Berlin is talking about the possible collapse of the EU: what does this mean for Europe and Ukraine

When the German capital is no longer shy about suggesting that the EU may not survive the next decade.

Berlin political circles no longer avoid formulations that yesterday would have seemed almost sacrilegious: "the end of the EU is possible," "the Union could disappear without a big explosion," "Europe risks dying from indifference."^{1 5} The French newspaper Le Monde describes the atmosphere in Germany as an unprecedentedly gloomy turn: politicians and influential publicists are talking less and less about deepening integration and more and more about whether the European Union will withstand simultaneous pressure from within, due to the strengthening of nationalists, and from without, in particular from the Donald Trump administration.¹ For Ukraine, which is fighting for the right to become part of this project, these discussions are not just an alarming background, but a reminder: the Union to which we aspire is itself fighting for its own future.

What Le Monde actually writes: The EU project no longer seems irreversible

Le Monde's article "Germany questions the future of the European project" captures a turning point: for the first time in Berlin, the viability of the Union as a political construct is being so openly questioned.¹ The author describes how the idea is spreading in German political and intellectual circles: if the EU continues to allow Trump to divide European capitals and extreme nationalist parties to grow stronger, “the end of the European Union is quite possible.”¹ . It is not about a sudden collapse, but a gradual loss of weight: the treaties and buildings will formally remain, but the political idea behind them will fade away.

Le Monde cites a number of German voices — from politicians in the ruling coalition to commentators in leading media outlets — who speak of the EU's "fatigue" and its inability to respond quickly to new challenges: from Russia's war against Ukraine to economic competition with the US and China.^{1 5} For the first time, a scenario is being seriously discussed in which the Union will formally exist in ten years, but its decisions will actually have little impact.

"The end of the EU is no longer taboo": how German publicists describe the crisis

One of the key voices cited by Le Monde is essayist Sabine Rennefanz, whose column in Der Spiegel sparked a heated debate: "The end of the EU is no longer a taboo subject."^{1 5} . She portrays the Union as a construct that is not yet falling apart, but is no longer able to act: paralyzed by internal squabbles over Russia's imperial policies, the unpredictable behavior of the United States, and its own strategic confusion.

Rennefanz suggests that in ten years the current EU may disappear “not through a catastrophe, but through a slow loss of significance”: the institutions and buildings will remain, but the political meaning of integration will dissolve to the level of a decorative shell.^{1 5} This is a scenario of "quiet extinction" - without loud exits by individual states, but with a long process of internal withering away of real levers of influence.

"The EU could die from indifference": warnings from Munich and Brussels

Adding to this chorus is an editorial from the Süddeutsche Zeitung, which is being reported by European commentators: Brussels correspondent Josef Kellenberger warns that the European Union could “die of indifference” if political elites continue to shift responsibility to one another and voters increasingly turn away from the pan-European agenda.⁵ He describes the risk of “the collapse of the Union as early as 2027” if radical Eurosceptics come to power in elections in key states — primarily in France.

The journalist draws attention to the paradox: in European discussions, "the tone is increasingly set not by Brussels, but by the US president."⁵ This means that Europe’s strategic agenda is shaped by external players, while the major pro-European parties within the EU countries themselves offer no clear narrative about the future of the Union. The structure designed to contain the chaos of the 20th century has itself lost its ability to plan.

Trump and European pessimism: how Washington is adding fuel to the fire

Le Monde directly links the wave of skepticism in Berlin to Donald Trump's return to the White House and his course towards Europe¹ It's not just about demands for a sharp increase in defense spending or threats of tariffs. With his contradictory rhetoric and refusal to explicitly guarantee automatic defense for NATO allies, Trump is reviving a long-standing fear that the United States could step aside at a crucial moment.

Berlin and Brussels see how the new American administration simultaneously pressures the EU on trade, demands greater involvement in containing China, and makes no secret of its willingness to exploit internal disagreements between European capitals to strengthen its own positions.³ In this perspective, the European Union ceases to be a “framework without alternatives” and turns into one of the formats whose viability has to be proven in practice.

The rise of the far right: a threat from within that Berlin can no longer ignore

The second key factor of pessimism is the growing influence of far-right and Eurosceptic parties in EU member states. European media cited by Le Monde point to the consistently high ratings of Marine Le Pen's National Rally in France, the strengthening of radical forces in Poland, the Netherlands, and Germany, as well as attempts to create an "anti-Brussels bloc" in the European Parliament.^{1 3} In Germany itself, the rise in support for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) further fuels the feeling that the EU no longer has monopoly appeal.

For Berlin, it is also a question of historical responsibility. European integration after World War II was conceived as a vaccination against a return to dangerous rivalry between nation states.¹ Now that the far right is openly talking about the “return of full sovereignty” and the “end of Brussels’ dictates,” German elites are forced to honestly ask: can the Union retain countries where a significant part of society no longer sees added value in it?

Does Berlin really believe the EU is doomed?

Clear formulas like "the existence of the EU is doomed" are eagerly picked up by Kremlin mouthpieces and secondary Russian-language reports, presenting the German discussions as almost an official verdict on the Union.^{3 4} But a careful reading of both Le Monde and the quoted German texts shows otherwise: it is not about acquiescence to inevitable disintegration, but about the recognition that the risk can no longer be dismissed as fantasy.

Sabine Rennefanz's formula — "the end of the EU is no longer taboo" — means that the topic has moved from the periphery to the center of the political conversation, not that it has already been resolved.^{1 5} Most serious analysts emphasize: the Union still has room for maneuver - from the idea of ​​a "hard core" of the most committed to integration states to deeper cooperation in the field of defense without full reliance on the United States.¹ But this requires political leadership today that is ready to call crises by their proper names.

"Hard core" as plan B: what German experts propose

According to Le Monde, more and more German experts are returning to the concept of a “hard core” – a group of countries that are ready to move forward in integration, even if others prefer to remain in a looser format of cooperation.¹ Some are also talking about restoring the logic of the Western European defense community — an additional layer of security that could operate if the US weakens its participation in NATO.

Former head of the Munich Security Conference, Wolfgang Ischinger, and a number of Berlin think tanks emphasize that if the EU cannot become an independent player in the security sphere, its economic and political weight will gradually erode.¹ This does not necessarily mean an official collapse, but it threatens precisely the scenario of “quiet fading” that Rennefanz and Kelnberger write about.

Why talk of the "death of the EU" is beneficial to Moscow and Beijing

The plot about the "inevitable end of the European Union" is actively picked up by pro-Kremlin and some Chinese media, which are building a line: they say, "sanctions against Russia will be suicide for Europe."³ This image of a weak, shaky Union simultaneously demoralizes pro-European citizens in the EU countries themselves, pushes voters to support Eurosceptic parties, and convinces partners in the world that relying on Brussels is risky.

European analysts cited by Le Monde emphasize that the less cohesive the EU appears, the easier it is for Russia and China to promote their own formats of cooperation — from BRICS to bilateral energy or military-technical agreements that bypass European institutions.^{1 3} For Ukraine, this means that a weak, divided Union will be less willing to invest in other people's security when it is unsure of its own future.

Ukrainian perspective: which EU are we heading towards?

Ukraine is officially moving towards EU membership amid discussions in Berlin about the possible “end of the era of the Union.” This is not a paradox, but a sober description of the moment: we are striving to become part of a project just when its future is no longer perceived as something guaranteed by itself.^{1 2} For Kyiv, this means that betting on the EU is not a ticket to a ready-made "comfort zone," but participation in the repair and modernization of a political structure that is creaking at all the seams.

In this sense, the Ukrainian experience can become not only a test for the Union, but also a source of renewal. A country that is waging war and building institutions at the same time reminds Europe of its own origins in ruins and crises, rather than in periods of prosperity.² But for this, Brussels and Berlin must see Ukraine not just as an object of assistance, but as a partner shaping a new European agenda — from security to energy and technology.

Is the EU really "doomed to exist"?

Loud headlines like “the EU is doomed” are more of a media exaggeration than an accurate reflection of the mood in Berlin. The primary sources convey a different tone: if the Union continues to live by inertia, failing to respond to rising nationalism, external pressure, and strategic instability, the “end” scenario can no longer be dismissed as fantasy.^{1 5} This is a warning and a call to action, not a final verdict.

It is useful for Ukraine to perceive this signal in this way. The EU we aspire to is not a stone fortress, but a political project standing at a crossroads. The choice between slow marginalization and renewal is a choice in which we also have a say, if we expect to sit at the European table not as a supplicant, but as an equal participant.^{1 2} First of all, this requires a sober awareness: the European Union is not automatically doomed, but its survival is no longer guaranteed by the inertia of past successes alone.

Sources

1. Le Monde: analytical article about doubts in Germany about the future of the European project and the risk of the EU's "quiet fading away".
2. Euronews (Euroviews): a column on why Europe in 2026 needs not wishful rhetoric, but a "survival strategy" and real strategic autonomy.
3. European media outlets retelling Le Monde (particularly German and French reviews): context on the impact of Donald Trump's policies, Russia's war against Ukraine, and economic competition with the US and China.
4. News digests with links to Le Monde: mentions of the "EU existence in question" narrative in connection with the mood in Berlin.
5. Synthesis of materials from Der Spiegel, Süddeutsche Zeitung and other European publications cited in Le Monde: assessment of the risks of the EU's "quiet disappearance", the "hard core" scenario and the threat of the Union's marginalization.