Lithuanian Foreign Minister: US is doing more for sanctions against Russia than the EU - why this is a worrying signal for Europe

When a country on NATO's eastern flank says out loud that the United States has gone further than the European Union in imposing sanctions on Moscow, it sounds like a compliment to America — but at the same time a rebuke to Brussels. Lithuania, which lives under the direct threat of Russian aggression, cannot afford polite silence when it comes to the real cost of half-measures.

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What Budris said: a paradox amid US criticism

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kestutis Budris said that in a number of key aspects of sanctions policy against Russia, the United States is doing more than the European Union⁷ He called it a “paradox,” given the amount of criticism directed at Washington in Europe — from the pace of aid to Ukraine to the domestic American debate over the war.⁷ In an interview with Lithuanian public broadcaster LRT, Budris stressed that despite all the differences, it is the US that imposes tougher, particularly secondary, sanctions, while the EU often limits itself to half-hearted solutions.⁷ .

The statement was made on the eve of the approval of the 20th package of EU sanctions, which is due to be adopted on February 24, the fourth anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.⁷ The Lithuanian minister bluntly stated that he hopes for a “truly ambitious” package, not another symbolic gesture “for a check mark” that Moscow will quickly bypass through shadowy schemes and third countries.⁷ His message to his EU colleagues is clear: without a real increase in sanctions pressure, the mere fact of the war anniversary will mean nothing to the Kremlin.

How the US is ahead of the EU in sanctions pressure

Budris separately emphasized that the US is using tools that the EU is still approaching cautiously or avoiding altogether — primarily secondary sanctions against companies and banks in third countries that help Russia circumvent restrictions.^{7 11} The American sanctions regime allows for the punishment of not only Russian entities, but also foreign intermediaries that trade in Russian oil, supply critical components for the Russian military-industrial complex, or service the “shadow fleet.”¹¹ This makes any cooperation with Russia toxic for global businesses that do not want to lose access to the US market or the dollar system.

In addition, Washington has created special interagency structures such as KleptoCapture and the REPO Task Force, which are specifically engaged in identifying and blocking Russian assets, monitoring compliance with sanctions, and countering attempts to circumvent them.¹¹ According to these groups, tens of billions of dollars of Russian assets were blocked and frozen by the spring of 2023 alone, and yachts, luxury real estate, and other symbols of the wealth of the Russian elite were seized.¹¹ In the EU, similar mechanisms operate more slowly and in a fragmented manner, which creates gaps in the overall sanctions “filter”.

Where the European Union is slowing down: "packages that lag behind reality"

This is not the first time Lithuania has publicly criticized the EU's sanctions policy as insufficient. Back in 2025, Budris called on his colleagues to immediately move to the 18th sanctions package, stressing that the previous one, the 17th, was "already yesterday" and did not meet either the scale of Russian aggression or Ukraine's expectations.^{4 5} He insisted at the time that the new measures should hit the most vulnerable areas of the Russian economy — oil, LNG, nuclear fuel and financial institutions — and not be limited to cosmetic restrictions on secondary goods.^{4 5} .

A similar logic is being used now, as the EU prepares its 20th package. According to Budris, if the next package of sanctions turns out to be “symbolic” and does not affect the Kremlin’s key sources of income, it will mean that the European Union is not meeting its own stated level of support for Ukraine.⁷ Lithuania, as one of the strongest supporters of strong sanctions, is actually warning: a slow and inconsistent sanctions policy could become the weak link in the entire Western front against Russian aggression.

Energy as a litmus test: LNG, oil and the "shadow fleet"

One of the key fronts in the debate between the EU's hawks and conservatives is Russian energy. Budris has repeatedly stressed that sanctions pressure will be incomplete until Europe stops importing Russian LNG, takes a more radical approach to oil and gas revenues, and reduces its dependence on Russian nuclear fuel.^{4 7} Lithuania, which has completely abandoned Russian gas and switched its energy supplies, in particular to American LNG, requires the same level of political will from its partners.^{3 7} .

At the same time, the latest European sanctions only partially affected the "shadow fleet" - tankers that transport Russian oil bypassing restrictions by changing flags and routes.^{6 11} The US Congress is already considering legislative initiatives that directly target this fleet and the companies that insure or service it.¹¹ The EU is currently limiting itself to regulating its companies, avoiding secondary sanctions against third countries, which, according to the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry, leaves Russia "oxygen" to continue the war.

Secondary sanctions: what the EU is missing

Budris directly says that it is secondary sanctions that could become the tool that "shakes up" the Russian decision-making system, forcing the Kremlin to count the real cost of war.⁷ . These are restrictions not only for Russian companies, but also for banks, traders, logistics operators in third countries - from Turkey to the Gulf and Asia, which help Moscow circumvent Western restrictions.^{7 11} The US is already taking this approach: being listed on OFAC means de facto isolation from the dollar system and global markets.

The EU is much more cautious in this regard: it tries to avoid conflicts with partners outside the Union and focuses on regulating its own companies. For Lithuania, which lives a few dozen kilometers from the border with Russia and Belarus, such caution seems like a dangerous luxury. That is why Budris cites the United States as an example of a country that, despite disputes, is not afraid of confrontation with major players if they support the Russian military machine financially or technologically.^{7 11} .

Lithuanian view: sanctions as an element of security on the eastern flank

Lithuania systematically builds its foreign policy around tough deterrence of Russia. Budris regularly reminds partners that for the Baltics, sanctions are not an abstract instrument of "general policy", but a direct component of national security.^{3 7} In an interview with European and American media, he emphasizes: as long as the Russian economy receives enough resources to finance the army and the military-industrial complex, the threat to Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland does not decrease, even if the front in Ukraine stabilizes.^{3 9} .

In this context, the statement that the US “does more than the EU” sounds like a warning: if the European Union does not catch up to the level of Washington’s sanctions resolve, the eastern flank will remain vulnerable, and Kyiv will remain under an insufficient economic shield.⁷ For Ukraine, Lithuania's voice is also important because Vilnius often becomes the internal advocate for tougher decisions in Brussels — from energy sanctions to the use of frozen Russian assets for the benefit of restoring our state.

What's next: expectations from the 20th sanctions package

Budris directly links his criticism to expectations from the 20th EU sanctions package, which is due to be adopted on February 24.⁷ He demands that this package not become another compromise of the “lowest common denominator”, but finally hit key sectors — energy, finance, military-industrial complex, as well as channels for circumventing already existing restrictions.^{4 7} This concerns the expansion of the lists of companies and banks through which Russia imports electronics, equipment, microchips, and other components critical to the army.

For Ukraine, the outcome of this discussion has practical significance. If the EU confines itself to cosmetic changes, the Kremlin will take this as a signal that the West's sanctions "window of opportunity" is running out, and will try to use any pause to regroup forces and adapt the economy to partial restrictions.^{4 11} If the 20th package becomes truly ambitious, synchronized with American measures, it will increase pressure on Moscow and demonstrate that Europe and the United States are capable of acting as a united sanctions front.

Sources

1. Geopolitique.eu: interview with Kestutis Budris about EU sanctions, the need for increased pressure, and dissatisfaction with insufficiently strict energy restrictions.
2. DW, Hudson Institute, Cipher Brief: Budris's speeches on Lithuania's role in supporting Ukraine, defense spending, and the importance of sanctions in containing Russia.
3. Hudson/Cipher Brief video: Budris' theses on the security of NATO's eastern flank and the severance of energy ties with Russia.
4. RBC-Ukraine, European Pravda: Budris's statements about the need for the 18th package of sanctions and a blow to vulnerable sectors of the Russian economy.
5. Ukrainska Pravda (Eng): Budris' comments after the EU Council meeting on the content of the 17th sanctions package and the need to move forward.
6. Forbes and other Western media: analysis of EU sanctions against the "shadow fleet" and comparison with the US approach to secondary sanctions.
7. Anadolu Agency (AA): Budris' quotes about the US doing more than the EU on certain issues, and the demand to make the 20th sanctions package truly ambitious.
8. UNN: Budris's statements on the preparation of the 19th sanctions package, the importance of preserving transatlantic unity, and increasing pressure on Russia.
9. Human Rights Watch, other European reviews: the context of the EU debate on sanctions, migration policy, and human rights.
10. A&O Shearman review: comparison of US, EU and UK sanctions regimes, data on American KleptoCapture and REPO mechanisms and the scale of blocked Russian assets.