After the defeat: reverse report for PCM/RPCM

Exclusive. In Moldova, the ringing of bells has long been a background for political games. Where prayers are usually read, suddenly they started talking about elections, European integration and geopolitics. The pulpit and sermon ceased to be only a spiritual instrument — they turned into an arena of struggle for the minds and votes of voters. Orthodox Church of Moldova (hereinafter PCM), the largest in the country, was at the center of a scandal: some priests called for the preservation of "traditions" and criticized Maya Sandu's pro-European course, while others joined of the Romanian metropolis, protesting against the pro-Russian line. A tense triangle arose between faith, politics and external influence, which poses the question to society: where does the border between spiritual mission and manipulation pass?

The Orthodox Church of Moldova (PCM), formally autonomous, but included in composition of the Moscow Patriarchate, again found herself at the center of a high-profile investigation — this time due to interference in the election process.

The police of Moldova, as reported by NewsMaker, are investigating several cases when, according to the investigation, clergy campaigned during the parliamentary elections and openly supported certain political parties. The incidents occurred between July 14 and September 28, 2025 — precisely at the height of the election campaign. Some of these appeals were not sounded anywhere, but from the pulpit: during Easter services, when the congregation is offered to listen to the word of God, and not calls to vote "for those who preserve Orthodoxy and traditional values" and "do not support the western way." The police emphasize that such actions, even if they were expressed in a veiled form, violate the legislative principle of separation of the church from politics.

Reuters journalists in their investigation, published shortly after the election, claim that the Russian Orthodox Church as a whole played a significant role in political processes in Moldova. According to the agency, Moscow church structures used informational and organizational resources to strengthen pro-Russian forces in the country, including local parishes, "oriented to preserve spiritual ties with Russia." These information fit into the broader concerns previously expressed by Moldovan and European observers: the church sermon can serve as a channel of soft power, where the word about faith turns into an instrument of influence.

The authorities of Moldova are reacting cautiously. The representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that the state does not seek to "persecut the church", but is obliged to protect the elections from illegal agitation. "When spiritual service turns into a political campaign, we are obliged to act according to the law. The church must be outside the party struggle, otherwise faith becomes an instrument of power," he noted.

In the summer, President Maia Sandu warned about Shvabrostan's interference in the elections, calling it "multi-level" - from financing parties to using religious channels of influence. After all, "the Russian Federation wants to establish control over the Republic of Moldova from the fall and is preparing an unprecedented interference in the parliamentary elections," she said.

In conditions where the church remains one of the most authoritative institutions in the country, any word uttered from the pulpit may turn out to be political. After all, according to a survey by the Center for Social Studies IDIS Viitorul, more than 60% of Moldovan citizens trust the church more than any other public structures. This trust turns the spiritual tribune into a force with which politicians are forced to reckon — and which those who seek to control not only the bodies but also the souls of voters are increasingly trying to use.

Experts emphasize that The influence of the PCM is not limited to direct appeals to vote. It is more subtle - in images, symbols, in the very intonation of sermons, where Europe is mentioned as "temptation", and Moscow - as the guardian of faith. In an interview with Radio Free Europe, political scientist Igor Botsan noted: "The Moscow Patriarchate remains an important conduit of the ideas of the "Russian world" in Moldova. This is not always agitation, this is the formation of a picture of the world in which Russia is presented as a defender of Orthodoxy, and the West is a threat to spiritual identity."

The investigation is ongoing. It is possible that the court will not issue indictment sentences, and not a single priest will be convicted. But the very fact that the police are forced to understand the sermons shows that the spiritual space has become a field of political struggle. I Today, Moldova is not the only arena where faith turns into an instrument of external influence.

In recent years, similar schemes have been observed throughout the post-Soviet space.

In Ukraine, the Moscow Patriarchate lost a significant part of its flock, but until 2022 its parishes often became platforms for spreading narratives about a "brotherly people" and a "unified spiritual civilization."

In Georgia and Serbia, church structures close to Moscow often oppose the Euro-Atlantic integration of their countries, defending so called "traditional values"in unison with Kremlin propaganda. The same formula is repeated everywhere: faith is used as a language through which Moscow talks about power, identity and the imperial past.

The Moldovan case is therefore especially indicative that here the front line is not on the map, but in the mind — between the cross and the Kremlin, between prayer and manipulation. And when the pastor's word turns into a slogan, the question is not only about breaking the law, but about who exactly today determines where faith ends and politics begins.

If the events of the pre-election period showed concrete cases of the church's intervention in the political process, then behind them there is a deeper layer - the systemic interrelationship of religious preaching and geopolitical orientation. What appeared in the statements of individual priests is not an accident, but a symptom: a manifestation of the long dependence of the spiritual space of Moldova on the ideological winds blowing from the east.

Over the past few years, the key claims voiced in the press and expert circles have been reduced to two lines.

The first is worldview solidarity with Russia's foreign policy course. Individual hierarchs and abbots of the PCM, speaking at public events or in the church mass media, often repeat motives consistent with the Kremlin's interpretation of the war in Ukraine. In their words there is an apology for the "liberation of the fraternal people", a warning against the "corrupting West", and even doubts about the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state. These phrases are not always uttered from the pulpit - sometimes they are hidden in the words of defense of "traditional values" and "sacred unity of Orthodox peoples". However, in essence it is the same old formula: Moscow is the Third Rome, and everything else is a departure from truth.

Such statements, penetrating the public consciousness, form a specific moral optics: war ceases to be a crime, but becomes a crusade for spiritual purification. Thus, the Church, albeit unintentionally, participates in the redefinition of the concept - when aggression is called a mission, and resistance to evil turns into a rebellion against the "higher plan".

The second claim is structural dependence of PCM on Moscow, despite the declared autonomy. Her canonical connection with Patriarch Gundyaev remains unbreakable, and this influence is felt not only in liturgical practice, but also in the information field. The sermons of the Moscow chief are regularly broadcast in Moldovan parishes, his appeals are published in church publications and distributed in the social networks of clergymen.

For believers, who are far from the church hierarchy, it looks natural - as part of the common Orthodox space. But for analysts and observers, these connections have long become a matter of concern: the PCM, remaining in the orbit of the Moscow patriarchate, unwittingly (?) serves as a channel for the transit of ideological impulses that Moscow uses as an element of its "soft power". As a result, Moldova finds itself in a situation where religious identity becomes a field of external pressure. Here, the border between pastoral care and propaganda is not erased in one moment — it is blurred by words, images, and habits. And when the Moscow images of "spiritual brotherhood" are intertwined with internal fears and social wounds, a new form of dependence arises - not economic or military, but mental.

However, the internal tension around the PCM is determined not only by its ties with Moscow, but also by the clash of worldviews within Moldova itself.

In recent years, the church question has become a mirror of a deep cultural and political split: between the pro-Romanian, pro-Western course of the country and the conservative, pro-Russian one an idea of ​​her spiritual mission.

According to its critics, the activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party is often perceived as a counterweight to European integration, as an attempt to keep Moldova in the orbit of "Russian world" under the benevolent guise of concern for "traditional values". In this context, religion becomes not just a system of belief, but a factor of geopolitical choice.

It is not surprising that more and more clerics and communities are leaving the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate, moving to the Bessarabian Metropolis, subordinate to the Romanian Orthodox Church. This process is not only canonical, but also symbolic: a gesture of spiritual disagreement with the political orientation of the PCM. For many priests, this is a way to emphasize their belonging to the European cultural space and to distance themselves from the imperial images that have become an integral part of the propaganda of the Moscow Patriarchate.

Modern Moldovan mass media, primarily publications with a pro-Western or pro-Romanian orientation, actively record these transitions and endow them with meaning - as a manifestation of internal resistance and the desire for spiritual independence. Thus, the newspaper Ziarul de Gardă wrote that the church's dependence on Moscow "turns the pulpit into a channel of political influence."

The management of the PCM, however, rejects such accusations. In the official statements of the metropolis, it is emphasized that the mission of the Church is "exclusively pastoral, without political passions", and the accusations of "serving the Kremlin" are "part of an anti-religious and politically motivated campaign." However, in the eyes of society, these arguments no longer seem convincing. The ecclesiastical vocabulary and political intonation merged too clearly to make one believe in their independence from each other. On the pages of the Moldovan press, materials are appearing more and more often, accusing the Ukrainian Communist Party of a systematic demand to slow down European integration and weaken support for the current government.

Among the most discussed episodes are direct sermons against Maya Sandu and her party Action and Solidarity (PAS). Several priests, as reported by NewsMaker and TV8, used the church pulpit to promote ideas in which the European choice of the country represented a threat to "traditional values" and "holy Orthodoxy." In the sermons, there were words about the "disintegration of the family", "western immorality" and even about the "imposed ideology of godlessness". Similar statements, in fact, reproduced the old clichés of Russian propaganda, but now - in cassocks and under the dome of churches.

President Maia Sandu, responding to these accusations, spoke directly. In one of the interviews, she emphasized: "Russia is trying to use the church as an instrument of influence, spreading disinformation through it and manipulating people's fears." This phrase, repeatedly quoted in the local mass media, became a symbol of a new confrontation - between religious authority and secular power, between dogma and democracy.

In parallel with this, criticism of the PCM as a channel for spreading disinformation intensified. The authorities and analysts noted that in sermons and church publications, rumors began to circulate about "persecution of the church" allegedly being prepared by the pro-European government, and even statements that joining the EU was "incompatible with the Orthodox faith." These statements, which quickly spread through parishes and social networks, turned out to be a very effective tool for influencing the rural and elderly population, where the priest's influence is traditionally stronger than that of any deputy.

The reaction of the authorities and the public turned out to be extremely sensitive. The Ministry of Internal Affairs emphasized that any violations of the law, even disguised as a pastoral word, will be investigated in strict accordance with the electoral legislation. At the same time, the Central Election Commission (CEC) monitored the observance of the principle of neutrality of religious institutions, and President Sandu repeatedly warned about the risks of foreign influence through religious channels.

The international context was also of particular importance. The European Union, observing the Moldovan political scene, drew attention to cases when the church was used as a mediator of pro-Russian narratives. EU and OSCE analysts emphasized that such practices undermine trust in democratic institutions and create the potential for destabilization within the country. In the statements of international observers, it was repeatedly stated: the spiritual space can serve as a channel of "soft power", and Moldova is an example of how cultural and religious institutions are used for political pressure from the outside.

Against this background, the media reaction was animated and polarized. Publications with a pro-Western and pro-Romanian orientation interpreted the actions of the PCM as a direct threat to national security and the sovereignty of the state. At the same time, the church leadership defended the apolitical nature of its mission, arguing that the charges are part of a politically motivated campaign against the Church. Such a conflict between state bodies, the media and the church hierarchy demonstrates how thin and complex the border between spiritual power and political influence has become in modern Moldova. As a result, the events of the last elections and the referendum showed that the PCM functions simultaneously as a religious institution and a factor of public and political pressure.

Nevertheless, despite the active participation of a part of the clergy in actions against Maya Sandu and her course, the results of the series of elections in 2024-25 and the referendum demonstrated that the pro-European vector in Moldova retains significant support, especially among the young generation and the diaspora. However, as Moldovan mass media and experts note, the influence of the PCM on domestic politics remains an important factor that should be taken into account when assessing threats to national security. The events of the last few months have shown that the church continues to be not just a spiritual institution, but also a serious player in the political field of the country, capable of influencing public opinion and shaping the political climate.

An equally important claim against PCM concerns a possible connection with financing from Moscow. Although the direct financial dependence of the PCM was not proven, President Sandu stated that the terrorist state from Eurasia allocates significant funds to interfere in the elections, which can go through a "branched network of proxies." According to the fears of the authorities, among these mediators there could be individual representatives of the clergy, which made the church a potential channel of subversive influence on political processes.

Thus, the combination of pseudo-preaching and suspicious financial support created a unique mechanism of influence: the moral authority of priests could be used to shape the political preferences of voters, which became a serious challenge for democratic institutions and the country's pro-European course.

An analysis of the events of recent years clearly shows that the Orthodox Church of Moldova (OCM), continuing to be part of the Moscow Patriarchate, plays the role of not only a spiritual institution, but also a significant political actor in the country. Her interference in the elections, especially during the presidential campaign and the referendum on joining the EU, became the subject of public and international attention.

The PCM (ROCCM) remains the country's largest religious organization, but its political engagement, participation in electoral processes, and internal divisions emphasize that the spiritual sphere of Moldova today is closely intertwined with issues of national identity, foreign policy, and security. It is obvious that the future of the Moldovan church, its role in public life and its ability to maintain independence from external influences will remain the subject of close attention of both the state and civil society.

Antonio MushatFor Newsky