Germany is sharply increasing its military power: why France is growing anxious about the new balance of power in Europe

15.01.2026 0 By Chilli.Pepper

When a country that has been criticized for decades for being pacifist suddenly becomes the continent's major military player.

What NATO allies have been demanding for years is already happening: Germany is launching a historic rearmament and by the end of the decade is turning into one of the most powerful armies in Europe, investing over 500 billion euros in defense and reaching the level of about 3,5% of GDP.1 2 For the US and its Eastern European allies, this is a relief, but in Paris this process is perceived much more nervously: France, which is used to seeing itself as the main military pillar of the EU, suddenly finds itself in the shadow of the German defense giant.1 3 It is this new, not yet fully formed balance of power that Bloomberg describes as the source of a “schizophrenic atmosphere” in the French establishment: between joy that Berlin is finally serious and fear of remaining number two.

What exactly is Germany doing: figures that scare allies and delight NATO

According to Bloomberg, cited by Censor.NET, the government in Berlin has pledged to spend more than 500 billion euros on defense by 2029, including a special fund of 100 billion created after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.1 2 This will allow Germany to surpass NATO's goals by mid-decade and reach a defense spending level of about 3,5% of GDP — six years earlier than the alliance's planned guidelines for a gradual move above 2%.1 2 .

During a December visit to Berlin, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte did not hide his satisfaction: “This is exactly the kind of determination we need to ensure our security. Germany is leading by example,” Bloomberg quoted him as saying, followed by Ukrainian media.1 4 For an alliance that has been berating Berlin for decades for "saving on the army," this looks like doing old homework "with a bonus."

The French perspective: from relief to fear for one's own status

France, which has one of the most powerful armies in Europe and the only fully national nuclear triad in the EU, is placed in an unusual role by the sharp increase in German military capabilities.1 3 . As Bloomberg writes, there is a “schizophrenic atmosphere” in Paris: on the one hand, relief that the continent’s largest economy is finally investing in defense; on the other, deep fears that the German defense industry will overtake the French one, and political weight will follow.1 3 .

Paris understands well what budgets Berlin can afford: given the current difference in economic scale, even the same percentage of GDP means completely different absolute amounts for Germany, and therefore different series of orders, new production lines, and greater influence on the formation of armaments standards in Europe.2 5 French politicians on the sidelines admit that if nothing changes, “European defense” will increasingly be associated with German factories, rather than French missiles and aircraft.

Historical memory: why German rearmament triggers Paris so much

In French debates about Germany, two planes always stand side by side: today's NATO and EU ally and the historical trauma of two world wars. Commentators quoted by Censor.NET in the readers' reactions block remind us: in 1932, the Reichswehr was formally limited to 100,000 soldiers without an air force and heavy equipment, but seven years later the Wehrmacht had about 2,7 million soldiers, over 75 divisions and thousands of tanks, and in 1940 it defeated France in just a few weeks.1 These figures regularly surface in French journalism as a reminder of how quickly the situation can change if the political will emerges in Germany.

Therefore, although modern Germany is a democratic state, deeply integrated into NATO and the EU, every leap in its military capabilities is automatically passed through the filter of "what if the balance of power shifts again?"3 4 Not everyone speaks about it openly, but the reluctance to see Berlin as the absolute military leader of the continent, especially without a similar growth in the French role, is almost consensual in Paris.

What is the "historical rearmament" of Berlin in practice?

After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared a "Zeitwende" - an epochal turn in Germany's security policy2 6 Under this slogan, a decision was made to create a special 100-billion-euro defense fund, rearm the Bundeswehr, purchase new F-35 fighters to carry NATO nuclear weapons, increase heavy mechanized brigades, and finally make the army “combat-capable not only on paper.”2 6 .

A separate goal is to restore the combat capability of the defense industry. Rheinmetall, Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and other key players are expanding the production of artillery, ammunition, and armored vehicles, and are concluding long-term contracts with both the German government and allies, including Ukraine.2 5 In addition, there are Franco-German projects such as the future MGCS tank and the FCAS aviation system, which both bring us closer and force Paris to nervously watch the pace set by Berlin.

The French trump card: its own nuclear umbrella and expeditionary experience

France traditionally relies on two main arguments for its “special role”: its own nuclear forces and experience in global operations. It is the only EU state that has independently developed and maintains a strategic nuclear triad, and does not hide its ambitions to position its nuclear umbrella as one of the elements of the security of the entire EU.3 4 Added to this is the experience of expeditionary operations in the Sahel, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific region.

However, if Germany becomes the main supplier of conventional weapons and the largest payer for defense in the EU, the French “nuclear argument” loses its monopoly weight.3 5 In discussions about “European strategic autonomy,” Paris will no longer have to only offer its forces, but also adapt to the fact that important decisions will increasingly be made in tandem with Berlin.

Fear of industrial backwardness: tanks, shells, contracts

Many of the French concerns are not so much about the army itself, but about the industry behind it. If German companies, fueled by 500 billion programs, increase the mass production of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery and missiles, Berlin will become a key center of defense supply chains in Europe.1 2 5 Rheinmetall is already opening new production sites, including facilities focused on the repair and production of equipment for Ukraine.

French players like Nexter, Thales or Dassault, who are used to being the main suppliers for European programs, risk losing their monopoly and part of the market.3 5 There is also a political concern associated with this: whoever controls the production of key systems will have greater influence on EU policy on standards, procurement and export decisions.

Is there really panic in France: politics, media and skepticism about Bloomberg

The Bloomberg headline itself about the "panic" in Paris caused a polar reaction in the Ukrainian and European segments: some commentators believe that the agency is exaggerating the emotional component, selling drama, while in reality it is about a sober discussion about the new balance of power.1 . This is also pointed out by Censor.NET readers in the comments: “This Bloomberg is stupidly throwing things at the fan. And this is not the first time,” writes one of the users, reflecting skepticism towards the media giant.

Official Paris does not publicly call German rearmament a threat; rather, mantras about the need to “better coordinate efforts” and “prevent undesirable imbalances” are heard.3 4 However, the very appearance of the topic in the rhetoric of French politicians — from centrists to the opposition — shows that the issue has already left the walls of think tanks and entered the public political space.

The Ukrainian dimension: why a strong Germany and a nervous France are both a risk and an opportunity

From Ukraine's point of view, the growth of Germany's military power is a positive trend: the country, which was criticized on the eve of the full-scale invasion for its reluctance to supply Kyiv with even defensive weapons, is now one of the key donors of air defense, artillery, and armored vehicles.2 6 The greater Germany's production capacity, the greater the chance that a long-term war of attrition will not freeze Ukraine without shells and equipment.

French nervousness has two sides for Kyiv. On the one hand, the competition between Paris and Berlin for the status of the main “European defender” may encourage both capitals to maintain a high level of military assistance to Ukraine so as not to appear weaker compared to their neighbor.3 5 On the other hand, if the rivalry escalates into mutual blocking of defense initiatives in the EU, this could slow down the adoption of critical decisions on which the Ukrainian front also depends.

German nuclear taboo and hidden European fears

Another element that is often discussed in low tones is the issue of German access to the nuclear dimension of security. Today, Germany relies on the US “nuclear umbrella” and participation in joint NATO missions, while neither international treaties nor political consensus allow it to develop its own weapons of mass destruction.3 4 But with each step towards the status of the continent's leading military power, the debate about who and how guarantees Europe nuclear deterrence may become more acute.

There are already voices in the French public sphere suggesting that if Europe wants true strategic autonomy, it should rely more on the French nuclear arsenal and avoid any “cynical temptations” to revisit the German nuclear taboo.3 4 It is important for Ukraine that these discussions do not obscure the main thing - the need to strengthen Europe's conventional potential as a shield against Russia as quickly as possible.

What's next: a twin-engine Europe or new cracks in the heart of the EU?

If Germany implements its plans in full, Europe will find itself in a “dual-engine defense” configuration: Berlin will become the main payer and logistics hub, Paris will be the carrier of the nuclear umbrella and expeditionary experience.2 5 6 The ideal scenario for Ukraine and the EU as a whole is for these two engines to work in unison, coordinating policy in NATO, joint defense programs, and support for Kyiv.

The pessimistic scenario is the opposite: competition for status, influence, and contracts, which could paralyze joint decisions and give the Kremlin a chance to play on the EU's internal disagreements.3 4 For Kyiv and its Eastern European partners, it is now critically important to push both capitals towards the first option, constantly reminding them that while Paris and Berlin compete for symbolic leadership, Ukrainian cities pay for slow decisions with real blood every day.

Sources

  1. Censor.NET: “France is wary of Germany’s military buildup” — reprint of Bloomberg material, basic figures of 500 billion euros and about 3,5% of GDP, quote from Mark Rutte, emphasis on France’s reaction.
  2. Bloomberg: "Germany's defense spending and military strength worry some European allies" — analysis of Germany's plans for the defense budget until 2029, characterization of the course as a "historic rearmament."
  3. Le Monde / France 24 (via quotes in international digests): an overview of the French debate on Germany's growing military role and the fear of industrial backwardness.
  4. Official NATO statements: Secretary General Mark Rutte's speech in Berlin supporting Germany's increase in military spending and calling on other allies to follow suit.
  5. Analytical materials from European publications on the joint MGCS, FCAS programs and competition between the German and French defense-industrial complexes.
  6. Reviews of German security policy (government documents "Zeitwende", decisions on a special defense fund) - detailing the structure of future spending and priorities of the Bundeswehr.

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