Towards the idol of the state away from God: ecumenism of the "Russian world"

Exclusive. When the dispute about the "Russian world" goes too far, it inevitably rises above theology and begins to expose the very architecture of consciousness in which this simulacrum was born This is exactly what we are approaching now. After analyzing the ideological core and church changes, it is time to see what this system is asking from the inside: a special type of religious sensitivity, in which the sacred is replaced by symbolic loyalty, and spirituality is replaced by the discipline of obedience. And therefore we need to honestly name the mechanisms thanks to which the "deified state" came to be perceived as a spiritual norm, and morality as an optional application.

Without uncovering these deep-seated attitudes, it is impossible to understand why the "Russian world" turned out to be so durable, so attractive to some and so repulsive to others. And most importantly, it is impossible to offer a real way out that will restore the integrity of Christian thought where it has been replaced by political mythology

And we have to start here with the most unpleasant thing - with the internal spiritual deformation, which gradually became the norm among the "Russian-peaceful" worldview. It is not about dogmas or canons, but about a profound way of experiencing faith, in which the religious feeling ceases to be an appeal to God and turns into a ritual confirmation of political loyalty.

It is this change - almost imperceptible, but destructive - that explains why in the space of the "Russian world" morality can give way to ideology, why holiness can be thought contrary to morality, and why any critical theology is declared a "dangerous innovation". Here we are dealing not with a mistake, but with the relearning of the human heart: the habit of considering as "spiritual" what in fact is only a cultural code and instrument collective identity.

Next, we will continue with the analysis of the religious experience that made ideological idolatry possible. Without an understanding of this experience, its origins and its mechanisms, all subsequent discussions will resemble the demand to treat the symptoms while ignoring the disease.

If we try to disassemble the "Russian world" into its components, then we will not have a neat system, but rather a dependence of ideological breeds, from where each adept digs for himself what shines precisely for him.

At first, a special place is occupied by the idea of ​​Russians as a kind of "super-ethnic group" to which a global mission is attributed. The interpretations of this "super-ethnos" fluctuate so sharply that an unprepared researcher can get dizzy: from crude nationalism, where other Slavic peoples are at best assigned the role of torchbearers of history, to the revival of the Soviet myth about the "new community" and the "new man". For some preachers, the "Russian world" is not a Christian project at all, but a version sprinkled with holy water of the communist "Soviet people", only with flags and icons, sometimes icons of new martyrs, that is, victims of the satanic Soviet regime.

Secondly, the messianic function of this "superethnos" for some reason is inevitably reduced to the construction of the state-Catechon, the last fortress holding peace from the triumph of cosmic evil. The lexicon here is rich: from Duginsky "geopolitical arks" to fantasies about the need to restore the Russian monarchy, it is clearly far from the legitimate heirs residing in emigration. And all this is accompanied by the conviction that the power of the Russian state is not a matter of politics, but of saving humanity from final destruction.

Thirdly, enters the scene religiously based statism. The state acquires the features of a sacred idol, and we are talking about a very specific modern Russian state, which is declared to be infallible, wise and almost all-holy. It is personalized, they pray to it, repent before it - and sometimes it seems that they confess.

Fourth, inevitably follows the denial of human rights and the very value of a person. The formula is simple and cruel: "to live is to serve (your) family." Человек здесь is a cog, and the meaning of his existence is measured by the degree of readiness to dissolve in the will of the state. In such a system, even death becomes a form of "civic debt".

Fifthly, there is a quiet but persistent erosion and complete deconstruction of the image of God. The personal God of the Scriptures disappears, turning into a kind of warm fog - "good radiation", which allegedly emitted by the church hierarchy. This change relieves the person of responsibility for a personal meeting with the Living God, because it is enough to simply stand closer to the source of "beneficial radiation." 

Sixth, an obligatory set of conspiracy relics is in use - from the "Dulles Plan" to the notorious "Protocols of the Elders of Zion". These texts play the role of sacred texts written in a parallel universe, where the world is ruled by shadows, and the truth is always hidden behind the scenes.

And finally, crowns all this with the main gilded core - hatred of the abstract West, which is declared to be the personification of world evil. The West is not a geography here, but a universal demon, a convenient target that can be blamed for everything and nothing in particular at the same time.

From all this chaos, each adept of the "Russian world" collects his personal version of ideology - incompatible with others, but at the same time, for some reason, claiming to be the absolute truth. This fragmentation is not a deficiency of the system. This is her "system".

Before delving into the ecumenism of the "Russian world" — this exotic symbiosis in which church "preaching" merges with imperial decors, — it is necessary to outline that it is precisely in this construction that there is a theological break, and where the pure replacement of Christian logic by the surrogate metaphysics of the state begins. Because without this distinction, it is impossible to understand why the "Russian world" positions itself as an Orthodox phenomenon, but in reality it is outside Christianity as reliably as a guinea pig is outside the sea and outside the herd of pigs.

At first, ideas about a "super-ethnicity" may be ridiculous, pretentious or simply naive - but they become heresy only when they are given a religious status. When it is asserted that a certain nation has a theologically established mission, that the realization of an ethnic claim is the sacred meaning of its existence, this is no longer political boasting, but a direct dogmatic substitution. Here the ethnos turns into a quasi-god, and history into the liturgy of the "chosen people." And this, of course, is heresy.

Second, the the doctrine of Katekhon in the version of the "Russian world" is a classic example of theological falsification. The appeal to the words of the apostle Paul - τὸγὰρμυστήριονἤδηἐνεργεῖται τῆςἀνομίας... - "for the mystery of iniquity is already at work" (2 Thess. 2:7) is accompanied by a selective reading of the tradition.

The most convenient interpretation of "the Roman Empire as holding" is declared the only possible one, while other, no less ancient interpretations - for example, that the holding power is the grace of the Holy Spirit - are simply crossed out. Even John Chrysostom, who accepted both options, is "not entirely comfortable" in such a scheme. When a private interpretation is given absolute status, this is a fundamental sign of heresy.

Next comes the most painful part. In the doctrine of the "Russian world" there is no place left for God or man - all space is occupied by the state. The state, renamed "(u)family", receives the attributes of a personal deity: will, voice, sanctity, infallibility.

The real God (Jesus Christ - the Creator of the world) in this system dissolves in the fog of impersonal energy, loses his face and voice. This is not just a methodological error, it is a radical change: the state takes the place of God, and the human being turns into a function of the state. The dehumanization of the personality becomes a logical continuation depersonalization of the Deity. Christianity has nothing to do here - it is simply being displaced.

This a brief overview of heresies, contained in the doctrine of the "Russian world" shows that before us is not a variation within the Christian tradition, but a full-fledged false teaching, which is decorated with church words, but has no relation to the Apostolic Faith. And it is with such baggage that we have to move on to the next topic - to the ecumenism of the "Russian world", an even more colorful and paradoxical phenomenon, where things that do not even sit next to each other in normal theology are combined. If there is something truly international in the "Russian world", it is his own version of "ecumenism" - bizarre, almost circus. After all, despite the regular mantras that belonging to the "Russian world" supposedly automatically implies belonging to the ROC MP named after Stalin, in fact this ideological volcano erupted long ago far beyond the Orthodox fences. And in the hot currents of ideology there were those who not only warm themselves, but manage to build their own theological sheds from the same dubious bricks.

It is, of course, about Protestant interpreters of the "Russian world", who with amazing enthusiasm undertake to glue together their "theological" constructions from the same set of ideological axioms.

Let's take at least one of the most zealous representatives - Dmytro Shatrov, a minister of ROSHVE, a participant of the same World Russian People's Council, where they prayed before Putin as if he was at least the key to the Kingdom of Heaven. His rapturous reports are already a separate genre of Pentecostal glossy eschatology. But it's not a matter of personalities: the Protestant variation of the "Russian world" does not fundamentally differ from the Orthodox one, it's just that the liturgical context is simpler, but the blasphemy is more fiery.

First, all the same messianism of the Russian "superethnos", as if the Almighty created peace exclusively for the sake of the geopolitical mission of the citizens of Shvabrostan.

Secondly, the same religiously based statism — the state as a direct channel of grace, the president as a prophet of the era, and the political vertical as a precious Jacob's ladder. The only difference is that Protestants, who are not constrained by Byzantine stylistics, allow themselves much brighter wording. Where the ROC MP named after Stalin is still vacillating between sacred decoration and careful allegory, some officials of the Russian Federation of Russian Orthodox Churches are already directly calling state rockets "the Lord's". So to speak, deification of aerobatics.

An old pattern is easily recognized in all this. Just as the German "Christians" of the Third Reich built their anti-theology around the figure of the "divinely appointed Führer", so the Russian interpreters of the "Russian world" make political power the main pillar of their theology. And again, as on a tracing paper, the same verse is placed in the center: "There is no power except from God." Nazi Reichsbishop Müller used ego to justify the sacred nature of Hitler's power; modern Russian "servants" - to give sacredness to any word of the Kremlin. The speculation remains the same, only the names change. Anyone who wants to understand how deep this rift is between real Christian teaching and its ideological forgeries should turn to Erwin Lutzer's analysis in the book "The Cross for Hitler", where he shows with surgical precision how the biblical text is turned into a political instrument.

And this is how, step by step, we see: ecumenism of the "Russian world" is not a dialogue of traditions, not a search for unity, but simply an expansion of the geography of one and the same pseudo-religious ideology. In other words, the "Russian world" is missionary not by Christ, but by the cult of the state. And in this mission, it doesn't matter to him whether he is Orthodox, Pentecostal or Baptist. If only the bow was deep enough.

Sometimes one gets the impression that the XXV Congress of the World Russian People's Council, which took place on November 27-28, 2023 in Moscow, decided to give us not a theological intrigue, but a sociological experiment: how far ideology can go when it replaces religion, and religious language replaces political loyalty. And if someone thought that the "Russian world" would remain an intra-Orthodox project, then the sudden "ecumenism" of the Council dispelled all illusions. But, if you think about it, there is nothing surprising in this.

Why did such "ecumenism" suddenly start at the 25th Congress of the VRNS (doesn't this remind us of all the notorious congresses of the CPSU)? Why are there Orthodox, Protestants, and figures of, to put it mildly, dubious competence? The answer is actually prosaic. The general goal of the ideology of the "Russian World" is deification of the Russian state as the only source of truth, strength and salvation. And everything else — confessional differences, liturgical traditions, ceremonial culture — are allowed as variations on one and the same theme. No matter what he burns: incense, rock music or quotes from Dugin, as long as the incense is directed towards the Kremlin.

And here it becomes clear what this strange "ecumenical" solar system revolves around. Not around Christ, not around the creed, not around the Holy Scriptures — but around a political quasi-deity named "State". It is called "(u)rodyna", "Russia", "Holy Russia" - but in any case it is a personalized idol, which is allowed everything and which requires bowing. Such a cult easily unites people, regardless of whether they fast according to the Typicon or pray to a drum, or rave under the influence of psychotropic substances at a regular Shaman's concert.

At the same time, there are two opposing calling voices in parallel. Some church leaders propose to convene a pan-Orthodox council in order to to condemn Gundyaev's heresy — "Russian world". And here they are essentially right: an ideology that replaces God with the state is incompatible with Christianity.

Others - in the same circles - also dream of gathering an All-Orthodox Cathedral, but to will condemn the "LGBT heresy" — a term so clumsy that it speaks for itself. But there is also a logic in this direction: attempts to introduce leftist liberal anthropology into Christianity also require a theological response.

However, both sides have the same mistake: they are moving with a negative agenda. Their goal is to "condemn", "forbid", "curse". But the council, if it is truly called to serve the Church, is obliged not just to sweep away the rubbish from the corners, but to formulate a clear and positive teaching. Not on emotions, but on a theological basis. Not on slogans, but on clear concepts.

So, in the issue of nation and state, it is necessary to clearly distinguish two things. It is blessed - when a person loves his land, honors his ancestors, serves society, but holds God above all.

And it is cursed - when the state turns into an idol to which human life, morality, truth and faith itself are sacrificed. Too many things today testify to the fact that the "Russian world" chose the second.

The question of gender identity also needs a clear wording. What is gender? What is gender? How are nature, psyche, and freedom related? How should the Church pastorally accompany people with deviant behavior patterns — not justifying sin, but also not destroying a person? Unclear concepts give rise to unclear teachings - and that is why there is so much chaos today.

But why do people like the protodeacon of the entire Horde, Comrade Kuraev, continue to insist that "Russian peace" is not heresy at all? The answer is simple and bitter. Theology, in the view of many in the ROC MP named after Stalin, concerns exclusively metaphysics: the Trinity, hypostases, energies, nature — that's the point.

Everything related to life, society, and morality is declared "non-theological", something secondary. And a catastrophic consequence arises from this: their morality is separated from theology, as if it has nothing to do with God. Therefore, their holiness is able to exist contrary to morality, aesthetically beautiful and ritually flawless - but morally empty.

And here we see: this ecumenism of the "Russian world" unites people not by Christ, but by the idol of the state; not by a common creed, but by a common political loyalty; not by truth, but by fear of losing access to the "correct" table. This is no longer theology - it is political metaphysics dressed in a cassock and decorated with prayer words. And the sooner this is recognized, the sooner it will be possible to move on to the real conversation - about what faith is and what idolatry is in the 21st century.

Concluding the examination of these processes, it is important to see the main thing: spiritual deformation does not appear suddenly and does not act in isolation. It takes root in those places where faith ceases to be a meeting with the Living God and turns into an instrument collective self-identification. This is how ideological pseudo-religions are formed — stable systems in which political and cultural constructors replace theology, and emotional and psychological loyalty replaces spiritual experience.

The tragedy of the "Russian world" is that it skillfully used several weak areas of the post-Soviet Orthodox consciousness - the absurdity of the nation category, the lack of a developed doctrine of the state, the incompleteness of the doctrine of the human personality and the body, the incompleteness of moral theology. A false-religious system is built on these gaps, which has impressive power precisely because it is simple, emotional and promises a person spirituality without repentance and identity without inner work.

But understanding the mechanics of this change gives a chance to overcome it. Not a single heresy is eternal, if the Church accepts the work - painful, but necessary - to speak anew the truths that were left to flow. Where theology finds its voice again, where faith returns to its personal core, there also disappears the ground on which similar ideological simulacra can grow.

Therefore, the result is simple and solid: overcoming the "Russian-peaceful" religious counterfeit is possible only through a return to genuine theological reflection, to a clear teaching about man, society and the state — and through the restoration of that spiritual sobriety, without which church tradition turns into convenient material for political mythmaking.

Martin Skavronsky, for Newsky