Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine: historical revisionism and "dual diplomacy"

Madison L. Sargent

The growth of digital diplomacy has provided state entities with new opportunities to advance their national interests.

Twitter has become a "megaphone and the main means of communication" ^[1] for heads of state, state institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and scientists. The Russian Federation used the growing importance of social media platforms for diplomacy to legitimize and normalize its 2014 annexation of Crimea, which is almost universally recognized as Ukrainian territory. ^[2] Despite an active digital campaign, the percentage of Ukrainians who consider Crimea a Russian territory has actually decreased since 2014. Moreover, Russia's activity in social networks did not strengthen its claim to Crimea, but it gives an idea of ​​how the state uses new technologies below the threshold of war to achieve strategic goals.

Context

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine became the owner of the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world. Encouraged by both the United States and Russia, Ukraine abandoned the arsenal of international security guarantees protecting its independence and territorial sovereignty, as specified in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. ^[3] In 2014, Russia violated these security guarantees by invading Crimea and annexing it after the overthrow of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych during the Revolution of Dignity (known internationally as the Euromaidan Revolution). The annexation was immediately condemned, ^[4].world leaders point to international law as the basis of their arguments against the alleged act of aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin replied that the security guarantees given in the early 1990s were valid only with the pre-revolutionary Ukrainian government, hinting that the post-Euromaidan government is headed by a "new" one ^[5] the state, and that the Russian armed forces have an obligation to protect ethnic Russians from the "nationalist junta" ^[6] in Kyiv. Since most of the international community rejected these justifications, Russia launched a revisionist information campaign to legitimize the occupation of the peninsula.

Wider use of social media has led to the spread of historical revisionism and reinterpretation of current events, although the Kremlin is no stranger to distorting the narrative about its behavior. For example, Moscow has long sought to eradicate data on the mass murder of almost 22 Polish soldiers by the Red Army in 000 in Katyn, focusing on the destruction of the Belarusian village of Khatyn by occupying Nazi troops. ^[7] Only in 1990 did the Soviets admit that the Red Army was "responsible for the murders" ^[8], despite the fact that Kremlin-sponsored social media accounts, such as the account of the Russian Mission to the EU (@RusMission_EU), denied this fact as recently as May 2020. ^[9] Russia uses internet trolls,^[10] boots, ^[11] and government-affiliated social media accounts to shape the narrative by targeting naïve social media users who either inadvertently perpetuate lies or rely on an extreme form of confirmation bias ^[12], in which they only receive and re-share content with which they agree.

Digital activity in Russia

In recent years, Russia has honed its tactics in relation to social networks, along with some other methods of waging information warfare. Russia's information war against Ukraine was described in 2014 by US Air Force General Philip Breedlove as "the most stunning information war blitzkrieg." ^[13] Social networks play an important role in the Russian strategy of information warfare, as they provide "cheap, effective and highly effective access" ^[14]public, while maintaining plausible deniability of the Kremlin. The conditions of the environment of social networks - a sense of anonymity, coverage and speed - create unique problems for combating information campaigns on such platforms. Social media platforms allow trolls and bots to connect with real people, who can be divided into three categories: (1) "useful idiots" who unknowingly lend credence to Russian propaganda and goals; (2) "companions" who sympathize with Russia and the Kremlin; (3) "provocateurs" who are actively manipulated by the Russian government. ^[15]  Collectively, these individuals and accounts provide the Kremlin with sufficient grounds to engage in narrative-building and other disinformation campaigns.

Twitter and other social networks give the Russian government the opportunity to export its historical and political narratives to both foreign governments and private individuals in all corners of the world. Those who are not involved in Ukrainian-Russian relations, international law or the main forces of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity may be more susceptible to Russian propaganda that "Crimea is Russia" and that Russia invaded to "protect Crimea" from " nationalist junta" is the government after Euromaidan. ^[16] Such people can promote these views, paying attention to Russia's position, further legitimization and normalization. In addition, such attention confirms the bias of pro-Russian activists who seek confirmation of their views on the Internet. ^[17] Political experts can also accidentally or purposefully contribute to this prejudice. Excerpt from November 2019 ^[18], in which American political commentator Tucker Carlson asks: "Why shouldn't I root for Russia? And I'm sick", about the ongoing war in the east of Ukraine, which became viral and provoked the condemnation of many Twitter users. Carlson in this case was a "useful idiot" ^[19], and it is necessary to take into account the confidence that his comment could give to pro-Russian activists, although it is difficult to measure it quantitatively.

The Russian government uses several official accounts on Twitter to create an image of Crimea. Some of the most prominent government accounts are the account of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (@MFA_Russia), the account of the Government of Russia (@GovernmentRF) and the account of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia in Crimea (@PMSimferopol). These accounts publish tweets about Crimea in two different ways: 1) some messages comment on the sovereignty of the peninsula, usually arguing Russia's historical right to it, and 2) other messages try to make Crimea a Russian territory, emphasizing its beauty and industrial nature, distracting attention from the disputes surrounding its status . On June 25, 2020, @MFA_Russia posted a photo on Twitter ^[20] Parade of the Victory in the Second World War in Crimea with the caption "# Zakharova: # Kyiv continues to make statements fueled by a distorted sense of reality. @MFA_Ukraine "protested" against the Victory 75 Parade in Crimea, without seeking any "approval" from Kyiv. We remind you that # Crimea is an integral part of # Russia. #Check in real conditions.” Such messages are a clear attempt to delegitimize Ukraine's claims to Crimea. Less aggressive tweets included images of the echo above the bridge across the Kerch Strait ^[21], frescoes by "artists from Moscow and Krasnodar region" ^[22] , as well as reports on economic development ^[23] and improving the quality of life in Crimea. ^[24] Similar tweets, depicting Crimea as a flourishing society and a tourist destination, are aimed at normalizing the situation on the peninsula. If you take these posts at face value, they do not even suggest that the region is at the center of an international crisis. Government-related accounts such as those mentioned are considered "white exits" ^[25], because their affiliation and loyalty are obvious, which facilitates their attribution to the state.

Accounts in social networks whose affiliation to the Kremlin is not so obvious are considered more nefarious. These include "gray exits" - conspiracy sites and data dumps - and "black exits" - personal user accounts. ^[26] A relevant example of a black outlet is the St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency (IRA), a "troll farm" headed by Russian oligarch Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin. The IRA conducted the Lakhta project, an informational influence operation aimed at sowing discord among Americans regarding the 2016 US presidential election. ^[27] Organizations like the IRA are not necessarily controlled by the Kremlin, ^[28] But they reinforce the narratives of the Russian government by responding to official messages, retweeting them, and liking them. These users can also create their own messages and links that are considered pro-Russian activism, because they sympathize with the Russian regime, have anti-Western sentiments, or publish messages only with the intention of upsetting other users. Not all gray or black outlets are also recognized as malicious - some may think that they are sharing reliable information and do not realize the large role they play in the information sphere. However, gray and black accounts, due to their relative anonymity and number compared to white accounts, make the biggest contribution to the spread of disinformation and perform most of the work for the Kremlin, usually without even being told about it.

Data collected from white and black sockets can end up in gray sockets, which then flow back to white and black sockets when users move between them. Internet trolls are the majority of users of white and black outlets. According to a 2018 RAND Corporation study, the largest group of Twitter trolls in Eastern Europe are accounts of pro-Russian activists, with 2016 active users from May to July 40. ^[29] These accounts mostly retweeted pro-Russian media accounts such as Zvezda News (@zvezdanews) and state-run RT (@rt_russian) and most often attached hashtags such as #RussianWorld and #CrimeaIsOurs to the content they shared. ^[30] The influence of these stories on the formation of the narrative about the Russian government is inestimable. Troll accounts are more likely to be topics that interact with real Twitter users, other trolls, and bots than Russian government accounts. A pro-Russian troll account can involve a private citizen in a "two-way form of interaction in the form of a dialogue" ^[31] to influence this user's point of view on the situation in Crimea, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may be perceived as acting in an inappropriate manner for this. Bots and trolls exist in large numbers and can persistently tweet, desperately trying to interact, which would lead to a loss of political capital for the official account. The most important thing is that bots, using their large number of people, manipulate the algorithms of social networks, which determine what is ranked higher for users partly due to the level of interaction, and trolls can create "the appearance of genuine interaction" ^[32] and talks about the legality of Russia's claim to Crimea, creating an imaginary acceptance of the 2014 annexation.

Russia's attempts to change historical narratives both online and offline have also led to clashes with foreign governments on Twitter, the most relevant of which is the main state account of Ukraine @Ukraine. On May 30, 2017, the main government account of Russia posted a photo on Twitter ^[33] Sophia Cathedral, one of the oldest Orthodox cathedrals in the world, with the inscription "We are proud of our common history. Russia, Ukraine and Belarus have the same historical heritage, which should unite our peoples, not divide us." @Ukraine responded with a gif from the TV show "The Simpsons" with the caption "You really don't change, do you?" ^[34] Exchange after the meeting between French President Emmanuel Macron and Russian President Vladimir Putin, in which Putin asserted that Franco-Russian friendship began at 11 - ^м century, when Anna of Kiev became the French queen. ^[35]

The comment was considered offensive to Ukrainians who recognize Anna of Kyiv as part of their national history, considering that the current capital of Ukraine is Kyiv. @Ukraine immediately published an infographic on Twitter in which it explained that Anna is not a link in French-Russian relations, considering that at that time there was no Russian state. ^[36] While @Russia's tweet received 3000 retweets and 3000 likes, @Ukraine's response garnered almost 39 retweets and 000 likes, indicating overwhelming support for Ukraine's message, despite the fact that the Twitter account has 55 fewer followers , than in the Russian state account. At the very least, this indicates a strong preference for Ukraine's message and rejection of Russian efforts to shape the narrative on the platform.

Analysis

Digital coverage of the Russian Federation seems to be limited, despite an active information campaign. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Twitter account receives most of the attention from other government accounts, such as the Russian Mission in Geneva (@mission_Russian) and the Russian Mission to the United Nations (@RussiaUN), bots and trolls. ^[37] Other government-related accounts appear to be in the same predicament. These results allow us to conclude that the accounts of the Russian government on Twitter most often work in digital echo chambers, practically without affecting changes among the non-Russian population. Russian accounts affiliated with the state are able to attract attention not only from their echo chambers, but usually because they attract negative attention from other international players.^[38] Although digital diplomacy is an instrument of public diplomacy, it does not currently have the ability to change international opinion. This point of view is confirmed by a public opinion poll conducted in 2018 by the Ukrainian non-governmental organization Razumkov Center, during which Ukrainians were asked whether they believe that Crimea should belong to Ukraine. According to the poll, 69% of Ukrainians considered Crimea a part of Ukraine, while an absolute minority both in the south and in the east - parts of Ukraine with the largest ethnic Russian population - believed that it should belong to Russia. ^[39] From 2016 to 2018, support for Crimea, controlled by Russia, actually decreased (from 7,2% to 4,4% ^[40]), which indicates that, among other things, Russian social media campaigns did not contribute to increasing support for annexation in Ukraine. ^[41]

It is noteworthy that, in general, Russia's unsuccessful attempt to change the perception of the annexation of Crimea by foreigners contrasts sharply with possibly more successful information campaigns, such as Russia's interference in American politics and society. Russia conducted a large-scale information warfare campaign aimed at the 2016 presidential election and sought to sway the election in favor of Republican candidate Donald Trump. ^[42] The campaign was aimed at sowing distrust in the mass media, ^[43] to use existing differences in society and erase the boundaries between truth and deception. ^[44] The relative success of the Russian campaign in America can be explained by many external factors, such as the general tolerance for influence campaigns and disinformation in American politics ^[45], as well as the lack of a single American identity, among other things. Ukrainians, given their historical relations with Russia, may also show increased sensitivity to the behavior of the Russian government, and although Americans generally consider Russia unfriendly or an enemy of the United States ^[46], they don't all know how the Kremlin works. Thus, the effectiveness of Russian information campaigns largely depends on the vulnerability of the target population, as can be seen from the comparison between the Ukrainian and American populations.

Conclusion

After the annexation of Crimea, Russia launched an information campaign to create a narrative about the historical and current status of the territory. This information campaign used various methods of influence on Twitter, including state-sponsored messages, trolls and bots. Although some accounts are directly linked to the Russian government, many operate independently, and their operators are naive or ambivalent about their role in information campaigns in Russia. These efforts strengthened the presence of the Russian government in the digital sphere and created a lot of "noise" both on the Internet and offline, but ultimately did little to change the perception of the status of Crimea in Ukraine and the international community. However, Openness, with which this strategy was carried out, shows how Moscow strives to use social network platforms in the interests of Russian foreign policy as a whole. A keen understanding of Russia's preferred methodologies is crucial for responsible national security in the information age.