Ukrainian intelligence has named the main external threats to Ukraine

Hybrid war, armed conflict, Russia's aggressive policy regarding internal socio-economic and political processes in Ukraine, efforts of the Kremlin authorities to undermine the foundations of support for our state at the international level — these are the main threats to Ukraine. This assessment was given by the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service Valery Kondratyuk.

About it пишет Information resistance.

The strategic goals of the political regime of Russia, despite any cosmetic statements of the Moscow authorities, remain unchanged: it is the return of Ukraine to the zone of its complete influence, the elimination of its national identity and independence, the establishment of external control over the processes taking place in our country, the termination of the existence of Ukraine as sovereign state. The Russian political regime, using the multidimensionality of hybrid forms and methods, tries to achieve advantages in the military, political, economic, information and cyber security spheres, stirs up social conflicts on the basis of language and religion.

Military threats

Direct armed aggression against Ukraine, the result of which was the temporary occupation of Crimea and certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (ORDLO). Subjective factors were the weakness of the collective security systems and the favorable environment created in Ukraine for the activities of the "fifth column" of supporters of the Russian Federation since independence. Putin's regime set out to destroy the entire system of international security and international law that had been in place for decades.

At the current stage of the hybrid war, Russia has deployed a military group around Ukraine, which includes two new armies and an army corps: the 20th army — already practically formed, includes two divisions with a total strength of about 24 thousand people; 8th Army — about 45 people, including the 1st and 2nd Army Corps in the temporarily occupied territories of Donbas; The 22nd Army Corps is a unit of the coastal forces of the Russian Navy, numbering 9 servicemen. These units will gain full operational readiness in the near future.

The Kremlin views its own army as a tool for achieving foreign policy ambitions, so an order to invade another country is only a matter of time and opportunity for Moscow.

The level of armament with the latest means in the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation reached 83%, in the aerospace forces - 75%, in the airborne troops and naval forces exceeded 63%, and in the ground forces - 50%. The level of equipping with modern means of management in the troops is 67%.

Moscow creates long-term threats, including the construction of a new military base near the borders of Ukraine (in the city of Rostov, 60 km from the border) for the permanent deployment of units of the newly created 150th Motorized Rifle Division of the Russian Armed Forces.

For political pressure on Ukraine and the West, the Kremlin intends to use the strategic military exercises "Caucasus-2020", where the scenario of an attack on neighboring countries will be worked out. The total number of troops involved in the maneuvers that will take place in September of this year will be at least 120 soldiers, 3 armored combat vehicles, about 300 aircraft, 250 helicopters, 50 ships and up to 5 submarines.

A possible scenario of the exercises is also the use of troops to solve the issue of water supply in the temporarily occupied Crimea. Before the annexation, mainland Ukraine provided up to 85% of Crimea's fresh water needs, so the Russian Armed Forces could potentially march deep into the territory of the Kherson region under a contrived pretext in order to establish control over the dam of the North Crimean Canal.

In general, the peninsula has already been transformed by Russia into a solid military base with ready-made infrastructure for storing nuclear weapons. Since 2016, the Soviet infrastructure for the storage and operation of nuclear weapons has been actively restored near Feodosia ("Feodosia-13" facility) and Balaklava ("Sopka"). The development of the transport infrastructure of the peninsula, as well as its integration into the unified transport system of the Russian Federation, is oriented toward military goals.

The adoption of a strategic decision to carry out one form or another of an offensive force operation against Ukraine (in particular in the area of ​​the North Crimean Canal) is limited by the following factors:

– falling prices on the global oil and gas markets and decreasing revenues to the Russian budget;

- Moscow hopes to use COVID-19 to reset relations with the West;

- the approach of local elections in Ukraine and Moscow's hope to strengthen the presence of pro-Russian forces in the Ukrainian political system;

- diversion of resources to the Turkish-Russian confrontation in Syria and Libya, as well as, indirectly, within the framework of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict;

– local elections in the Russian Federation in September 2020, with a drop in Putin's trust rating to 23% and an increase in protest activity.

The vicissitudes of the pre-election situation in the USA and the development of the negotiation process regarding the settlement of the situation in the East of Ukraine in the Minsk and Normandy formats are also preventing the Kremlin from ordering an offensive. However, the combination of the focus of the United States exclusively on its internal problems with the course of the negotiation process "not according to the Russian scenario" significantly increases Moscow's willingness to cross the "red line" once again.

However, according to our estimates, the complex impact of these factors makes the scenario of military aggression against Ukraine in the fall of 2020 untimely for the Kremlin.

However, history teaches that Russia has never respected the sovereign rights of other countries, and the state border for it is just a line on a map. We can recall the year 1918, when Russia signed a preliminary peace treaty with the Ukrainian state with one hand, and with the other - unleashed a "civil" war in Ukraine with Bolshevik units that allegedly did not obey it.

Our analysis shows that in the future, the activity of the Russian Federation in relation to Ukraine may transform into a large-scale military operation with the capture of new Ukrainian territories. The following factors can contribute to this:

- the need to divert attention from a number of internal Russian problems (decrease in the rating of the Russian government due to the worsening of the population's life, the rapid decline of the economy, the weakening of the vertical of power, the front of regional elites);

– the need to solve the socio-economic problems of the temporarily occupied Crimea (water supply, failure of the holiday season);

– the concentration of attention of our leading international partners exclusively on their own internal problems (complicated election processes, radical aggravation of social, demographic, economic issues, refugees, terrorism).

Another important dimension of Russia's hybrid aggression against Ukraine is political threats

We record the attempts of Russian special services to conduct special operations to bring discord into Ukrainian society and undermine the foundations of Ukrainian statehood. The bet is on the systematic discrediting of the Ukrainian national idea and the Western civilizational choice, the demonstration of the "artificiality of the Ukrainian identity and the state" (recently this discourse has been imposed on us both from the outside and from the inside). Moscow actively manipulates the factor of temporarily occupied territories, trying to oppose the people of Ukraine and the "Kyiv authorities", which allegedly betrayed pre-election promises regarding the long-awaited peace in Donbas.

The political goal of the Russian Federation is to destabilize social and political life to such a level that the Kremlin would be able to raise the issue of the need for "humanitarian aid" and cut off oxygen to Ukraine with "fraternal" hugs. In fact, we are talking about attempts to ignite a "war of all against all" on the territory of our state and, against this background, to carry out a political sabotage and/or force operation to change the state leadership in the medium term.

The forms and methods used by the Russian Federation are very diverse, multivariate, non-standard. Most often, provocations, the use of agencies of influence, terror and political murders, which have been repeatedly confirmed both in Ukraine (the murders of intelligence officer M. Shapoval and Russian politician D. Voronenkov in Kyiv, counter-intelligence officer O. Haraberyush in Mariupol, etc.), are often peculiar "brand tools". and beyond. The latest example was the events in Germany and Austria (the murders of Russian political emigrants Zelimkhan Khangoshvili in Berlin and Mamikhan Umarov on the outskirts of Vienna), which once again forces the civilized world to think about whether Russia has turned into a country sponsoring terrorism.

Intelligence pays special attention to the analysis of the processes taking place in the occupation structures in the ORDLO. Recently, major changes have taken place there, primarily in the system of Russian curatorship over the territories. Thus, after the resignation of V. Surkov, access to the ear of the new curator of the "USSR 2.0" project, D. Kozak, was obtained by the ideologue of the "Russian peace" K. Zatulin, who whispered to Kozak the idea of ​​putting the "Georgian or Moldovan model" as the basis of the Russian strategy in the Ukrainian direction:

"...conduct long negotiations, if possible, create such a model as the Minsk agreements, so that Donbass is actually independent, formally part of Ukraine, and can influence the policy of the Ukrainian government.

I hope that by this time the Americans will stop dealing with it, stop throwing resources into this furnace, wave their hand and overthrow some nationalist, and a more or less moderate regime will come. Wait for the evolution of the ego and build a relationship with it."

Economic threats

The Russian Federation uses all opportunities to wage a trade and economic war against Ukraine. It is about financial pressure, energy blackmail, transit and transport blockade, displacement of Ukrainian producers from traditional sales markets, discrediting of our enterprises on international markets, investment penetration of Ukrainian markets through false structures. Intelligence has data that the Russian Federation has already prepared a so-called "register". "pain points" of Ukraine, through which it is planned to cause as much damage as possible to the economy of our country. The flagships of the domestic industry, Ukrainian ports and transport infrastructure, PEK enterprises and, of course, defense industry enterprises occupy the central place in the lists.

The Russian Federation is trying to disrupt Ukraine's dialogue with international financial institutions, conducts information campaigns in EU countries, imposing an opinion about the unreliability of our energy transport system. Russian propaganda pays special attention to preventing the growth of direct foreign investment in our country, providing our partners with distorted information about corruption risks and threats.

Thus, on the eve of Ukraine's next negotiations with the IMF, Russia, through diplomatic and other channels, is providing authoritative representatives of foreign banking and business circles with data on Ukraine's allegedly inappropriate use of credit funds, as well as technical and humanitarian assistance. He does not neglect the spread of misinformation about the "economic decline of our state due to corruption" during official contacts of the Russian top leadership with Western leaders.

Russia is actively promoting the idea of ​​an energy embargo on Ukraine through the implementation of bypass gas routes, the final stage of which should be the completion of the construction of the Nord Stream 2 project and the closure of natural gas supply routes from the Russian Federation through Ukraine.

Information threats

We consider Russia's attempt to dominate the Ukrainian information space as one of the prerequisites for preparing for aggression against Ukraine. The Kremlin plans to intensify information and psychological warfare. For this, social networks, targeted information operations, fakes, and disinformation are actively used. It is worth recalling the manipulation of versions regarding the flight MH-17 shot down by the Russian invaders, the accusation of Ukraine of training terrorists for ISIS, the spread of false information about the alleged use of Ukraine's territory for secret laboratory research of biological weapons. We should also not forget about the norm laid down in the updated constitution of Russia on the impossibility of alienating territories, as well as criminal liability for calls for this. From now on, anyone who speaks about Crimea belonging to Ukraine may become the object of criminal prosecution in the Russian Federation.

The main element of the destabilization of Ukrainian society from within is the manipulation of protest sentiments, built, among other things, on patriotic feelings (the language and religious issue, the problems of external governance of Ukraine are actively used, including due to dependence on the IMF and other Western institutions and governments) . The Kremlin spares no resources for this, both financial and human. Provocations with attacks by alleged "nationalists" on representatives of the "opposition" pro-Russian forces are being inspired and disseminated. False information about Ukrainian mercenaries in conflict regions, participation of Ukrainians in mass riots in other countries is spreading around the world. The latest example of such a special information operation is the protests in Serbia. The Kremlin spread fake news about the involvement of "mercenaries from Ukraine" in protest actions in Belgrade due to dissatisfaction with the introduction of curfew due to the increase in the number of coronavirus patients.

The activity of pro-Russian television channels in Ukraine requires a comprehensive assessment and response of the Ukrainian state aimed at curbing Russian informational aggression.

Threats arising on religious grounds

One of the forms of Kremlin pressure on our country is the promotion of the idea of ​​the "Russian Orthodox Church". The Russian special services, having leverage over the religious sphere, use the Russian Orthodox Church both as a "hard" force (the inspiration for protest actions that can easily turn into demonstrative clashes with law enforcement officers or provocateurs) and as a "soft" force (influence on the minds of believers) . In this direction, Russia uses all available technologies to oppose the process of formation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, manipulating the feelings of Ukrainian believers and trying in every possible way to maintain its influence on them.

Another special project of the Kremlin is attempts to create and legalize paramilitary formations in the regions of Ukraine within the framework of religious communities with law enforcement functions. It is about intensifying the activities of pro-Russian "Cossack" organizations, which are trying to duplicate the functions of the police on the protection of public order at the local level. Such cases were recorded, in particular, in the Kyiv, Vinnytsia, and Zaporizhzhia regions.

Exacerbation of contradictions at the regional level

The Russian Federation is trying to take advantage of the historical conflicts between Ukraine and its neighbors to sow enmity between peoples and take advantage of its consequences. Attempts to rewrite history as it is seen in Moscow is one of the prerequisites for legitimizing the invasion of Ukraine.

All threats arising around Ukraine at the regional level are somehow related to the destructive activities of the Russian Federation.

A typical example is the historical legacy in relations with Hungary and Poland. Our states managed to reach an understanding on these issues, but even here it was not without Russia, which fuels chauvinism directed against Ukraine. At the same time, they act not only in the dark, but also brazenly, openly. The attempt of the pranksters Vovan and Lexus to prank the President of Poland A. Duda and provoke him to speak on sensitive issues of Ukrainian-Polish relations (they offered to "return Ukrainian territories... Lviv and many others") is indicative. A few more examples: in 2016, the Polish Internal Security Agency detained the leader of the pro-Russian party "Zmina" Mateusz Piskorski for cooperation with the special services of the Russian Federation; in 2018, Polish law enforcement officers detained their own citizens — members of the radical pro-Russian organization "Falang" on suspicion of setting fire to the office of the Society of Hungarian Culture in Uzhhorod.

The situation with Belarus has a slightly different character: the Kremlin has never stopped in its desire to absorb Belarus under the guise of "unification". This creates a danger of turning it into a bridgehead for the implementation of the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Moscow, using all levers, is trying to weaken RB as much as possible, remaining an irreplaceable partner for Minsk. This creates a threat of a change in the position of the leadership of Belarus on the "Ukrainian issue". The latest example — Belarusian law enforcement officers detained 32 militants of the Russian PMK Wagner, who arrived in Minsk to destabilize the situation during the presidential election campaign in Belarus.

Intelligence also analyzes the processes taking place in Moldova (Transnistria), as well as in Georgia (Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region), which the Kremlin uses as a training ground to bring pro-Russian forces to power and return Chisinau and Tbilisi to its orbit of influence. Thus, in Georgia, Russia uses all available hybrid tools (from the "fifth column" and pro-Russian media to economic blackmail) to block the attempts of the Georgian authorities to reintegrate the territories and prevent the appearance of NATO infrastructures on the Georgian coast of the Black Sea.

In general, the development of the situation in the South Caucasus, including recent events on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border show that Russia continues to manipulate regional conflicts while hypocritically offering its services as a peacemaker.

Cyber ​​threats

Ukrainian intelligence pays special attention to countering threats in cyberspace. Hacker interventions in the work of critical infrastructure objects of Ukraine, inspired by the Russian Federation, are the same tool of hybrid war against our state as armed aggression. Everyone remembers cyberattacks on energy companies of Ukraine (2015, BlackEnergy Trojan), the "Northern" substation of the Ukrenergo company (2016), an attack due to vulnerabilities in office software (2017, Petya Ransomware), a cyberattack on the representation of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea ( 2020).

Moscow's cybermilitarization threatens not only Ukraine, but also other countries that the Russian Federation considers its enemies or competitors. It is not only about cyber-attacks and obtaining unauthorized access to information and telecommunication systems, but also about attempts to use social networks to manipulate public opinion, destabilize the socio-political situation — so-called influence operations.

Unauthorized interventions in cyberspace were recorded, in particular, during the previous presidential campaign in the USA and votes in European countries (Great Britain, the Netherlands). Among the latest examples: Britain has accused hackers controlled by the Russian SSR of interfering in the 2019 parliamentary elections via the Internet and of leaking British government documents. In addition, Britain, the United States and Canada have accused Russia of trying to steal data on the COVID-19 vaccine. Various tools and techniques have been used in hacking attacks on vaccine development organizations, including phishing and malware such as WellMess and WellMail.

The West's concerns were materialized in the decision: recently, the EU first applied the regime of sanctions for cyberattacks, introducing them against four officers and objects of Russian military intelligence who were involved in the NotPetya cyberattacks and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

In this context, Ukraine is undoubtedly interested in the experience of Great Britain, where the parliament published the report of the Intelligence and Security Committee entitled "Russia". The document deals with the facts of the interference of the Russian Federation in political processes in the Kingdom and contains specific recommendations of the government to counter hostile activities of the Russian Federation. This includes, in particular, giving the special services wider powers to monitor the assets and activities of Russians in the country, creating a register of foreign agents of influence and flexible use of sanctions instruments.

Terrorist threats

We are used to it: terrorism is ISIS, Taliban, Al-Qaeda. Or, for example, in the version of the US State Department, today Iran, North Korea, and South Sudan are identified as state sponsors of terrorism.

On the other hand, for Ukraine, against which Russia is waging a hybrid war, including using terrorist methods, the Kremlin is the terrorist number 1, because of which more than 13 thousand Ukrainians died in Donbas. Examples of terrorist attacks are flight MH-17 shot down by a Russian missile, shelling of Mariupol and Kramatorsk, terrorist acts against Ukrainian security forces.

Summarizing

According to the SZR assessment, the main external threat to Ukraine remains the political regime of the Russian Federation. The current Kremlin authorities will never accept the existence of an independent, unitary and Western-oriented Ukraine, and therefore will continue to wage a hybrid war against the Ukrainian state.

The latest events also testify to the formation of a unified policy of the West regarding the application of a complex toolkit for deterring the Russian Federation, where sanctions will be only one of the elements (approaches similar to Cold War measures).

The issue of timely detection and adequate response to threats from the Russian Federation will increasingly dominate the agenda of not only European, but also Ukrainian special services and politicians.

How will the situation develop further?

Russia plans to continue destabilizing Ukraine in order to achieve its goal of returning our country to the "zone of Russian influence", using various levers for this purpose.

We have data that with the approach of local elections in Ukraine, Russia will once again return to the practice of active pressure and provocations. Their goal will be not only to sow chaos and undermine the public's trust in state institutions, but also to form the opinion in the West that Ukraine is a "failed state", and therefore to make cooperation with Ukraine toxic for Western leaders.

One of the elements, in this context, is planting the idea of ​​federalization of Ukraine as the supposedly only real possibility of resolving the conflict by peaceful political means. The Kremlin is convinced that, given the "civilizational and national heterogeneity of Ukraine and the limited influence of the central government" (these are the definitions used in Moscow), the transition to a federal form of government will activate the process of disintegration of the State of Ukraine into small parts that will continue to exist without problems reintegrated into the "Russian measure", except for one territory, which they call "Galicia".

The key to this strategy is holding elections in ORDLO. The Russian Federation insists on holding elections in the temporarily occupied territories of eastern Ukraine without any preconditions, namely, without the restoration of Ukrainian control over the relevant section of the Ukrainian-Russian border and the withdrawal of all armed units controlled by Moscow. The emissaries of the Kremlin are now trying to push this approach on all negotiating platforms. Other options do not correspond to the interests of Russia, which consist in ensuring total political control over the Luhansk and Donetsk regions in the post-conflict period.

According to our forecasts, despite Ukraine's commitment to the peaceful settlement process, in the near and medium term, there will be a high probability of hostile provocations along the demarcation line. Our data show that the armed formations controlled by the Russian Federation have already received instructions from their curators from Russia to use the cease-fire agreements for provocations and to find ways to compromise Ukraine, as the party that first violated them.