Sanctions impasse in Brussels: why Paris and Bratislava are saving the Kremlin's wallets

A dangerous precedent is unfolding in the wings of the Council of the European Union: diplomats have once again failed to extend personal restrictions against the aggressor, exposing the unity of the continent to blackmail by oligarchic lobbyists on the eve of the September 15 deadline.

Diplomatic battles in Brussels usually take place behind tightly closed doors, where hard-line geopolitical interests and transnational capitals hide behind the dry wording of a communiqué. However, the events of Friday's meeting of the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the EU member states (Coreper) revealed what European politicians would prefer to keep quiet about in public. Ambassadors of the 27 member states of the European Union have once again reached an impasse and failed to agree on another extension of personal sanctions against Russian individuals and entities, introduced in response to the Kremlin's armed aggression against Ukraine ¹ . The situation has become critical not only because of the approaching deadline of September 15, at midnight of which the current sanctions regime legally loses its force, but also because of the unexpected configuration of forces that blocked a joint decision.

If earlier such demarches were perceived as isolated blackmail by the pro-Russian leadership of Hungary or Slovakia, now the diplomatic landscape has undergone a noticeable deformation. Paris has unexpectedly emerged alongside the government of Robert Fico. According to the testimony of relevant European observers, Bratislava insists on the immediate exclusion of Russian oligarchs Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman from the blacklist. However, now the dispute has acquired unprecedented sharpness: France has joined the demand to lift the restrictions on Usmanov ¹ . This step has jeopardized the legitimacy of the entire EU sanctions architecture, forcing diplomats to schedule an emergency round of negotiations for Monday — literally a few hours before the legal collapse of the restrictions.

Brussels Time Rush: Anatomy of the Backstage Crisis of September 11

The procedure for updating the EU’s individual sanctions lists, launched in 2014 and radically expanded after the full-scale invasion of 2022, remains hostage to the consensus rule. More than 2700 individuals and entities — from top generals, Kremlin propagandists and collaborators to key steel, financial and energy magnates — are subject to European asset freezes and travel bans. However, this register is not permanent. According to Article 31 of the Treaty on European Union, any extension or amendment of restrictive measures under the Common Foreign and Security Policy requires absolute unanimity from all capitals every six months — in March and September . ²

This norm has long since become a tool of geopolitical bargaining. For over a year, the diplomatic corps of most of the continent’s states has been trying in vain to change the procedure by moving the prolongation regime from a 6-month to a 12-month cycle — similar to the way general economic sectoral sanctions against the energy or financial sectors of the Russian Federation are continued. An annual cycle would deprive the process of excessive vulnerability and make it impossible for regular attempts at toxic revisionism. However, it is precisely those states that are accustomed to trading with the veto that are blocking the change in the regulations, retaining for themselves the lever of regular pressure every six months.

During the meeting on September 11, the ambassadors were supposed to formalize the standard rollover procedure — a technical extension of the register. Instead, the discussion degenerated into personal bargaining. Sources in European diplomatic circles note that Bratislava's resistance was an expected scenario, as Robert Fico's government tried to "knock out" indulgences for those on the list during the spring review on March 14. However, France's resolute joining in lobbying Alisher Usmanov's interests came as a shock to its Northern European and Baltic partners, who view any concessions to Putin's sanctioned wallets as a direct capitulation to Moscow's hybrid expansion.

Oligarchic tandem: who are Usmanov and Fridman for the Kremlin system?

To understand the scale and toxicity of what is happening in Brussels, it is necessary to take a closer look at the figures around whom European spears are breaking. Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman represent different but fundamental segments of Putin's kleptocratic model, which for years has fueled the war machine and ensured the financial stability of the authoritarian regime in the face of unprecedented pressure from the West.

Alisher Usmanov, whose fortune was estimated by international financial agencies at tens of billions of dollars, is officially qualified in the decisions of the EU Council as a person with particularly close ties to Vladimir Putin and plays the role of one of his most important trusted financiers ² . Controlling assets in metallurgy (“Metalloinvest”), telecommunications (“Megafon”) and the IT sector through the USM holding, Usmanov systematically served the Kremlin’s strategic priorities. The holding’s mining and metallurgical enterprises supply raw materials for enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex, and the extensive digital and media infrastructure was used to strengthen state propaganda and digital surveillance of Russian society. In addition, Usmanov headed the International Fencing Federation (FIE) for many years, spending hundreds of millions of euros to establish the Russian sports lobby in Europe and the world.

Mikhail Fridman, a native of Lviv and co-founder of the financial and industrial empire Alfa Group and the LetterOne holding company, has long tried to build an image of a “cosmopolitan private banker” distanced from the Kremlin’s military adventure. However, analytical structures and Ukrainian investigative bodies have repeatedly emphasized that it was Alfa Bank that provided credit lines to Russian defense enterprises, and the insurance company AlfaStrakhovanie provided insurance services to the structures of the Russian National Guard and the Russian Ministry of Defense. Moreover, Fridman’s attempts to obtain the removal of personal restrictions through offers of large investments in Ukraine or appeals to British elites failed, without finding moral and legal justification.

The inclusion of these individuals in the sanctions registers in February-March 2022 was intended to undermine the resource base of Putin's entourage. Any reverse step today means not only returning the oligarchs access to frozen assets, accounts in European banks, and luxury real estate on the Cote d'Azur and in Bavaria, but also creating a dangerous hole in the transatlantic sanctions front.

The Fico Factor: Why Slovakia is Playing Russian Roulette

Bratislava's position did not arise out of thin air. Since Robert Fico's return to the post of Prime Minister of Slovakia, the country's government has embarked on a gradual dismantling of solidarity with Kyiv and a drift towards so-called pragmatic cynicism. Bratislava, which is critically dependent on Russian energy supplies, has long used European institutions for blackmail, trying to negotiate preferences in oil and gas imports.

In the matter of protecting Russian oligarchs, the Slovak trail has a clear lobbying background. According to investigators and OSINT analysts, pressure in favor of Usmanov was exerted through a complex network of political and economic contacts in Central Asia and Turkey, where the oligarch retained enormous influence and capital after moving to Uzbekistan. Usmanov managed to attract high-level lobbyists in a number of Eastern European capitals, appealing to his "humanitarian projects", investment potential and the alleged lack of direct connection to military operations.

Slovakia has already demonstrated similar tactics during the debate round in September 2025 and in March of this year. At that time, Bratislava also issued ultimatums, demanding the removal of Fridman and Usmanov from the lists, while simultaneously expressing claims regarding oil supplies via the Druzhba ² pipeline . At that time, coordinated pressure from 25 other EU members and tacit diplomatic intervention from Washington allowed the status quo to be maintained. However, the lack of a tough political reaction from the European Commission leadership convinced Fico’s cabinet that such blackmail practices would go unpunished.

The French Turn: Behind the Scenes of Paris and the Interests of the Elites

The main dangerous sensation of the current meeting was precisely the change in France's vector. If the demarches of Fico or Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban have long been included in Brussels' risk scenarios, then the support of the oligarch by Paris has caused a real tectonic shift in the perception of European unity. Official Paris, which publicly declares leadership in supporting Ukraine's defense and declares the inadmissibility of Putin's victory, in closed halls advocates for an amnesty for the personal fortunes of Putin's richest tycoon.

To understand the reasons for this metamorphosis, it is necessary to look at the structure of French interests and the legal context:

First, a significant part of the luxury real estate, yachts and business structures associated with Usmanov and his inner circle were historically located in the French Republic. Legal proceedings in France to challenge the seizure of property (including estates in Paris and villas on the Cote d'Azur) are accompanied by colossal legal costs and the involvement of the country's most expensive law firms with connections in French politics.

Secondly, the factor of Paris' geoeconomic interests in Central Asia cannot be dismissed. Usmanov has a deep influence on the political and economic leadership of Uzbekistan, a country with which France, under Emmanuel Macron, is actively developing a strategic partnership in the extraction of critical raw materials, in particular uranium for the needs of French nuclear energy. In Tashkent, Usmanov's fate is perceived very sensitively, and his financial and political patronage in the region has been used as a bargaining chip in large international contracts for years.

Third, some French lawyers cite controversial precedents at the EU Court of Justice in Luxembourg. Oligarchs are spending tens of millions of euros on litigation, trying to prove that the criteria for their listing in 2022 are legally outdated, or that the European External Action Service (EEAS) has not updated the evidence base properly. The fear that the EU Court of Justice may overturn sanctions due to formal procedural errors is often used by individual diplomats as a convenient excuse to abandon the fight on their own, under the guise of “protecting the rule of law.”

Legal war in Luxembourg: how oligarchs are hitting the sanctions armor

The Luxembourg courts have become a second, less visible, but no less fierce front in the confrontation between Europe and Russian financial clans. During the years of the Great War, almost every Russian tycoon has filed a lawsuit against the EU Council demanding that the imposition of sanctions be declared illegal. Until recently, this line of defense was restrained by fundamental decisions. In particular, the court's precedent-setting verdict in the case of Roman Abramovich clearly established that even if a businessman does not formally make decisions about launching missiles, the presence of significant assets in sectors of the Russian economy that generate significant income for the Russian budget is a sufficient legal basis for a sanctions ban ².

But the Kremlin’s beneficiaries have changed tactics. They no longer try to prove their commitment to Western democracy; instead, their lawyers have focused on finding flaws in the EU Council’s motivations. In cases where European officials copied outdated media articles without citing up-to-date financial intelligence, a court in Luxembourg has ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, overturning the old decisions. This is what the supporters of the exclusion of Usmanov and Fridman are now manipulating, arguing that the sanctions will be “swept away in court” anyway.

However, such an argument is deeply manipulative. The EU Council has all the legal tools to review and supplement the evidence base with new facts obtained by financial intelligence and think tanks. Giving in to the demands of Bratislava and Paris without exhausting legal protection creates a disastrous precedent: any Russian billionaire will receive a signal that instead of lengthy legal red tape, it is enough to hire the necessary lobbyists in one or two EU capitals and paralyze the mechanism of European consensus.

The Price of Compromise: Implications for Ukraine and International Security

If EU ambassadors fail to find a compromise formula by September 15, the European community will face an unprecedented legal and political crisis. The scenarios for Monday's developments are extremely dramatic, and each of them comes with a high price:

Scenario 1: Complete capitulation to the demands of the blackmailers. If the EU Council goes the route of removing Usmanov or Fridman from the list in order to continue sanctions against the remaining 2700 people, this will deal a devastating reputational blow to Brussels. This de facto legitimizes the thesis that personal sanctions against the Russian elite are temporary, opportunistic, and subject to bargaining. Dozens of other tycoons, from Oleg Deripaska to the Rotenberg brothers, will follow suit and demand exclusion.

Scenario 2: Collapse of the sanctions regime through veto. The most devastating, though less likely, option. If Slovakia or France do not fundamentally lift their objections, and other countries (Poland, the Baltics, the Netherlands) refuse to remove the oligarchs from the register, the sanctions regime could expire at midnight on September 15. This would unfreeze tens of billions of euros in assets of Russian oligarchs and businesses across Europe, which would immediately begin to be transferred to neutral jurisdictions.

Scenario 3: Tactical postponement or technical compromise. The most typical practice of Brussels diplomacy: extending sanctions for a short transitional period (e.g., one or two months) for additional legal consultations or keeping the oligarchs on the list with corrected wording in exchange for non-public concessions to Slovakia in other sectors (e.g., customs or energy issues).

For Ukraine, any retreat by Brussels on the issue of sanctions is unacceptable. In conditions when the aggressor daily directs hundreds of drones and missiles at Ukrainian cities, every attempt to remove Russian financial elites from under attack is perceived by Ukrainian society and the front as a blatant betrayal of common values. The real effectiveness of sanction pressure lies not only in limiting the aggressor's current budget revenues, but also in creating an unwavering sense of inevitability of responsibility for the entire Putin establishment.

Sources

1. Ukrainian Truth / European Truth: EU Ambassadors Failed to Extend Sanctions Against Russia Due to Opposition from Slovakia and France, September 2026
2. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty: Reviews and investigations of EU diplomatic processes on updating sanctions lists, 2025–2026
3. Official Journal of the European Union: Council Regulations concerning restrictive measures in view of the Russian Federation's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine
4. Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU): Case law and decisions on challenges to personal sanctions (Abramovich, Usmanov and others cases)
5. Council of the European Union: Official reports and procedural documents of the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper II)