The Night of "Daggers", "Iskanders" and 241 Drones: What Russia Launched Over Ukraine and What Air Defense Shot Down

On the night when normal countries are preparing for the weekend, Russia traditionally arranged a test drive of "mixed hell" for Ukraine: hundreds of drones, "invincible" hypersonic missiles, ballistics from neighboring regions and a targeted hunt for energy. The Air Force counted not hours, but targets - 246 air objects per night, and this is not a weather forecast, but a list of everything that tried to reach Ukrainian cities.

According to the Air Force, from 6:00 p.m. on December 18 to the morning of December 7, the Russian army carried out a combined air strike on Ukraine, using 241 strike drones of various modifications and 5 operational-tactical class missiles: three Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles and two Iskander-M / KN-23 ballistic missiles.¹ Radio engineering units recorded a total of 246 air targets, of which 179 were shot down or suppressed by air defense forces — 175 drones, two Kinzhal missiles, and two Iskander-M missiles.¹

Despite the high percentage of interceptions, 65 strike UAVs reached targets at 14 locations across the country, causing new damage to facilities, including the energy infrastructure of the Poltava region and, above all, the energy facilities of the Kremenchuk district.¹ The strike was another step in Russia's "electricity blackout" campaign — an attempt to inflict maximum damage on Ukraine's power system ahead of peak winter loads by combining massive drone attacks with launches of expensive missiles that Moscow still likes to call "hypersonic superweapons."

Scale of night attack: 246 targets in the sky

RBC-Ukraine, citing the Air Force, reports: from the evening of December 6 to the morning of the 7th, the Ukrainian air defense system tracked 246 air targets, of which 241 were Shahed, Gerbera-type attack drones and other modifications of the Iranian and Russian "garage genius."¹ The rest are 5 missiles, including three Kinzhals launched from the Tambov region of the Russian Federation, and two Iskander-M/KN-23s from the Kursk region.¹

The main airstrike was provided by drones: approximately 150 of them were Shaheds, the rest were other variants of loitering munitions, launched from the territory of the Kursk and Oryol regions, the Millerovoye district, Primorsky-Akhtarsk, as well as from the occupied Crimea.¹ This geography makes it clear that Moscow has traditionally approached from several directions, forcing the Ukrainian air defense to stretch its forces across the entire eastern, southern, and central arcs of the front, rather than concentrating on one "corridor."

What was shot down: 175 drones, 2 "Daggers" and 2 "Iskanders"

Despite the scale of the attack, by 9:00 a.m. the Air Force had reported shooting down or suppressing 179 targets: 175 attack drones, two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missiles, and two Iskander-M/KN-23 missiles.¹ In other words, all five missiles that Russia launched that night did not reach their targets - at least some were physically shot down, the rest were "jammed" or deflected off course due to Ukrainian air defense and electronic warfare countermeasures.

The fact of shooting down two "Daggers" once again confirms: the status of "uninterceptable hypersonic weapons", which the Russian Federation loved to boast about, remained somewhere in the advertising booklets of "Army-2018". Western air defense systems, primarily Patriot and, probably, SAMP/T, have long demonstrated the ability to hit these missiles, which hurts not only the real capabilities of the Russian troops, but also their myth-making arsenal for the domestic audience.¹

Where and how did Ukrainian air defense work?

The air attack was repelled by all available components of the air defense system: aviation, anti-aircraft missile units, mobile fire groups, electronic warfare units, and even unmanned systems used for both reconnaissance and independent counteraction to enemy UAVs.¹ Such a "mosaic" response has already become a standard for Ukraine: each segment with different ranges and capabilities covers its own area of ​​the sky, and mobile groups in pickup trucks with anti-aircraft guns and MANPADS finish off what breaks through closer to the objects.

Electronic warfare units also played their role: some of the drones were presumably not shot down, but rather "suppressed" — the Air Force report states that these are "shot down or suppressed" targets.¹ For Ukrainian cities, it doesn't make a fundamental difference: whether it was shot down, drowned, or fell in a field due to the loss of a navigation signal - the main thing is that it didn't fly into a transformer substation, a residential high-rise building, or a fuel warehouse.

Why was the energy industry hunted again tonight?

RBC-Ukraine separately emphasizes: the main target of the attack was energy infrastructure, primarily in the Poltava region.¹ The head of the Poltava OVA, Volodymyr Kohut, reported that at night the Russians carried out a massive combined attack on energy facilities in the Kremenchuk district; several energy sector enterprises were hit, according to preliminary data, with local outages and equipment damage.¹

Kremenchuk is not a random choice: a city with a large industrial hub, transport corridors, well-known oil refining and energy infrastructure is traditionally viewed by Moscow as an important element of the Ukrainian economy and logistics.¹ The strike on it fits into the overall strategy of the Russian Federation - to force Ukraine to enter the winter consumption peak with the most damaged generation and networks, increase the load on repair crews, and create a constant background of anxiety and instability for the civilian population.

Shahed Night: Why launch over 200 drones?

The use of 241 strike drones in one night is not only an attempt to penetrate air defenses with numbers, but also an economic calculation: Shaheds and their "relatives" are much cheaper than cruise or ballistic missiles, so Russia can afford to drop them on Ukrainian cities in batches, forcing Ukraine to spend more expensive air defense missiles or at least keep the entire system in 24-hour combat mode.¹ This is a kind of "tiring attack" - when even unsuccessful attempts to hit achieve the goal due to psychological pressure, the cost of interception, and wear and tear on equipment.

This is not news to Ukraine: over the three years of the war, air defense has evolved from episodic interceptions to systematic defense against swarms of drones, combining expensive anti-aircraft missiles with machine guns, optics, mobile groups, and electronic warfare.¹ However, the greater the number of Shaheds in a package, the higher the risk that some of them will break through to their targets — and 65 successful hits across 14 locations tonight clearly confirm this.

How Russia combines "golden" weapons with "disposable mopeds"

The combination of Kinzhals and Iskanders with hundreds of drones well illustrates the current tactics of the Russian Federation: expensive high-tech (at least by Russian standards) missiles are not launched alone, but in the "noise accompaniment" of cheap Shaheds, which are supposed to distract radars, overload target designation channels, and force air defense to disperse attention.¹ The ideal scenario for Moscow is when part of the batteries is occupied by "flying mopeds", and at this time some ballistic or aeroballistic missile breaks through to an important energy facility.

This night, this scenario did not work: all five missiles were intercepted or diverted from their trajectory by the Ukrainians, but 65 drones still reached their targets, including energy facilities in the Poltava region.¹ For the Kremlin, this is still an “acceptable” result: from the point of view of terror against civilian infrastructure, the main thing is not so much to destroy a specific CHP plant, but to force the country to constantly put out fires (sometimes literally), repair, patch, and live in fear of blackouts.

The Ukrainian energy system: why it is still holding up

Despite regular massive strikes, the Ukrainian power system as a whole continues to operate, although in some regions with local restrictions and schedules.¹ Over the past two years, energy professionals have honed almost military logistics: dispersal of critical facilities, rapid repair teams, equipment reserves, temporary power supply and switching schemes, as well as active use of backup and mobile sources.

At the same time, each new strike on substations, lines, and generation is not just "another accident," but a gradual depletion of the system, equipment, personnel, and supplies, which are not infinite.¹ That is why the Ukrainian discourse regularly calls on allies to strengthen not only air defense over cities, but also the protection of energy as a separate priority — including additional air defense systems to cover key facilities and technical assistance for faster recovery.

What the night of December 7 showed about the capabilities of both sides

For Russia, the massive attack was another demonstration that the arsenal of Shaheds and ballistics is far from exhausted: hundreds of drones and several missiles in one operation is not a "last gasp", but a working template that Moscow may try to repeat more than once.¹ For Ukraine, this night confirmed that a comprehensive, layered air defense is actually capable of taking down from the sky even what Russian propaganda still sells as "analogs" — but at the cost of a serious strain on resources, equipment, and people.

The key figure, which remains in parentheses in Russian reports, is 179 targets shot down or suppressed out of 246.¹ For the Kremlin, this means that for each relatively successful strike (such as damaging several energy facilities), it has to spend a huge amount of weapons — both drones and missiles, of which the Russian Federation, despite its high production rates, also does not have an infinite supply.

Sources

1. RBC-Ukraine: “The Russian Federation launched “Daggers”, “Iskanders” and over 200 drones at night: what was shot down by the air defense”
2. Official reports of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the results of the night attack of December 6–7, 2025
3. Message from the head of the Poltava OVA, Volodymyr Kohut, about the attacks on energy facilities in the Kremenchuk district
4. Analytical materials from Ukrainian and Western media on the interception of Kh-47M2 Kinzhal and Iskander-M missiles by Patriot complexes and other air defense systems