Russia sells 108 million tons of oil to China: a humiliating U-turn for Moscow

When Moscow is forced to trade raw materials for pennies, and Beijing dictates the terms

Imagine giant tankers gliding across the Pacific Ocean, carrying Russian oil to Chinese ports at below-market prices. This is not fantasy, but reality in 2025: Russia, once a proud supplier of high-tech goods, now exports to China mostly raw materials – oil, gas, coal. The volumes are staggering: more than 108 million tons of oil in 2024, but at a discount that makes the deal profitable only for Beijing.¹ This U-turn is not just an economic maneuver – it is a symbol of dependence, where the Kremlin loses not only money but also strategic sovereignty. Why did this happen? And what awaits both sides ahead?

Oil exports soar: from sanctions to records

Since 2022, after Western sanctions, Russian oil exports to China have increased rapidly. In 2024, China imported more than 108 million tons - 30% more than before the full-scale invasion.¹ This surpassed previous records: China became the largest buyer of Russian crude oil, providing 47% of all of Moscow's seaborne exports.³ In September 2025, China bought 42% of all Russian energy, worth 5,5 billion euros, where oil accounted for 59% - 3,2 billion.³

But the growth is not without its challenges. In the first half of 2025, oil imports fell by 11% in volume and 24% in value due to new US sanctions on maritime shipping and falling global prices.² Russia's share of Chinese supplies has fallen to 17,5%, the lowest level in two years.² Beijing is diversifying suppliers: imports from other countries increased by 4,5%.² The discount on Russian oil has widened, making it attractive to Chinese refineries but unprofitable for Moscow.

In October 2025, crude oil exports reached a record 1,99 million barrels per day, with China as the second largest customer at 1,2 million barrels.⁴ However, there are congestions in the ports: 9 tankers were waiting to be unloaded in China in early November.⁴ Sanctions complicate logistics, forcing Russia to use a “shadow fleet” – old ships under the flags of convenient jurisdictions.

Gas and coal: successes with limitations

The gas sector is also developing. With the launch of Power of Siberia-1 in 2019, pipeline gas exports to China are increasing, reaching full capacity of 38 billion cubic meters per year by the end of 2025.¹ In September, China bought gas worth 658 million euros – 12% of Russian energy exports.³ LNG imports have tripled since 2019, reaching 8,3 million tons in 2024, and jumped 37% in September 2025.¹³

Coal shows stagnation. Exports to China increased in 2023 due to the loss of European markets, but fell in 2024 due to Chinese production growth.¹ Since December 2022, China has purchased 43% of all Russian coal, worth 784 million euros in September 2025.³ In the first half of the year, imports fell by $1,5 billion.²

These figures highlight the vulnerability: China is a key buyer, but its domestic production and diversification are holding back growth.¹

Trade asymmetry: raw materials in exchange for technology

Trade between Russia and China is fundamentally unequal. Russia exported raw materials – oil, gas, coal, ores – worth $68,68 billion in 2021, mostly mineral fuels worth $45,69 billion.⁶ In 2025, China exported $8,51 billion worth of machinery, cars, and electronics to Russia in October.⁷ Russia accounts for only 3% of Chinese exports and 5% of imports.⁵

This is a complete reversal from the 2000s, when Moscow sold high-value-added goods to China.⁵ Now the Kremlin is selling what it extracts from the ground and buying what it cannot produce. Oil and gas provide a third of Russia's budget, but China buys at a discount, knowing there are no alternatives.⁵

In the first half of 2025, trade decreased by 9,6% due to a drop in energy imports of $6,3 billion.² In return, China supplies $1,9 billion in “dual-use” goods – key to the war, despite Western restrictions.²

Russia's Economy in 2025: Stagnation or Militarization?

The Russian economy is teetering between stagnation and militarization. Dependence on China supports production but not innovation. Energy exports are concentrated: China dominates in oil and coal, Turkey in products, the EU remains the leader in LNG.³ In January-June 2025, trade fell, but China is financing the war through imports.²

This is humiliating for Moscow: the loss of Europe has forced it to look for Asian markets at a discount. Beijing, avoiding the “Power of Siberia-2”, keeps the initiative.¹ Russia is trying to expand its share, but China is diversifying, keeping Russia at 17-20% of imports.²⁵

Geopolitical implications: dependency as the new norm

This dynamic is changing the global landscape. China is gaining strength as an energy hub, Russia as a raw material appendage. Sanctions have accelerated the reorientation, but have increased the asymmetry. For Ukraine, this is a signal: Western pressure is working, reducing the aggressor's income.²³ Moscow spends energy dollars on war, but in the long run it weakens without diversification.

New challenges lie ahead: possible tightening of sanctions, price fluctuations, China's green transformation. Russia is looking for markets in India (38% of oil), but China remains the core.³

The future of partnership: chances for balance?

Can Russia escape the raw materials trap? Investment in technology is needed, but war and sanctions are holding back. China, seeking stability, may expand imports, but on its own terms. “Power of Siberia-2” with 50 billion cubic meters is a test of trust.¹ So far, Moscow is in the role of a junior partner, selling cheaply what once cost a lot.

Sources

1. OSW: China-Russia Dashboard
2. Kina Centrum: China-Russia trade in early 2025
3. Energy and Clean Air: September 2025 analysis of Russian fossil fuel exports
4. S&P Global: Russian crude exports hit record high in Oct
5. Atlantic Council: The Russian economy in 2025
6. Trading Economics: Russia's Exports to China
7. OEC: Russia (RUS) and China (CHN) Trade