When history is against the empire: MOC is looking for a way to freedom

Exclusive. The Moldavian Church may soon find itself on the threshold of a historic decision. Autocephaly or preservation of dependence on Moscow is a choice that will change the entire religious life and future of the country. Moscow kept the MOC under control for decades. Constantinople keeps the old canons. Romania is watching, and the internal struggle in the Church is already going on today.

It is not simple canonical question. This is a question of power, identity, future people. History, politics and faith collide here. Here, every step decides the fate of thousands of people.

Our material includes an honest analysis of opportunities and risks, strategies and pitfalls, internal and external diplomacy. The reader will see why the autocephaly of the MOC — not a utopia, but a chance for Moldova will declare itself as a mature, free and independent Church. And why the path to it will be as dramatic as it is historically inevitable.

The question of the future of the Moldovan Orthodox Church is becoming increasingly persistent beyond the quiet church kitchen. Whether someone in Moscow likes it or not, the very logic of history pushes Moldova towards the fact that its Church will sooner or later gain independence. After all, the country is going to Europe - and the spiritual sphere cannot live forever according to the patterns of the "third Rome", especially if this "Rome" long ago turned into a political-bureaucratic museum of Soviet reflexes.

Yes, the MOC is now formally in the "embrace" of the Russian Orthodox Church. But these hugs too often resemble not maternal care, but the grip of a big neighbor who "knows what you need" and if you don't agree, you just don't understand it well "canonical structure of the world", approved, as they like to emphasize in Moscow, even under Ivan the Terrible and personally blessed by Comrade Stalin in the format of the "Special Department".

Propaganda in the ROC MP is appropriate: any demand for Moldovan church independence is immediately written into "Uniate intrigues", "Western manipulations" or "Romanian expansion", or even worse - "soul-destroying schism". But, as practice shows, such logic works increasingly less effectively — that in Moldova itself, that in Georgia, that in Ukraine. Nations grow up; church sovereignty ceases to seem like a luxury and becomes a matter of dignity.

From the canonical point of view, the MOC, already having a developed structure, an episcopate and its own institutions, fully fits the classic criteria of "a church ready for independent life". This is not a small mission, not a parish on the periphery - this is a full-fledged church organization that has long proven that it is capable of managing itself without Moscow's watchful supervision.

And Moscow does not so much "spiritually feed" Moldova, but rather broadcasts its geopolitical whims and lusts here through the church channel. As if the Church is a branch of "Rossotrudnichestva", and the liturgical calendar must be coordinated with the Russian Federation.

Therefore, the question of autocephaly no longer looks like something "dangerous" or "revolutionary". Rather, it is a return to normality, to the model that is characteristic of all European Orthodox nations: Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Serbia, Ukraine. Everyone has their own Church, with their own voice and their own initiative.

There are those who consider it a natural step to restore historical ties with the Romanian Orthodox Church. There are reasons for this for a number of very good reasons (political, psychological, identity), but if this option remains unacceptable for the majority of believers, then independence remains the only decent way.

And Moscow is not an assistant here. The ROC MP named after Stalin is afraid to let go of Moldova not according to the canons, but because of geopolitics. The "Holy Russian World" does not tolerate the reduction of the area, and even more so the departure of those who want to live in a European way, and not according to the models of the god-awful USSR.

That is why the potential autocephaly of the Moldovan Orthodox Church is not at all a manifestation of hostility or an attempt to distance oneself from someone based on the principle of resentment. Rather, it is a step towards own maturity, towards the strengthening of national spiritual subjectivity, towards the European trajectory that Moldova is already following in its state reforms.

The Independent Church acts here as a natural expression of an independent state: if a country aspires to sovereignty, to responsible self-government, then its church life cannot remain tied to an external political center, especially one that constantly tries to speak on behalf of everyone and dictate how it believes, how it thinks, and whom to listen to.

In fact, the question today is no longer about "against whom" the idea of ​​autocephaly stands, but about "what" it stands for: the possibility of faith, free from geopolitical games; for the Church, which does not live according to the rules of other people's information campaigns; for the right of Moldovan believers to determine their spiritual future themselves, without looking back at daily TV stories from Moscow.

After all, the maturity of the Church is not an administrative formality or a political gesture, but the ability to conduct its own pastoral policy, cares about people, and not about preserving someone's "canonical influence" in the region.

And here, paradoxically, it is the Moscow side that is pushing Moldova towards independence.

The authoritarian style of management, the heavy Stalinist legacy woven into the structure of the ROC MP, the attempt to control everything — from the liturgical language to the public discourse — create the impression that the MOC is held not by love, not by spiritual logic, and certainly not by canons, but by the habit of looking at Moldova as a "responsibility zone". In such an atmosphere, the desire to say: "Thank you for everything, but we are on our own" ceases to be a challenge and becomes a manifestation of elementary dignity.

But with all this, the path to autocephaly is impossible without the active support of the church people - and this is not the church bureaucracy, but the very spiritual fabric of Moldova: the episcopate, the priesthood, monasticism and the laity. Without their consent, any solution looks artificial, which means it is unviable. Conversely, when broad and stable support is formed from the bottom up, the Church begins to breathe as a single organism.

In this case, the convocation of a council or an extended synod, which will officially address a request for independence, becomes not a mechanical step, but an expression of the general choice of the people. In the history of Orthodoxy, this is exactly how mature autocephalous churches arose - not by order of the imperial chancellery, but by the natural growth of the church community.

Of course, the question of recognition will be raised immediately. Theoretically, there is a classical scheme: the MOC turns to the Russian Orthodox Church and considers the request and grants the Tomos, and then the rest of the Local Churches confirm the decision. On paper, everything looks good, almost idyllic. But in reality, it resembles an attempt to obtain a certificate of maturity from a structure that itself in its time received its own "passport" according to the expression of historians — a method, let's say, of a very creative interpretation of canon law.

The autocephaly of 1589, issued to Moscow by Constantinople under Boris Godunov, was a political-diplomatic act rather than theological: Godunov himself literally bargained for this autocephaly, taking advantage of Constantinople's need for financial and political support. The beautiful legend of the "five patriarchates" hides much less romantic mechanisms, the irony of which is especially visible today, when the Russian Orthodox Church tries to portray itself as a strict guardian of the canons, although the canons themselves owe a very dubious diplomatic performance of the 16th century.

But there is another aspect: only the mother churches founded by the apostles can grant autocephaly, and when the apostles preached, frogs croaked on the Moscow hills, and in the forests, if the ancient historians are right, cannibals were found. So they don't even mention canon law there. They have other motives. Let's consider them.

Precisely for political reasons, Moscow will not only not grant Moldova autocephaly, but will resist it to the last. Not because church tradition demands it, but because imperial logic does not like to let go of any territories, even those where it itself lost trust and spiritual authority a long time ago.

From this follows the real path — the one that Ukraine has already followed, and which is objectively open to Moldova as well: turning to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. It is Constantinople, as the Mother Church for the majority of Orthodox regions, including the historical Moldavian lands, that has both the right and the moral basis to intervene when it comes to restoring broken church justice.

Until 1812, the Moldavian dioceses belonged to the Ecumenical Patriarchate — and were transferred to Moscow not by a canonical decision, but by an imperial treaty concluded between the two states, as if dioceses were not a spiritual structure, but part of the land registry. In fact, their deportation to the Russian Orthodox Church was an act that Constantinople today has every reason to reconsider, just as it reconsidered the situation with Ukraine.

Thus, if Moldova chooses the path of autocephaly, the logic of canons and historical memory is more likely to be on the side of Constantinople than Moscow. And if the Russian Orthodox Church deepens the split, accuses everyone of the "disintegration of universal Orthodoxy" - well, this will only show how political its arguments have become.

And for Moldova, as a European country, the second is much more important: to have a Church that belongs to itself, and not to external structures whose agenda changes depending on what is written in the Kremlin calendar today.

The path to the autocephaly of the Moldavian Church, no matter how logical and mature it looks on paper, faces a number of obstacles, each of which is capable of turning church evolution into a political-canonical drama.

The first and most painful problem is the jurisdictional conflict.

Two parallel structures have existed on the territory of Moldova for a long time: the Moldavian Metropolis, subordinate to Moscow, and the Bessarabian Metropolis, restored by the Romanian Orthodox Church. Any request of the MOC to declare independence will inevitably be perceived by Bucharest as an invasion of its own historical domain.

For the Romanian Orthodox Church, Bessarabia is not just a region, but a part of spiritual memory, and therefore its reaction will be, to put it mildly, extremely sharp. In the eyes of many in Romania, the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church may not look like a step towards maturity, but rather an attempt to "cement" the consequences of the historical losses of the Romanian Orthodox Church, which were inflicted by external powers in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Moscow, of course, will oppose it even harder. Today, the ROC is experiencing the syndrome of imperial decline: Ukraine has already slipped out of control, Georgia is looking towards Constantinople, the Baltics are distancing themselves, and influence in the Orthodox world is rapidly melting. For her, the loss of Moldova is not just minus one metropolis, but a symbolic recognition that the project of the "Russian world" has finally crumbled. And therefore the resistance will be maximum: pressure on the episcopate, threats of schism, accusations of "state interference" - the whole standard set of Moscow church diplomacy of the late Putin era. Of course, the Russian Orthodox Church will once again portray itself as a strict guardian of the canons, although it interprets these canons more flexibly than the tax code under Boris Godunov.

But, perhaps, the thinnest and most dangerous barrier is inside the MOC itself. There is no single church identity in Moldova: one part of the clergy and laity gravitates to Moscow, the other to Bucharest, and it is far from a fact that the idea of ​​full autocephaly will be able to unite everyone at once. Moreover, there is a risk that any drastic movements will lead to an internal split, which will not only undermine the authority of the Church, but also increase external pressure. Schisms have already become a chronic instrument of influence in the Orthodox world: Moscow and Bucharest equally know how to play this instrument, each to their advantage. It is not excluded that both parties will try to drag communities, monasteries and bishops, creating a situation of multipolar loyalty, in which any initiative of autocephaly risks being choked.

Thus, the process of gaining independence will require not only canonical literacy and political fortitude, but also great internal tact, so as not to turn the future autocephaly into a battlefield for other people's interests. Moldova will have to find its own voice, its own formula for unity — and do it calmly and wisely, regardless of how loudly those who are used to controlling its spiritual life from afar will raise their voices.

Antonio MushatFor Newsky