Munich Conference‑2026: Europe seeks security without an “automatic” America, but with Ukraine at the center of the agenda

Leaders who yesterday relied on the “automatic” umbrella of the United States gathered in Munich, but today are forced to publicly admit that transatlantic security no longer works according to the old rules. Against the backdrop of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Donald Trump’s return to the White House, and the accelerated militarization of Europe, the Munich Security Conference 2026 has become a place where Western elites talk not so much about “supporting Kyiv” as about how to survive in a world where American leadership is no longer guaranteed by default.^{1 4 9} .

Who's in Munich and why everything is different this year

The New York Times online report from Munich notes right from the start: the atmosphere of the conference is dramatically different from previous years¹ On the one hand, there is a massive presence of European leaders, including German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who is speaking at the MSC for the first time as head of government, prime ministers from Northern and Central Europe, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.^{1 8} On the other hand, the official delegation of the US Congress has been significantly reduced: Speaker of the House of Representatives Mike Johnson canceled most of the congressmen's trip at the last moment, citing the domestic budget crisis and the partial shutdown of federal agencies.^{1 2} .

Despite this, some American lawmakers traveled to Munich at their own expense: Democratic Senator Jeanne Shagin, co-chair of the Senate NATO caucus, and her colleagues are scheduled to meet with Zelensky, the NATO Secretary General, and the prime ministers of Denmark and Greenland.¹ Several Democratic congresswomen – including Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Sarah Jacobs – also arrived as “independents.”¹ The very fact that the Congress is arriving not as a single delegation, but as a mosaic of “independent players” reflects well the state of transatlantic relations: Washington remains both the key military stronghold of the West and a source of strategic unpredictability.^{2 4 9} .

Merz vs. Trump: German Chancellor Speaks Publicly for the First Time About the End of the “Old Order”

The culmination of the first day was the speeches of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and other European leaders, who in fact addressed two challenges at once in Munich: Russian aggression and Trump's "wrecking ball policy."^{4 9 12} Merz, in a speech described by the NYT and CNBC as surprisingly tough, said that during Trump's second presidency, "the US claim to global leadership is no longer taken for granted."^{4 9} He directly linked Washington's policy to a threat to international law, noting that the US's "rapid U-turn" towards allies was forcing Europe to build its own, more autonomous defense architecture.^{4 9} .

This line is supported by other European voices. Think tanks had already recorded a “change in mood” before the conference: Munich 2025 was the moment when Europe first seriously began to talk about the fact that “American guarantees can no longer be considered automatic.”⁵ . Now, in 2026, this no longer sounds like an alarming forecast, but a working assumption for defense planning. The panel topics – from 5% of GDP on defense for NATO members to “the future of Europe’s armed forces” – show that Europeans are preparing for a reality where the United States remains important, but not the sole center of gravity.^{5 9 12} .

Ukraine at the center of the discussion: from symbolic support to demands to arm for years

For Ukraine, Munich 2026 is not just another venue. According to the Wilson Center, last year at MSC 2025, Zelensky used the podium to directly tell Europeans: “The old relationship between Europe and America is ending. It is time for Europe to become self-sufficient.”⁵ This year, as follows from the conference agenda and announcements of speeches, the President of Ukraine again intends to put pressure on the Europeans: not just on a “position of solidarity”, but on specific long-term commitments in the areas of armaments, air defense, financing and – importantly – the EU’s own defense capabilities.^{5 8 11} .

NATO, for its part, through statements by Secretary General Mark Rutte, clearly outlines expectations even before the conference: more money, more missiles, more interceptors for Ukraine.⁸ In his “doorstep” comment before entering the Bayerischer Hof hotel, he recalled that European members of the Alliance have already doubled their defense budgets compared to 2021 and are moving towards spending over 150 billion euros in Germany alone, but stressed that this is still not enough if there is no rapid increase in the production of ammunition and air defense systems for Ukraine.⁸ In fact, the issue is that the issues of “Ukraine’s survival” and “restoring European defense sovereignty” have merged into one – and this, according to Zelensky and some European analysts, is the main lesson of recent years.^{5 8 11} .

5% for defense: Europe's "catch-up" and the production problem

At the same time, the Munich Conference has become a platform for discussing figures that seemed fantastic a few years ago. CNBC reminds us: after Trump returned to the White House, European NATO members agreed to move towards defense spending at the level of 5% of GDP - a figure that had long been heard only in the morning tweets of American "hawks"⁹ Formally, this looks like a fulfillment of “Washington’s long-standing demands,” but in practice it means a colossal structural break for economies that have been downsizing their armies and cutting defense budgets for decades, relying on the American umbrella.^{5 9} .

However, as a separate study on European defense by 2026 notes, the problem is not only in money, but also in production. Even with a sharp increase in budgets, the European defense industry is encountering a “production gap”: procurement systems and industrial capacities are not able to convert new funds into real tanks, shells, air defense systems and drones in the required volumes.³ The grueling war in Ukraine is burning through artillery ammunition and equipment at a rate that shatters peacetime assumptions about “resource consumption,” and by the end of 2025 the EU had already transferred over €60 billion in military aid to Kyiv, much of it directly from its own warehouses.³ Munich 2026 notes: if Europe does not reform its defense industry, even 5% of GDP risks remaining a pretty figure in declarations.

American politics as a risk factor: reduced delegations and double signals

The New York Times specifically highlights the symbolism of how the US domestic political crisis has seeped into Munich.^{1 2} . Due to a funding dispute and the threat of a shutdown of some federal agencies, Speaker Johnson cut short a trip by a large House delegation that was supposed to demonstrate to Europeans the "steadiness" of American support² As a result, senators fly separately, congressmen - as best they can, and European leaders are forced to read not only official statements from Washington, but also signals from campaign rallies, comments on Fox News, and posts on Trump's social media.^{2 4 9} .

This double bottom line – the official line, where NATO continues to be declared the “foundation of security,” and domestic policy, where threats are made to “not defend those who do not pay” – significantly changes the Munich discussions.^{5 9} . If earlier panels on transatlantic relations were more of a ritual, now they are turning into an exercise in strategic planning: what to do if the next US administration – or even this one – decides to radically reduce participation in European security? For Ukraine, this issue is no less important than for Berlin or Warsaw: without American logistics, intelligence and finances, supporting the front will become much more expensive and politically more difficult for the EU.

Ukraine's Place in the New Architecture: From "Support Object" to Co-Creator of Security

Behind the scenes of the speeches, think tanks, including the Wilson Center, are drawing attention to an important shift in the way people in Munich talk about Ukraine.⁵ If in the first years after 2022 Kyiv was primarily an “object of aid”, then in 2025–2026 the idea is becoming louder and louder: Ukraine should become a co-creator of the new European security architecture, and not just its beneficiary.^{5 8 11} The speeches of Zelensky and some European politicians already directly mention the possibility of creating an "Armed Forces of Europe", where the Ukrainian experience will become the core of the doctrine - and that security guarantees for Ukraine and NATO membership should not be a "gift after the war", but an element of deterrence against Russia right now.

This shifts the focus from talk of “war fatigue” to a discussion of the price of defeat. For the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and Scandinavia, Munich 2026 becomes an opportunity to once again formulate a simple thesis to the entire audience: if the West allows Russia to emerge from the war safe and armed, this is not the “end of the conflict,” but a prologue to the next round of aggression.^{5 8 11} And that is why the issue of shells, air defense, defense budgets, and the “European army” is not only technical, but also existential.

What does Munich 2026 mean for Ukraine?

For the Ukrainian reader, it is important to see in Munich not only a parade of speeches, but also several key trends. The first is that Europe is no longer hiding behind the US: under pressure from both war and Trump, it is entering with real money and political commitments where for years it has only promised "more responsibility"^{3 5 9} . The second is that the issue of Ukraine is no longer “relegated to a separate section,” but permeates virtually all panels: from the defense industry to NATO reforms and energy security. The third is that the risk of fragmentation is growing: different EU countries see the limits of dialogue with Russia, the scale of support for Ukraine, and the depth of European defense integration differently.

In this picture, Kyiv’s task is to make the most of the Munich platform to capture a “new consensus”: long-term, legally and politically binding guarantees of support, accelerated deliveries of air defense and ammunition, and a move toward NATO and EU membership not as a symbol but as a practical security mechanism. How well Ukraine performs in Munich 2026 will largely determine whether the European “turn of the tide” will translate into real solutions – or whether it will remain just another set of correct but toothless speeches.^{5 8 11} .

Sources

1. The New York Times: Live Updates "Munich Security Conference" - a report on the reduced US Congressional delegation, the participation of senators, and the general atmosphere of the 2026 conference.
2. The New York Times: "Partial Federal Shutdown Shrinks Congressional Presence at Munich Security Conference" – the reasons for the cancellation of the official House delegation and the political context in Washington.
3. Airstreet: "European Defense Entering 2026: Spending Is Up, Production Lags" - an analysis of the growth of European defense budgets and the shortage of production capacity.
4. The New York Times / Europe coverage: “German Officials Needle Trump at Munich Security Conference” – quotes from Chancellor Merz about the weakening of US claims to global leadership.
5. Wilson Center: “Making Sense of the Munich Security Conference” – an interpretation of Munich 2025 as a turning point in perceptions of transatlantic security and the role of Ukraine.
6. MSC / Wikipedia: general information about the Munich Security Conference and its evolution to MSC‑2026.
7. MSC 2026 Agenda: official conference program – confirmation of key panels and participation of leaders of Ukraine, NATO, and the EU.
8. NATO: "Doorstep statement by the NATO Secretary General at the Munich Security Conference" - focuses on Ukraine's needs and increasing European defense spending.
9. CNBC: "Europe 'failed' on Trump, Putin's 'wrecking ball' politics" – context on increasing defense spending to 5% of GDP and Trump's political influence.
10. MSC / official website: general description of the conference's role as a leading forum on international security issues.
11. Analytical materials on MSC-2025–2026 (through citations in the Wilson Center and Western media): assessment of Ukraine's role in the new European security architecture.