The Russian economy is falling into reality

Exclusive. The Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (CMAKP) reported at the end of 2023 — the beginning of 2024 about a decrease in exports and production activity in industry and construction. From the fall of 2023, industrial production actually does not grow: in the fourth quarter, indicators decreased by 0,1% compared to the third, and in January by 0,3% compared to December.

At the same time, everything stagnates: extractive processing industries, construction, retail trade, cargo turnover (in particular, Russian Railways plunged into a crisis of the scale of the 90s) and the demand for labor. Which, in general, is not surprising, since all industry in Russia is gradually becoming military, and the rest is disappearing - from the economy, and, in general, out of necessity.

However, the official data on the level of production of the Russian military-industrial complex are catastrophically at odds with reality. The reason is attribution. Here's how it looks on a simple example (this topic is actively discussed on professional forums).

For example, the company receives an order for 100 tanks. In fact, this is a whole complex of enterprises that can nod to each other and cover each other, but this is a separate topic.

They received the order, and, most importantly, the money in advance, assessed the bottlenecks, found out, for example, that there are not enough engines and gun barrels. They ordered equipment, or ready-made components, if they can be imported, from China.

Until the order has arrived, they begin to work in three shifts on those components where it is possible to increase the volume, riveting, for example, the reducer of the rotary mechanism of the tower. Why are they riveting at a faster pace? Because it is necessary to report on the development of resources, the increase in the number of jobs, and the growth of production.

In the meantime, the ordered equipment was brought, but it is not possible to start it, there is a lack of it, and the Chinese are not coming to help. The defect is acted as a semi-finished product that needs to be refined to a normal state, a rejected card is drawn up, evaluated, losses are written off as losses. Things that can be repaired, at least in theory, are sent to the warehouse. That is where they send a reserve of suitable parts that can be put into operation when the rest of the components are made or brought to mind.

Now pay attention: the reducer, for example, is 5% of the total cost of the tank (the figure is arbitrary, just for example). 20 reducers cost the same as a tank. But only at cost. However, according to the documents, a pile of parts of varying degrees of suitability will eventually pass as 100 produced tanks.
At the same time, there will be, let's say, 30 real "more or less tanks". They will also have a lot of defects and shortcomings, but if you work correctly with the reception, then they can be steamrolled by the Ministry of Defense. By cannibalization, 30 of these 10 tanks will be assembled at the front. But this is no longer a problem for the enterprise, which reported on the successful completion of the defense order, raised the wages of workers and IT workers, gave out bonuses, and rewarded the directors and invited them to sleep in the hall at Putin's message. This deception and self-deception is almost impossible to expose, since it is covered with layers of secrecy, and in several layers.

Of course, sooner or later the deception will be revealed. Manufacturers rely on time and the Armed Forces. Some of the defective products still limp to the front and will be destroyed, and all the defects are buried with them. It will be possible to finish a part of it to a minimum working condition on rembases, and also spend it in battle. Part of the breakdowns can be explained by objective reasons. No one will ever rake this entire massif, and time is running out. People and products change — both at the top and at the bottom. Chess is being changed, the donkeys, whom they promised to teach speak, will die, and the pro-military Khoja Nasreddiny will be promoted...

This is how the entire military production of Russia is organized. By the way, it worked in the same way during the late USSR. And not very late either. And even when in the USSR they were shot for vandalism and sabotage, and prodtalons replaced money, it worked exactly the same way. At least to a very large extent. Let's say, out of 100 conventional tanks, 10 could be operational, but 70, but only at the peak of repression. And still not 100 out of 100.

Sergey Ilchenko, deputy editor Newsky