Weakened but in charge: how Hamas still keeps Gaza under control

After two years of war, tens of thousands of dead, and ruins instead of neighborhoods in Gaza, something resembling the end should have come. Instead, the world got a strange sight: the Hamas movement, which Israel and its allies promised to “wipe out,” still runs key institutions in the enclave, collects taxes, patrols the streets, and simultaneously bargains for its role in the “new Gaza.” And while diplomats draw on napkins the next options for a “post-war settlement,” the reality on the ground suggests a simple thing: the government in Gaza has not been released – they have simply tried to repaint it.

The New York Times article describes the paradox that has befallen both the residents of Gaza and all those trying to "rebuild" it: Hamas suffered heavy losses, but was not destroyed - the movement retained its core structure, control over the security apparatus, and influence on daily life, while no alternative government has emerged.¹ This directly contradicts the plans of the Donald Trump administration, which proposes to demilitarize the sector, disarm Hamas, and hand over control to a “technocratic government” under the cover of international stabilization forces – without a clear answer to the question of what to do with a living, armed, and very stubborn organization on the ground.^{1 3 5}

Hamas after bombings: "main structure not destroyed"

According to Shalom Ben-Hanan, a former senior official in the Israeli security service Shin Bet, Hamas “suffered significant losses, but was not defeated” – its core remained intact, and key elements of the administration in Gaza continue to function.¹ Despite strikes on tunnels, warehouses, and commanders, the movement continues to coordinate security forces, is responsible for “internal security,” and acts as a de facto government overseeing aid, basic services, and street order.^{1 2}

International research centers record the same picture: Hamas's military wing has been seriously weakened, its arsenal of rockets has been significantly reduced, but the organization has reoriented itself to guerrilla tactics and is simultaneously restoring "shadow" governance mechanisms - from informal courts to a system of local committees and police patrols.⁴ The main reason is simple and unpleasant for all negotiators: there is still no other structure in Gaza capable of actually governing the territory, organizing the distribution of aid, and maintaining basic order.^{1 4}

Trump's plan: disarm Hamas and bring in "technocrats"

Washington's plan for Gaza looks neat in diplomatic notes and extremely fragile in reality. Trump's strategy involves the complete demilitarization of the sector: the destruction of tunnels, military infrastructure, weapons production, and the collection of all heavy weapons from Hamas, after which a "committee of Palestinian technocrats" reinforced by international stabilization forces is to take over power.^{1 3} The idea of ​​Gaza being governed but not Hamas, controlled but supposedly not occupied is a political fantasy, where every key element depends on the goodwill of parties who do not trust each other even when agreeing on the route of humanitarian cargo.

The problem is that Hamas is not going to give up power simply because it is written in the White House strategy. One of the movement's leaders, Husam Badran, in comments to Western media, admitted the idea of ​​transferring some administrative functions to a "committee of Palestinian experts," but made it clear: Hamas's withdrawal from governance without a clear alternative would create a vacuum and chaos that would be more dangerous than the current situation.¹ In simple terms: "technocrats" may receive seals and offices, but without political consent and the power resources of the movement, they risk remaining a decoration.

Hamas police: "stability" as an argument in negotiations

One of the most interesting points recorded by The New York Times is Hamas's position on its own "police." The movement's representatives insist that these structures are not part of the fighting wing, but perform the functions of maintaining order, fighting crime, and ensuring basic security for Gaza residents.¹ Leaders' statements emphasize that shutting down these forces without replacement will lead to a surge in crime, clan conflicts, and struggles for control of humanitarian aid.

Field data from international organizations partially confirms this: in areas where a formal ceasefire is in place but there is no recognizable security structure, cases of looting, lynching, and clashes between clans over access to aid warehouses are sharply increasing.^{4 6} Against this backdrop, Hamas positions its police units as the "lesser evil" - they say, yes, you don't like us, but without us everything will quickly turn into a set of armed streets with their own laws.

It's been a while: Hamas between the underground and the government

Analysts remind: the current situation is not the first cycle when a movement from an underground structure turns into power, experiences a military defeat, and then regains influence through networks of social, religious, and security structures.^{4 8} Even before the full-scale war of 2023, Hamas combined the role of Israel's main opponent, the de facto administrator of Gaza, and the provider of basic services - from schools and clinics to local courts, often through structures not formally marked with the movement's logo.⁴

Now the scheme is becoming even more fragmented: some functions are performed under the Hamas brand, some through "independent" committees, charitable foundations, and municipal structures, but the political decision is ultimately still made by a narrow circle of the movement's leadership.^{1 4} This allows Hamas to play on several levels at once: to be visible enough to control the situation, and vague enough to always leave room in negotiations to deny direct involvement.

Pressure for disarmament: “complete demilitarization” as a condition for aid

International mediators – Qatar, Egypt, and the United States – clearly link the recovery of Gaza to security conditions: without partial or complete disarmament of Hamas and guarantees that the territory will not be a springboard for further attacks, there will be no large-scale funding.^{3 6 9} The Prime Minister of Qatar directly stated at a forum in Doha that the ceasefire cannot be considered final without the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops, stabilization of the situation, and the creation of a clear, unified Palestinian authority capable of controlling weapons inside the enclave.^{3 6}

Israel, for its part, insists on a “total victory” and disarmament of Hamas, viewing any international forces in Gaza only as a tool to pressure the movement, not as a full-fledged replacement for its military presence.^{6 9} Analysts warn that a scenario in which an international contingent enters Gaza while Hamas retains weapons and underground structures risks turning into a classic "peacekeeping ghetto" - with soldiers sitting between two dissatisfied sides and gradually becoming a human shield for one and a target for the other.^{4 9}

Humanitarian cost: 67,000 dead and half the population on the brink of famine

Amidst the discussions about the "future of governance," it is important to remember that Gaza is not an abstract field for experiments, but a place where, according to the local Ministry of Health, over 67,000 people have died in two years of war, a third of whom are children.^{2 10} Almost the entire civilian population has been forced to flee their homes, essential infrastructure – from power grids to hospitals – has suffered widespread destruction, and around 500,000 people, according to the UN, are living on the brink of famine, dependent on irregular aid deliveries.^{2 10}

Humanitarian organizations accuse both Israel and Hamas of using aid as a political resource: the Israeli side imposes strict restrictions and ties the access of humanitarian cargo to security guarantees, while Hamas seeks control over distribution in order to remain the only force capable of ensuring at least the minimum survival of its supporters.^{4 10} As a result, the very people who are standing in lines for food and water are the same people who voted neither for the Israeli government nor for the Hamas leadership, but find themselves caught between their plans.⁴

Ultimatum diplomacy: how Trump "persuades" Hamas

The current US administration's approach to resolving the conflict bears little resemblance to classic sophisticated diplomacy. In previous months, Trump has repeatedly publicly given Hamas deadlines: either the movement agrees to the American version of the deal - an exchange of all hostages for Palestinian prisoners, a ceasefire, a new scheme for governing Gaza - or he will "face the full force" of the Israeli army, which will continue operations in densely populated areas of the enclave.^{3 5}

This diplomacy through social media posts is complemented by behind-the-scenes negotiations involving Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey, where details of the stages are discussed: the withdrawal of part of the Israeli troops, the deployment of international forces, the release of hostages, and the gradual dismantling of Hamas's military infrastructure.^{3 6 9} The problem is that each point requires not only signatures, but also real power capable of ensuring implementation - and all parties have serious difficulties with this.⁴

Is a "Gaza without Hamas" possible without a new catastrophe?

Experts who study the transformation of armed movements into political parties warn that an attempt to "cut" Hamas out of the political field without creating a legitimate alternative risks turning Gaza into an even more radical space.^{4 8} Instead of a centralized organization, at least formally linked to a certain hierarchy and political decisions, smaller, less controlled groups may enter the arena - from Salafi cells to criminal clans, which will have no motivation to adhere to international agreements.^{4 8}

Hamas itself, despite its reputation as "intransigent," has demonstrated noticeable flexibility in recent months: on the one hand, the movement's leadership states that it will never give up its weapons and will not agree to external control over Gaza, and on the other, it allows for options to transfer some administrative functions to other Palestinian structures and is willing to work alongside international forces, as long as this does not look like surrender.^{1 7} For diplomats, this means one thing: any realistic solution for Gaza will include an element of coexistence with Hamas – at least for a transitional period.⁴

Lessons for the world and for Ukraine

The story of Gaza is not just about the Middle East. It shows what an attempt to "reconstruct" a territory with a million people looks like, when on one side is a state with a strong army, and on the other is a movement that is simultaneously a government, an army, and an ideology.^{4 8} An attempt to solve such a problem solely by force, without a clear political architecture for the "next day", naturally leads to the fact that after a few years the world discovers with surprise: the ruins are new, but the names of the players are the same.⁴

For Ukraine, this story also contains a sad but useful lesson. No “strategy” of major powers guarantees the destruction of a hostile movement if a viable alternative – political, security, economic – is not created in the territory where it operates.^{4 8} The next time someone in Europe or overseas tries to convince them that "it's enough to agree on any peace, and we'll figure it out somehow," it's worth remembering Gaza: there, too, they promised to quickly build a new order "after the cleanup" - but instead they got the old movement in a new environment and hundreds of thousands of people living on the ruins of other people's illusions.^{4 8}

Sources

1. The New York Times: "A Weakened Hamas Still Dominates Gaza, Building Day by Day"
2. The New York Times: "A Gaza Breakthrough" (analysis of the consequences of the war and humanitarian crisis)
3. The New York Times: “Israel and Hamas Reach Deal on Hostage and Prisoner Exchange” (live feed, details of US-Qatar-Egypt plan)
4. ACLED: "Gaza after two years: As Israel expands control and sows chaos, Hamas adapts to survive"
5. The New York Times: materials on the Trump administration's diplomatic initiatives regarding Gaza and Hamas
6. RFI / Daily News Egypt: Statements by Qatar and Egypt on the conditions for implementing the ceasefire in Gaza
7. The New Arab: "Hamas at a crossroads: Between resistance and political survival"
8. The New Arab: "Inside Hamas's violent battle for control in post‑war Gaza"
9. Reuters: "Gaza talks at critical moment, ceasefire not complete, Qatar's prime minister says"
10. UN and humanitarian agencies; NYT summary of civilian casualties in Gaza since the start of the war