"Nowhere to Hide": How Ukraine Strikes at the Russian Elite on Its Own Territory

Russian security forces traditionally tell on TV that “everything is under control” and “the enemy is far away.” Meanwhile, from Moscow to Madrid, people who have been building an empire of fear for Ukraine for years are falling one after another – politicians, propagandists, security forces, collaborators. The picture is simple and very inconvenient for the Kremlin: in this shadow war, Ukraine is slowly but surely seizing the initiative, showing the Russian elite that you cannot hide from the war either in an elite suburb, or under the protection of the FSB, or with a second passport somewhere in the EU.

Russian Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, killed by an explosive device planted in an electric scooter in Moscow on December 17, 2024 (Photo: EPA/YURI KOCHETKOV)

The LIGA.net article describes how the full-scale invasion of 2022 launched a parallel front – a war of targeted eliminations within Russia itself and beyond, where the key targets are the military, propagandists, security forces, collaborators, and businessmen serving the war.¹ The authors cite data from the British newspaper The Telegraph, analysts, and Western intelligence sources: according to their estimates, it is Ukraine that has been striking enemy figures more often and more effectively in recent years than Russia has struck Ukrainian ones, and this is already noticeably changing the feeling of impunity in Russian elite circles.^{1 2}

In the first eight months of 2025, the number of attempted eliminations linked to Ukraine on the territory of the Russian Federation exceeded the total annual figures for 2022–2024, the LIGA.net editorial team notes in its publications on social networks, citing its own analysis and comments from sources in law enforcement agencies.³ Against this backdrop, Western media – from the BBC to The Washington Post – are recording increasingly brazen attacks on Russian war criminals, propagandists, and collaborators from Moscow to the occupied Ukrainian territories, where “unknowns” time and again find people who sincerely believed that the war would end somewhere “on someone else’s field” for others.^{4 5}

Shadow War: From Moscow to Madrid

LIGA.net reports The Telegraph's assessment: in the new "war of eliminations," Ukraine is currently ahead of Russia, and we are not only talking about the frontline zone or occupied territories, but also about the deep Russian rear and Western capitals, where those who were calmly close to the Kremlin and outspoken collaborators previously felt at ease.^{1 2} The British publication describes a picture of a "de-escalation map" covering the territory from Moscow and St. Petersburg to Istanbul and Madrid: the longer the war lasts, the more "dots" appear on this map related to the Russian war machine.²

In parallel, according to The Washington Post and other American sources, since 2015, Ukrainian special services - primarily the SBU and the GUR - have been systematically building the capacity for so-called "high-value assassinations" - operations against high-value targets - with the support of Western partners, who provided training, equipment, and analytics.^{5 6} Official Kyiv in most cases is either silent or disavows public accusations, but anonymous interlocutors of Western publications describe dozens of episodes that form a holistic picture: Ukraine deliberately makes those roles dangerous to the enemy for which they previously did not pay a personal price - from the "television general" to the supervisor in the occupation administration.^{5 6}

Who is being eliminated: from propagandists to generals

LIGA.net focuses primarily on political and propaganda figures who have been inciting hatred against Ukraine for years or organizing repressions in the occupied regions.¹ If we add together the public data from Western media, the picture is broader: the list of targets includes officers of Russian security forces, heads of occupation administrations, mobilization supervisors, war bloggers, and those responsible for financing and logistics of the war.^{4 6}

In a special report on "brazen attacks by Ukrainian agents," the BBC describes a number of high-profile episodes, including the killing of a Russian lieutenant general who was blown up outside the combat zone by a remotely activated explosive device disguised as an everyday object.⁴ Another example, British journalists cite the murder of former pro-Russian Ukrainian MP Ilya Kiva near Moscow: a gunman entered the territory of an elite complex and shot him while he was walking, after which he disappeared without a trace - Russian propaganda received a loud but very demotivating signal for all the "escaped patriots" of the occupation.⁴

Mossad tactics in Ukrainian

LIGA.net cites assessments by British journalists and experts who compare the actions of Ukrainian special services with the practice of the Israeli Mossad - the elimination of individuals who pose a long-term threat to the nation, even if they are far from the front line.^{1 7} The CEPA think tank quotes an expert who says bluntly: these operations demonstrate that Ukraine is capable of reaching high-ranking targets anywhere in Russia, and this affects not only its tactical capabilities, but also the perception of stability of Putin's regime within the country.⁷

Unlike many of Israel's historical operations, where the main targets were the leaders of terrorist organizations, the Ukrainian campaign operates against a broader political spectrum - from the leaders of the occupation administrations to propagandists who openly called for the genocide of Ukrainians.^{5 7} This removes the problem of the "gray zone" for Kyiv: when a person has been justifying mass murders, organizing deportations, or legitimizing aggression for years, the question of their status as a military target becomes not so much a legal one as a political one - and the Ukrainian state, judging by the dynamics, has chosen a fairly unambiguous answer.

How Russia is losing its own "game of elimination"

An important motif in the LIGA.net material is a comparison of the effectiveness of Ukrainian and Russian attempts at elimination: Moscow has spent decades building a reputation as a state that pursues enemies throughout Europe – from London to Berlin – but in the war against Ukraine its “successes” have been much more modest.¹ British prosecutors and investigators have documented the involvement of Russian intelligence services in poisonings, assassinations, and sabotage in the EU for years, but after 2022, most such operations faced increased counterintelligence, sanctions pressure, and political isolation; in contrast, Ukrainian intelligence services, according to Western sources, adapted to the new reality more quickly.^{2 6}

Materials from The Washington Post and The Moscow Times, which LIGA.net refers to, remind us that even before the full-scale war, Ukrainian special services trained with the CIA and NATO allies - and at some point, from a "junior partner" they turned into an entity capable of independently planning and conducting complex operations deep behind enemy lines.⁶ American officials always emphasize that the United States does not participate in selecting targets and planning specific liquidations, but the "overall capability" of Ukrainian services is a direct result of many years of cooperation, training programs, and intelligence exchange.⁶

Who exactly pulls the trigger: the SBU, the State Security Service and more?

There is no single public list of structures responsible for these operations in open sources, but The Washington Post back in 2022, citing Ukrainian officials, described three key players: the Special Operations Forces, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (GUR), and a separate unit of the SBU, which is engaged in the elimination of occupiers and collaborators in the occupied territories and beyond.⁵ At the same time, anonymous interlocutors hinted that not all attacks are centrally directed from Kyiv: some operations are coordinated with the involvement of local partisans, and some are coordinated through informal support networks in other countries, where Russian agents feel too relaxed.⁵

At the same time, Kyiv, with rare exceptions, does not formally assume responsibility for specific removals, preserving both room for political maneuver and operational flexibility.^{1 5} Officials – from representatives of the GUR to the head of the SBU – allow themselves only ironic remarks about the “karmic consequences” for the organizers of the aggression, emphasizing in public comments only that any representative of the occupation structures “remains a legitimate target, wherever they are.”⁷

The fear effect: "there are no more safe cities in Russia"

One of the main effects, recorded by The Telegraph and reported by LIGA.net, is psychological: more and more Russian officials and propagandists are beginning to realize that the war has ceased to be a "screen event" and can come to them in their yard, car, or favorite coffee shop, even if the nearest Ukrainian unit is hundreds of kilometers away.^{1 2} CEPA experts point out that this undermines the myth of the "all-powerful special services" on which Putin's vertical is based: when a general, propagandist, or mobilization curator can be blown up or shot deep in the rear, confidence in the regime's steadfastness inevitably collapses.⁷

The factor of personal motivation is no less important: for thousands of people working in the Russian state machine, the risk of becoming a target is another argument to consider whether it is worth getting involved in the regime's new military projects, or whether it is better to suddenly "retire" or quietly disappear from the public sphere.^{4 7} This slow outflow of "war managers" may not be as spectacular as the loud explosions, but strategically it is no less important: systems are falling apart not only from the neutralization of prominent figures, but also from the mass unwillingness of the middle class to continue risking themselves for the sake of other people's imperial fantasies.

Law and morality: where to draw the line

Western media, including The Washington Post and the BBC, do not avoid difficult questions: to what extent such targeted liquidations comply with international law and where the line between a legitimate military objective and a political assassination is drawn.^{4 5} Lawyers quoted by the publication indicate that in the context of full-scale aggression, individuals who play a key role in waging war – from military and political leadership to organizers of occupation administrations – can be considered legitimate military targets, even if they are physically outside the zone of active hostilities.⁵

At the same time, liquidations in the territories of third countries (in particular, in the EU) create political risks for Kyiv: partners are reluctant to see themselves as "front-line showdowns," even if the target is an outspoken collaborator or propagandist guilty of inciting genocide.^{2 4} That is why in the open field, Ukraine prefers to act as cautiously as possible, preserving the “space of denial” for its allies, while Russia has demonstratively ignored this factor for decades – from the poisonings in London to the explosions in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic – which ultimately played against it after 2022.

What does this mean for Ukrainian society?

Inside Ukraine, the attitude towards such operations is generally unambiguous: the majority of society perceives the elimination of war criminals and propagandists as a just response to mass murders, deportations, and terror against civilians, as evidenced by sociological surveys and public discussions analyzed by LIGA.net in related materials.^{1 8} At the same time, there are ongoing discussions about the extent to which the state should then record such actions legally – through special tribunals, absentia sentences, or separate legislative procedures, so that years later they do not turn into “extrajudicial histories without documents” for historians.

Ukrainian security experts emphasize that the key difference between Russian and Ukrainian practices is in the nature of the war waged by each side.^{5 7} Russia came as an aggressor state and systematically kills civilians, while Ukraine eliminates those who organize and serve the aggression. This asymmetry is the main moral argument that allows Kyiv to explain to partners and its own citizens the necessity of such operations, even if the details remain secret.^{5 8}

Front after front: what will happen after the armistice

The Telegraph and CEPA draw attention to another unpleasant story for the Kremlin: according to their estimates, even if the active phase of hostilities is curtailed, the shadow war of eliminations could last for years - exactly as long as there is a political demand for justice and a request to restrain revanchist circles in Russia.^{2 7} For Ukraine, this means that the "target list" is unlikely to be limited to the current campaign: some Russian war criminals are already trying to legalize themselves in third countries, change their names, and reregister their businesses, and the issue of their personal responsibility will not disappear overnight.⁷

In this sense, the position voiced by Ukrainian publicists and political commentators such as the authors of LIGA.net is quite tough: "no impunity - neither for Putin, nor for his associates, nor for those who hid abroad," otherwise the war will only change form, but not stop.^{1 8} In this logic, targeted eliminations are not an end in themselves, but part of a broader strategy that should convince future aggressors: for attempting to destroy a nation, you will have to answer not only in international courts and under sanctions, but also personally, in any “cozy place” to which you try to escape.^{2 7}

Sources

1. LIGA.net: "Somewhere to hide. How Ukraine is winning the war of political assassinations on the territory of Russia"
2. The Telegraph: "Mapped: Russia and Ukraine's deadly shadow war of assassinations"
3. LIGA.net (editorial social networks): statistics of attempted eliminations in the Russian Federation in 2025
4. BBC News: "Ukraine's spies target Russian figures in increasingly brazen attacks"
5. The Washington Post: "Ukraine conducts 'high-value' assassinations inside Russia"
6. The Moscow Times with reference to The Washington Post: "Ukraine's CIA-trained intelligence operators assassinated dozens of Russians and collaborators"
7. CEPA: "Ukraine cites Mossad as assassinations multiply"
8. LIGA.net: "1932–2025. Ukrainians will no longer allow themselves to be destroyed with impunity"