Sanctions 2025: Hunting for tankers deprives Russia of $1,1 billion every month

ExclusiveNew US and EU sanctions in 2025 hit Russia’s “shadow fleet” — a network of old tankers that circumvents G7 restrictions. Blocking hundreds of vessels and pressuring key traders has already cut Moscow’s export revenues by more than $1 billion a month.

According to estimates by the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE), in November 2024, monthly oil revenues fell by $1,1 billion to $14,6 billion [1][2], and the downward trend continued in 2025.

How it works

After the start of full-scale aggression, the West restricted the sale of Russian oil, setting a price ceiling of $60/barrel.

In response, Moscow formed a "shadow fleet" — hundreds of tankers under "convenient" flags, with hidden ownership and dubious insurance schemes.

If in 2021 about 13% of Russia's sea exports passed through such channels, then in 2025 it will be up to 47% [3].

In 2025, restrictions hit energy and logistics, and a ban on imports of Russian LNG was announced from 2027.

In total, over 500 vessels have already come under international restrictions [4].

In parallel, OFAC tightened US sanctions, including expanding restrictions on Rosneft and Lukoil [5].

Together, these steps have made access to insurance, port infrastructure, and settlements more difficult — and forced the market to demand a discount to Urals.

Where did the oil billions disappear to?

KSE estimates Russia's oil revenues at $189 billion in 2024 [2].

At the beginning of 2025, they were still rising (January — $15,8 billion/month), but the effect of the sanctions became apparent at the end of 2024, when revenues decreased to $14,6 billion/month (minus $1,1 billion).

The key channels of pressure are more expensive logistics, insurance restrictions, and the discount to Brent that the market imposes due to the increased risks of “shadow” transportation. [2][3] Without full insurance, the “shadow fleet” transported about 3,7 million barrels per day in September 2025 [6] — that is, the overwhelming share of Russia’s seaborne exports.

Bypass schemes: from STS to “digital corridors”

The basis of bypass routes remains ship-to-ship (STS) operations: tankers of various levels meet in neutral waters and “transfer” oil from ship to ship, making it difficult to trace the origin.

According to CREA, in September 2025, the volume of such operations in EU waters was about €91 million per day — 44% less than in August [7].

It is known that the Russian Federation has invested $10–15 billion in purchasing old tankers through networks of intermediaries; the average age of such a fleet is over 20 years, often with or without fake insurance [8][3].

Geography: Baltic, North Sea, Mediterranean

After the autumn restrictions, some traffic shifted to the North Sea.

According to Lloyd's List Intelligence, dozens of ships have been re-registered under "neutral" flags, allowing them to continue sailing outside the direct control of the EU [9].

As before, Greek shipowners remain an important barometer. According to Windward.ai, they accounted for 37–40% of Russia’s seaborne exports in mid-2025. After the tightening of restrictions, some operators withdrew their participation, but a return to individual routes was also recorded when the Urals fell below the price ceiling, making the transport formally permissible again [10][11].

Macro picture of the Russian Federation: official “stability” and real pressure

The IMF predicts that Russia’s GDP will grow by about 0,6% and inflation will be around 9% by 2025. [12][13] Formally, this is “stability.”

However, the situation is different for households: energy, food, and transportation have increased in price by 20% or more, and incomes are not keeping up with prices.

The ruble's purchasing power outside Moscow is even weaker.

Market reaction and next steps

After Lukoil was added to the SDN list, some Chinese state traders stopped new contracts, signaling to the market the increased risks of secondary and tertiary sanctions [14].

European institutions are preparing new packages against third-country intermediaries, and this could reduce supplies to Asia as early as 2026 [3][14].

Long-term risk — ecology

Old tankers, unsupervised STS operations, and difficult routes all increase the risk of a major accident. Experts warn of dangers in the Baltic and North Seas: a single major spill could surpass the Prestige disaster (2002) [8].

A mechanism that works without authors

Sanctions have one property: they outlive their authors.

What began as a political tool became an economic force in its own right.

For Moscow, this is not a temporary "inconvenience" but a new norm: risk and reputation weigh more than a ton of oil.

According to Benjamin Hilgenstock (KSE Institute): “Coalition countries should continue to sanction shadow tankers until the shadow fleet is history” — DW, 13.01.2025 [15]

The sanctions machine is already operating without names — and stopping it will be more difficult than starting it.

Maurice K for Newsky © 2025

Sources

[1] Business Insider - 02/03/2025

[2] KSE — 11.03.2025

[3] Foreign Policy - 09/25/2025

[4] European Commission - 23.10.2025

[5] US Treasury (OFAC) - 22.10.2025

[6] Kpler — 10/21/2025

[7] CREA — 17.10.2025

[8] The New York Times - 09/21/2025

[9] Lloyd's List Intelligence - 21.10.2025

[10] Windward.ai — 03.07.2025

[11] gCaptain — 08/29/2025

[12] The Moscow Times (IMF) - 14.10.2025

[13] Intellinews (IMF) - 15.10.2025

[14] RFE/RL — 25.10.2025

[15] DW — 13.01.2025