay down fuses for the future, when the guns fall silent and political temptations only gain momentum.4 5 .
The role of the army in politics: where the red line is drawn
One of the most sensitive issues that has been prominently featured in polls is the growing popularity of the military as potential political leaders.3 5 In the history of other countries, the transition of generals into politics has often ended in very different ways: from stable democratic transformation to classic military regimes.4 There is currently a certain public consensus in Ukraine that the army should remain above politics, but at the same time, trust in the military is so high that their names inevitably become part of political scenarios for the future.3 5 .
Zaluzhny and Budanov as personalities embody the demand for competence, subjectivity, and security responsibility, not for populism or political show.3 4 . However, the main challenge is how to maintain a balance after the war between civilian control over the army and society's natural desire to trust those who have gone through the most difficult decisions on the battlefield.4 The answer to this question will partly determine whether Ukraine will become an example of a stable post-war democracy or a story about how a country that won the war lost to itself in a political sense.4 .
What will happen if elections are held during the war?
The hypothetical scenario of "elections tomorrow" looks attractive only on paper - polls, ratings, percentages, likes and dislikes1 4 5 In reality, this would mean the voting of millions of internally displaced persons, refugees in dozens of countries, soldiers at the front, people in frontline cities — all this against the backdrop of daily shelling and enemy attempts to disrupt logistics.1 4 The legitimacy of such a vote would be in question even before the first ballot is counted: access to polling stations, voter registers, security, the influence of propaganda, technical failures - each of these factors could, in itself, undermine trust in the process.4 .
That is why most Ukrainian sociologists, lawyers, and even some opposition politicians publicly admit: elections during a full-scale invasion are a recipe for a protracted political crisis, not for strengthening democracy.4 5 Formally, several laws can be passed, special voting mechanisms for the front and the diaspora can be devised, and temporary institutions for oversight can be created.4 But the question is different: is it worth risking credibility in the very idea of elections in order to satisfy the political ambitions of a few external players, who will then switch their attention to another crisis elsewhere on the map?2 4 .
When the war ends: what will happen to the ratings?
No poll can accurately predict what the ratings will look like on the day of the actual election after the war ends — there are too many variables, from the outcome of the fighting to the post-war economy.1 4 . However, several stable trends are already visible: first, the demand for accountability for military decisions and corruption scandals will not disappear with the latest explosion; second, the demand for people with real military and security experience will not go away.4 5 This means that the old “pro-European vs. pro-Russian” configurations that once defined Ukrainian politics are unlikely to dominate future elections — the axis of division has shifted to a different dimension.4 .
For Zelensky, this means a difficult but not hopeless prospect: he still has a significant support base and significant symbolic capital, but he will compete not with conventional “old politicians” but with a new wave of post-war leaders, some of whom are now not thinking about politics at all.3 5 For potential competitors, especially those who left the army or the power bloc, the electoral path will be no less difficult - few have managed to transform the image of an effective military leader into a democratic politician, and almost never without serious mistakes.4 .
Ukraine between two extremes: “vote now” and “never change anything”
Today's discussion about the elections in Ukraine is an attempt to find a balance between two obvious extremes4 5 On the one hand, there is political pressure from some external partners who really want to see the election calendar to check the box "democratic procedures have been completed"1 2 On the other hand, there is an internal fear that the war could become a convenient excuse for the endless continuation of the status quo and the postponement of elections “until better times” that will never come.4 5 .
Polls by KIIS, Info Sapiens, and other services demonstrate that Ukrainian society, despite fatigue and trauma, is not ready for either the farce of elections under bombings or endless "temporary" solutions without a real renewal of power after victory.1 3 5 In this construction, Zelensky remains a key player, but no longer the only center of gravity — the upcoming elections, no matter how they look according to the list of candidates, will become a referendum not so much about one person, but about what Ukraine wants to be in peacetime.4 5 .
Sources
- Euronews / Yahoo News: "Who would win if Ukraine held elections now?" — materials about the KIIS and Info Sapiens poll on hypothetical elections
- Donald Trump's public statements about the "non-holding" of elections in Ukraine and their coverage in international media
- Info Sapiens / Ukrainian media: poll on support for Zelensky, Zaluzhny and Budanov in the event of possible elections
- Atlantic Council, Journal of Democracy, analytical publications on the attitude of Ukrainians towards military elections and the post-war transition
- Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS): survey on the level of trust in Zelensky and attitude to elections in the war and post-war period
