Syrsky: Russia seeks to produce 1000 "Shaheeds" per day. What does this mean for Ukraine

At a time when Ukrainians are getting used to nightly reports of “dozens of downed drones,” Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi announces another figure — 1000. It is precisely this daily production capacity of Russian Shahed drones that Moscow is striving to reach, which is already, according to Syrskyi, assembling 404 such drones per day. This is not just a statistic — it is a warning that the war is entering a phase of a massive drone industry, where the ability to simultaneously produce, shoot down, and adapt faster than the enemy becomes key.

Geran-2 drones are currently the most common type of Shahed drone used by Russia in attacks on Ukraine. Andreas Stein/picture alliance via Getty Images

What exactly did Syrsky say about "Shaheeds"?

In an interview with the Ukrainian publication LB.ua, which Business Insider refers to, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrsky, stated that according to the Ukrainian side, Russia has already reached the level of production of 404 Shahed-type drones per day and plans to increase this figure to 1000 units daily.¹ This is a line of drones based on Iranian Shahed loitering munitions, but produced in Russia under the names "Geran" and their modifications.

Syrsky emphasized that Russia's ability to mass-produce such drones already allows Moscow to launch 5-6 thousand Shahed-type drones against Ukraine per month, and expanding the daily capacity to 1000 units will significantly increase the Russian Federation's ability to attack "in rows" and carry out large waves of strikes, forming a strategic reserve between large-scale attacks.¹

Current scale: 404 drones per day and up to 6000 per month

Business Insider quotes Syrsky as saying that today Russia is capable of producing 404 Shaheds of various types per day — these are not only strike variants, but also decoy models used to overload air defense systems.¹ They are grouped into a family of delta-wing aircraft modeled after the Iranian Shahed, but with local modifications.

According to the Institute for Science and International Security, also cited by the publication, in December 2025, Russia launched an average of 166 Shahed-type drones per day, which in total gives about 5000–6000 such drones per month.¹ At the same time, analysts emphasize: sometimes the intensity of strikes is reduced not due to a lack of drones, but to accumulate "pools" for the next massive series.

"Geraniums" and "Gerberas": what exactly is Russia attacking?

Russian Shahed-derived drones, according to Business Insider, come in several variants. The most common are the Geran-1 and Geran-2, propeller-driven drones that can reach speeds of around 115 miles per hour (over 180 km/h).¹ They are used as classic barrage munitions for strikes on infrastructure and military targets.

Separately mentioned is the Geran-3, a jet-powered modification that reportedly has a higher speed and a more complex trajectory, making it more difficult to intercept.¹ In addition, Russia produces cheaper decoy models called "Gerbera", which visually and by their signature resemble attack drones, but carry minimal or no explosives. The main purpose of this type is to force air defenses to waste expensive missiles on "empty" targets.

Why "Shaheeds" are so dangerous: the price factor

One of the main arguments in favor of mass production of Shahed-type drones is their relative cheapness. Business Insider reminds us: the cost of one such drone is estimated to be in the range of $20 to $70, which is significantly less than the cost of cruise or ballistic missiles.¹ This allows the Russian side to scale up the production and use of drones as the main tool of "cheap mass pressure" on Ukrainian air defense.

For Ukraine, the main problem here is the asymmetry of costs: to shoot down a cheap drone, an anti-aircraft missile is often used, which can cost many times more, or it is necessary to attract significant air defense resources and units, which distracts them from other areas of the front.¹ That is why Kyiv is actively developing its own drone interceptors and other relatively cheap means of countermeasures.

How Ukraine Responds: Interceptors and “Cheap Air Defense”

Business Insider emphasizes that resource-constrained Ukraine is forced to look for cheaper additions to the classic air defense system: deploying its own small drone interceptors, electronic warfare systems, and mobile fire groups.¹ This allows us to partially compensate for the Russian Federation's price advantage in drone warfare and to save scarce anti-aircraft missiles for more complex targets.

Over the past year, an entire ecosystem of FPV interceptor manufacturers has formed in Ukraine, which can shoot down "Shaheeds" at close range and over less protected areas where there is no dense "umbrella" of Patriot, NASAMS, or IRIS-T systems.¹ In parallel, a surveillance network is being deployed — from radars to acoustic and optical sensors that help detect and track drones along the route.

Russian Experiments: "Shaheeds" with Rockets and Cameras

Business Insider notes that despite a consistently high level of drone use, Russia continues to experiment with their configurations.¹ In particular, there are cases of Shahed-like aircraft being equipped with additional air-to-air missiles, as well as rear-view cameras that allow for analysis of the route, the quality of air defense penetration, and target hits.

Such modernizations have several goals: improving the accuracy and effectiveness of strikes, collecting intelligence on the operation of Ukrainian air defense, and testing concepts where the drone can not only strike static objects, but also potentially interact with other means of destruction or even with enemy drones.¹ This further complicates the task for the Ukrainian side, which must not only shoot down drones, but also adapt its tactics to their new capabilities.

The Balance of Power in Drone Warfare: Quantity vs. Quality

Separately, according to Business Insider, Syrsky assesses the balance of power in the broader "drone race." In his opinion, Russia and Ukraine are now roughly equal in terms of the production of attack drones.¹ Both sides have at different times claimed "superiority" in this segment, but the reality is closer to parity — at least in classic strike drones.

At the same time, Syrsky says, the advantage in quality is on Ukraine's side, especially in the segment of "conventional" drones - due to the fact that Ukrainian developers adapt better to frontline needs and improve equipment faster.¹ He calls optical and fiber-optic systems a problematic point: in this area, Ukraine, according to him, is "only catching up" with the enemy, which affects the quality of signal transmission and resistance to electronic warfare.

Syrsky's statement amid air defense shortage

Business Insider draws attention to the timing of the commander-in-chief's assessment: it came shortly after Volodymyr Zelenskyy publicly spoke about the critical shortage of missiles for Western air defense systems.¹ The president admitted that for some time Ukraine was forced to keep "several systems without missiles," and only recently managed to obtain new ammunition.

This context makes Syrsky's warning about "rates of 1000 Shahed-type missiles per day" even more alarming: if Russia is able to implement such plans, then even very effective air defense systems risk finding themselves in a situation where the number of targets exceeds their capabilities.¹ Therefore, relying on cheaper interceptors and mass solutions for "anti-swarm" defense becomes not just advisable, but necessary.

Why the 1000 drones a day claim can't be ignored

It may be tempting to write off such figures as “maximalist plans” on the Russian side. But the experience of the last two years shows that the Kremlin is capable of relying on long, boring, but large-scale programs — and that is exactly what the drone campaign is.¹ If Russia has already increased production to 404 Shaheds per day, the next step to 1000 is a matter of time, resources, and circumventing sanctions, not imagination.

For Ukraine, this means the need to think ahead: to plan not only how to shoot down the current waves, but also how to modernize air defense, energy, logistics, and urban planning, taking into account the fact that the skies over the country will be saturated with drones for a long time to come.¹ And in this sense, Syrsky's interview is not just a description of the threat, but an invitation to an honest conversation about whether we are ready to build a systemic response to Russia's drone industry, and not just catch it "after the fact" every night.

Sources

1. Business Insider: "Russia is pushing to build 1,000 of its localized Iranian Shahed drones every day, Ukraine's military chief says" — an article with comments by Oleksandr Syrsky on the scale and prospects of Shahed-type production in the Russian Federation, the balance in the drone war, and Ukraine's reaction.