Hybrid war and active measures

Hybrid war. Since the inauguration of Vladimir Putin as President of Russia after the stormy rule of Boris Yeltsin, Russia has been conducting a coordinated policy of conventional espionage measures, cyber-intrusions, and information operations aimed at the United States.

Translation Author Articles: Gabriel Lloyd

Tested on multi-domain battlefields and computer networks of vulnerable Baltic neighbors, active intelligence campaigns and Russian influence operations caught the United States by surprise. Four successive US presidential administrations fought Russian aggression, but the US response invariably lacked cohesion, strategy, and deterrence effectiveness.

Russia's use of social networks as a weapon and its readiness to attack the foundations of American democracy have made the development of a coherent US strategy a matter of urgent national importance. Hybrid war, a special tactic that Putin's Russia is using against the United States, and covering recent US responses to Russian espionage campaigns and cyber influence, this document identifies powerful tools and models of hybrid warfare strategies that together represent a growing threat to US national security.

While a hybrid war is inferior to a conventional military conflict in terms of physical destruction, its detrimental consequences for American security are indisputable and suggest the need for a long-term comprehensive strategy on the part of the United States.

Hybrid war

Modern Russian intelligence operations, cybernetic intrusions, and influence operations have found both strength in the spread of social networking technologies and a receptive target in the existing political and social contradictions in the United States.

Media reports, including dramatic documentaries and breathtaking biographical films about ten Russian "illegals" arrested in 2010, give the impression of either a newly developed Russian script or a full-scale return to the Cold War era, when spy against spy .

None of the points of view is completely accurate.

Russia under Putin pursues transparent foreign policy goals aimed at strengthening Russia's prestige in the international arena, reducing American unipolar global influence, and fundamentally changing the existing international power structure.

Assessment of Russian policy goals Baltic Bulletin briefly explains the attitude of the Putin era to the international system, noting that "Russia strives to acquire the status of a superpower and change the rules of the international system in order to put an end to the domination of the West and establish a multipolar world order", and notes that Russia has no interest in "seeking cooperation with Western countries on equal terms, without violating the current status quo." [I] The new set of tools that Putin-era Russia uses against the United States to achieve these goals exists in the larger structure of the Gerasimov doctrine and hybrid warfare.

Analysts have used many terms to describe the fusion of Russian espionage, cyber and information operations, but all three can best be explained as elements of Russian strategy hybrid war . Hybrid war "implies Moscow's use of a wide range of explosive devices, many of which are not of military use, to advance Russia's national interests." [II]

Although Russian officials themselves do not use the term, this concept includes espionage, cyber, and information operations directed against the United States, as well as a number of other military and governmental actions against neighboring Baltic states, European Union states, and other regional and global competitors.

The conceptual basis of hybrid warfare, developed by a political scientist RAND Corporation Christopher Chivvys, which offers three defining characteristics and six common tools, clarifies the nature of the Russian threat of hybrid warfare to the United States.

The Russian hybrid war is not a military strategy or a diplomatic strategy, but rather a combination of seemingly disparate elements of government operations into a single instrument of national power.

Chivvys notes that the hybrid war "economizes the use of force... it is permanent... [and] oriented towards the population." [III]

Nuclear deterrence, massive infantry and artillery formations, and secret submarines remain elements of Russia's vision of national security, but the atrophy of Soviet power after the Cold War has forced Russia to seek long-term, cost-effective, and partially covert strategies that will achieve in the long term what cannot be achieved alone only military equipment for Russia, superior in military terms.

Cyber ​​tools, information operations and espionage are not tools for casual use. Instead, "hybrid warfare destroys the traditional binary distinction between war and peace... strategies of hybrid warfare are always applied, although at certain moments they may become sharper and more intense or turn into conventional combat operations." [IV]

A diverse array of tactics supports current hybrid warfare operations, including information operations, cyber operations, the use of proxy forces, economic influence, covert (intelligence) operations, and political influence. [IN] All six elements are present in Russia's increasingly daring efforts against the United States over the past decade.

Despite the fact that he does not specifically use the term "hybrid war", Valery Gerasimov's professional articles provide the clearest insight into contemporary Russian strategic thinking and lay the conceptual foundations for understanding Russia's recent operations against the United States.

Gerasimov, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, describes the global "tendency to erase the boundaries between the state of war and peace" and notes that the "Arab Spring" and "color revolutions" indicate that "a beautifully prosperous state can in the course of months and even days will turn into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign interference and plunge into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe and civil war. [YOU]

Gerasimov's writings present a deeply formulated sense of Russia's vulnerability to dangerous global trends and the need for a decisive national response. Surprisingly, Gerasimov claims that "the very rules of war have changed." The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has increased, and in many cases they are more effective than weapons." [VII]

Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Thomas, a senior analyst at the Office of Foreign Military Research of the US Army, downplaying the novelty of Gerasimov's work, notes that "Gerasimov's speech ... is the first to express the observation that non-military methods are used in modern conflicts in a ratio of 4:1 compared to military methods." . [VIII] This concept of hybrid warfare, which is indirectly referred to by a high-ranking Russian military official in open publications, is a fundamental strategic vision on which Russia builds its espionage, cyber and influence operations.

Espionage, cyber operations and information operations on the Internet

Hybrid warfare can take various forms, from subtle information operations to full-scale military clashes. The main tools that Russia used against the United States in the 21- ^м veke are divided into three categories: espionage operations, cyber-intrusions and hacking, as well as operations with information or influence. Russian strategists combine these three types of tools in interdependent strategies of hybrid warfare.

These tools, implemented mainly through separate organizations of state security of Russia, retain clear similarities with Soviet operations during the Cold War and achieved a huge effect due to the use of technologies.

Thomas Reed describes the merging of intelligence and targeted disinformation campaigns in the 1960s, when intelligence agencies conducted targeted disinformation campaigns as an element of the so-called political war.

By the end of the 1970s, "disinformation had become well-resourced and fine-tuned... it had risen to the level of an operational science on a global scale, managed by a vast, well-oiled bureaucracy."[IX] This combination of intelligence and information operations became widely known as "active measures."

While the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the KGB largely halted such operations in the 1990s, Putin-era Russia combined traditional concepts of active measures with innovations in cyberwarfare and social media to create modern active measures that have been used against the United States with threatening efficiency

Traditional espionage operations are the basis of active measures campaigns, both during the Cold War and in the 21st century. ^th.century While Russian intelligence operations are most often associated with the recruitment of American spies, such as Robert Hanssen or Aldrich Ames, intelligence officers who possessed and had access to classified information that they could sell to Russian intelligence, traditional agent recruitment is only one of parties of Russian intelligence. In the 1960s and 1970s, KGB intelligence officers led disinformation campaigns.

Today, disinformation remains an important part of the repertoire of Russian special services. Gordon Korera, referring to 10 Russian sleeper agents or "illegals" arrested and sold in 2010, notes that observers downplay the threat posed by these operatives because they do not receive classified material. Korera claims that they participated in information operations during the Cold War in the version of hybrid warfare of the 21st century, and this phenomenon is as dangerous as the compromise of classified information. Korera asks the question: "What if spies are not after secrets, but influence?", noting that "Kremlin agents learned to conduct espionage, influence operations and use new technologies in the conflict with the West, for many years they remained unnoticed." [X]

Despite the necessary attention paid to information operations on the Internet and cyber-methodology after the 2016 presidential election in the United States, traditional Russian intelligence operations remain the main element of Putin's strategy against the West.

The recent involvement of Russian special services in attacks on former Russian intelligence officers exiled to Europe has added to the anxiety of Russian espionage operations in Europe.

In 2006, exiled FSB spy Alexander Lytvynenko died after polonium-210 was secretly mixed into his tea in London. Likewise, in 2018, Sergei Skripal, a former GRU intelligence officer who carried out a spy exchange in 2010 for 10 Russian illegals, miraculously escaped death after being exposed to a high dose of the Novichok nerve agent.

Just as in the case of cyberattacks, it is difficult to establish ironic attribution to these attacks. A lengthy British investigation into Lytvynenko's death found that the attack was likely ordered by the Russian authorities, but Russia refused to extradite the leading suspects for prosecution. In the case of Skripal[XIV] Russian killings of defectors did not reach the shores of America, but the audacity of these operations and the mysterious poisoning of the leader of the Russian opposition, Alexei Navalny, point to the inclusion of Cold War-era killing methods in the hybrid war scenario. Assassination on American soil is unlikely, but far from impossible.

The cyber intrusion of the Russian government into the computer systems of the US federal government in 2020 through hacking Solarwinds represents the latest in a long line of offensive cyber operations that Russia has carried out against the United States and its NATO allies.

Cyber ​​intrusions are another interconnected aspect of Russia's strategy of hybrid warfare. Starting with a powerful denial-of-service attack in 2007 targeting neighboring Estonia, Russia has demonstrated its willingness to use cyberweapons to steal information and state secrets, disrupt online commerce, and disseminate disinformation.

Oliver Fitton points to the effectiveness of these cyber tactics, as well as the difficulty of defending the United States against them, noting that "cyber operations are difficult to attribute, and in some cases -[XII] a closer study of the attack Solarwinds can serve as a useful example of the application of offensive cyber operations in contrast to information operations using cybernetic means."

Break Solarwinds, revealed by representatives of the private sector and the US government in December 2020, represents perhaps the most serious state-sponsored cyber attack targeting the United States, and the clearest indicator that Russia is actively pursuing a policy of offensive cyber operations within the country, as part of a larger strategy hybrid war

Hacking also demonstrates the absolute effectiveness of state-sponsored cyber operations. During this attack on the "supply chain", Russian hackers penetrated the servers Solarwinds, a company whose software is widely used as a popular IT resource management tool.

Hackers used periodic software updates Solarwinds for the installation of backdoor access and the penetration of malicious software into state and private networks. Unclassified networks from the Pentagon, the Department of Homeland Security, the State Department, the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration, and the Ministry of Finance faced widespread compromise.

The attack continued for several months until it was discovered in December.

Tom Bossert, President Trump's national security advisor, describes the massive scale of this hack, saying that “the Russians had access to a significant number of important and confidential networks for six to nine months. The Russian SVR will probably use its access to further gain administrative control over the networks," claiming that "the Russians have access to a significant number of important and confidential networks for six to nine months. [XIII]

For most of the year, unfettered access to the SVR prevents experts from assessing what other systems may be compromised and the exact target of the attack.

Reflecting on a possible Russian strategy, Bossert argues that “the actual and perceived control over so many important networks can easily be used to undermine public and consumer confidence in data… in networks that are controlled by the Russians, they have the right to destroy or alter data and expose themselves for legal people. Domestic and geopolitical tensions can escalate quite easily if they use their access for malicious influence and disinformation – both hallmarks of Russia's behavior.” [XIV]

Just as the use of sleeper agents in conventional espionage operations supported the ultimate goal of aiding Russian influence campaigns, cyberattacks Solarwinds also creates an infrastructure to support information operations.

The United States has been largely aware of its vulnerability to cyber operations and traditional espionage for many years, but Russia's ability to use social media as a weapon in influence operations caught most Americans off guard.

Starting in 2014, the Internet Research Agency, a Russian troll farm, used online marketing tools to conduct information operations and propaganda campaigns on behalf of Russian security services directed at US citizens.

"We have a multi-strategic, multi-threaded approach to influence and division," says Renee DiResta, manager of technical research at the Stanford Internet Research Observatory. [XIV]

In the period from 2014 to 2016, during the elections in the USA, the Internet Research Agency and the GRU of Russia conducted more than 20 campaigns of influence in social networks, aimed at 13 countries. [XVI] Meg Kelly and Alice Samuels from New York Times provide an informative and disturbing summary of these operations, noting that "Russian operatives used social networks as a weapon, using services and methods developed by technology companies for advertisers. They used traditional media, sharing hacked information and spreading sensational stories with the help of fake online personas. They renewed the long-established tactics of propaganda with unreliable behavior in social networks and traditional mass media in order to attract the attention of voters in the digital age. [XVII]

Social networks have provided Russia with a mechanism that allows to combine traditional espionage operations for influence and cyberattacks into a single powerful weapon that is difficult to detect or prevent. Just as Gerasimov's concept of hybrid warfare seeks to synchronize the domains of combat operations, Russian active measures in the 21st century combine the effects of the previously separate disciplines of security and intelligence.

Inconsistent and non-existent US policy

There is a broad consensus in the political and analytical communities that the threat to US national security from Russian espionage, cyber operations, and multidisciplinary active measures is serious and constantly growing. However, the creation of a comprehensive response strategy proved difficult for the leaders of both political parties.

The answer is also only part of the solution. The policy of the United States should consist of both elements of deterrence and elements of reaction, proactive and countermeasures to limit Russia's ability to achieve its long-term strategic goals of changing the existing international system. This section will consider a sample of the US response to espionage, cyber and information campaigns.

The reaction of the United States to Russian espionage operations has changed little since the Cold War. The expulsion of Russian spies with diplomatic credentials or the exchange of "illegals" for arrested American intelligence assets are not new methods.

However, previous administrations tried their best to balance punitive measures with the desire not to destroy bilateral relations with Russia. For example, in response to Russian cyberattacks on the Democratic National Committee (DNC) in 2016, the Obama administration ordered the expulsion of 35 Russian intelligence officers (under diplomatic cover), as well as imposing a number of new sanctions against the government of Vladimir Putin and private corporations accused of , that they serve as cover for Russian intelligence operations. Representatives of the administration hinted at other secret measures of response.[XVIII]

The capture of 10 Russian "illegals" in 2010 became a problem that could rarely be encountered since the Cold War, since none of the accused employees of the special services had diplomatic immunity.

Under such circumstances, criminal prosecution remains an option, but administration officials have decided to exchange ten agents for four Russian double agents who worked for the United States and Great Britain before being jailed in Russia on espionage charges.

Expulsion or replacement of intelligence officers is expensive for the Russian intelligence services, since these officers have many years of experience and contacts in the United States. However, there is little evidence that the threat of expulsion in itself serves as a deterrent. Instead, Russia considers such risks as the cost of doing business in intelligence.

The reaction of the USA to the attacks of the Russian special services on dissidents also largely corresponded to the methods of expulsion and sanctions during the Cold War.

In response to the poisoning of former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal in 2018, the Trump administration announced the expulsion of 60 Russian diplomats (some of them, presumably, intelligence officers) and the closure of the diplomatic corps in Seattle. However, without requiring a permanent reduction in the number of personnel in diplomatic units, all 60 were replaced by some combination of legitimate diplomats and intelligence officers. [XX] Despite the seriousness of the accusations of murder, the United States again tried to balance a "proportionate response" with the desire to maintain some level of friendly relations in bilateral relations with Russia.

Cyber ​​attacks and hacking are a clear problem for the US authorities.

First, the attribution of cyberattacks can be a complex and lengthy process. Herbert Lin, a senior researcher at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, notes that “all judgments about attribution are necessarily accompanied by some degree of uncertainty... the attribution of malicious cyber activity may be related to a machine, a specific person, exerting pressure on a person. keys ... and to the party that is considered to be fully responsible for this activity. [xx]

Just as the United States takes technical measures to hide its involvement in cyber operations, Russia also operates through a network of proxies, private corporations, and fake certificates.

Secondly, cyberwarfare and cyberespionage are completely different activities. invasion Solarwinds, although it damaged US national security, was not an act of cyberwarfare, but rather another form of intelligence gathering.

Borghard notes that "to call [Solarwinds] a cyberattack would be inappropriate. At this point, the operation appears to have been espionage for the purpose of stealing national security information, not for the purpose of disrupting, disproving, or degrading U.S. government data or networks... counterintelligence[XXI] On the contrary, The United States views Russian cyberattacks and hacking as espionage and has traditionally used the appropriate tools of government in response, primarily diplomatic expulsions and limited sanctions.

The Biden administration's response to the hack Solar winds, which was announced on April 15, 2021, had much in common with previous US responses to state-sponsored cyber intrusions, but clearly sought to establish clear attribution.

President Biden signed a decree that, in addition to announcing the expulsion of ten Russian diplomats from diplomatic missions in Washington, DC, imposed sanctions on 32 individuals and legal entities, "implementing requests sent by the Russian government that will affect the 2020 presidential election in the United States, and other actions . disinformation and interference". [XXII]

In addition, the White House directly called the "Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), also known as APT 29, Cozy Bear и The Dukes, the perpetrator of a large-scale cyberespionage campaign using the platform SolarWinds Orion"said: "The US intelligence community very much trusts its assessment of the attribution of SVR." [XXIII]

Finally, the National Security Agency, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation released a joint statement titled "Russia's SVR Targets US and Allied Networks," seeking to publish warning information to reduce the effectiveness of future Russian cyberespionage operations. [XXIV]

The decision of the Biden administration to deal with cyberespionage (Solarwinds), and with the interference in elections with the help of social networks with the help of a single reaction is evidence of the growing awareness that Russian methods of hybrid warfare are elements of a single strategy, and not separate incidents that cause concern.

In 2018, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on five Russian citizens and 19 individuals for cyber activity related to the 2016 election, but was hesitant to make longer-term policy changes. However, by 2019, the Trump administration recognized the vulnerability of the US electoral system and warned that technological advances would only increase the risk of foreign interference.

In a memo to Congress, Trump wrote that "the ability of individuals... outside the United States to interfere with or undermine public confidence in elections in the United States, including through unauthorized access to election and electoral infrastructure or the covert dissemination of propaganda and disinformation, continues to represent an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States".[XXV] However, the memorandum did not mention that Russia is the leading perpetrator of disinformation.

Since the widespread use of social networks has contributed to the implementation of the modern Russian disinformation strategy, social network platforms have made some efforts to solve this problem on the part of the private sector. Twitter banned political advertising on the eve of the 2020 presidential election, a Facebook и Google created tools that allow users to verify the source of political advertising and content. Facebook subjected some reports to fact-checking by third-party organizations, which led to increased domestic political tension in the United States. Across the social media industry, engineers have focused new attention on removing fraudulent accounts and bots from their platforms with some degree of success. [XXVI]

Controversy continues over the extent to which social media platforms are required to screen and censor misleading content, and government regulators are still reluctant to subject companies to strict government oversight.

employee Brookings Niamh Yaraghy ​​notes that "there are two ways to look at social media platforms: on the one hand, we can look at them as technologies that simply allow people to publish and share content... on the other hand, we can argue that social media platforms are now content curators" . [XXVII] Despite limited efforts to combat their exploitation as a means of delivering Russian influence and disinformation, major social media companies remain vulnerable to continued exploitation.

Conclusions

Russia's active measures exist as part of the hybrid warfare strategy developed by President Putin as a tool to achieve foreign and domestic political goals. The United States did not have a comprehensive response strategy under the last three administrations. While the constitutional and democratic norms of the United States require a different foreign strategic textbook than in Russia, nevertheless, it is extremely important for the United States to implement a structured, comprehensive strategy of deterrence and response to brazen acts of aggression aimed at undermining the national security and internal governance of the United States .

Although Russia's active measures are largely an improvement on the strategies and tactics of the Cold War, their amazing success in destroying the life of America undoubtedly attracted the attention of other adversaries of the United States, primarily China, Iran, and North Korea.

Defense and intelligence agencies must continue to study how their equal and close adversaries around the world are developing their own active measures.

The exponential growth of technological interdependence practically guarantees that active measures in various forms will remain a threat to US national security in the foreseeable future.

[I] Franklin Kramer and Lauren Speranza, "Russia's Hybrid Challenge: A Comprehensive Strategic Framework," Atlantic Council: Brett Scowcroft Center for International Security, May 2017, as of April 10, 2021, Russia's Hybrid Challenge: Complex Strategic Framework.

[II] Christopher Chivvys, "Understanding the Russian" hybrid war "and what can be done with it", Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives, March 22, 2017, as of April 10, 2021, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT468/RAND_CT468.pdf

[III] Chivvys, "Understanding the Russian" hybrid war "and what can be done with it"

[IV] Chivvys, "Understanding the Russian" hybrid war "and what can be done with it"

[IN] Chivvys, "Understanding the Russian" hybrid war "and what can be done with it"

[YOU] Valery Gerasimov, "The value of science is foresight, new challenges require a rethinking of the forms and methods of conducting hostilities", Military Review, January and February 2016, p. 24, as of April 10, 2021, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/m military-review/Archives/English/M militaryReview_20160228_art008.pdf,

[VII] Gerasimov, "The value of science is foreseen, new challenges require rethinking of the forms and methods of conducting combat operations", p. 24.

[VIII] Timothy Thomas, "Evolution of the character of warfare in Russia", Military Review, July and August 2017, p. 41, as of April 10, 2021, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/m military-review/Archives/English/M militaryReview_20170831_THOMAS_Russias_Way_of_War.pdf#:~:text=

[IX] Thomas Reed, Active measures: the secret history of disinformation and political warfare (Sl: Profile Books, 2021), p. 7.

[X] Gordon Corera, Russians among us: sleeping cells, ghost stories and the hunt for Putin's agents (Sl: William Collins, 2021), p. 7.

[XIV] Rivell, Patrick. "Before Navalny - a long history of Russian poisoners." ABC News, ABC News Network, 26 Aug. 2020, abcnews.go.com/International/navalny-long-history-russian-poisonings/story?id=72579648.

[XII] Oliver Fitton, "Cyber ​​operations and gray areas: challenges for NATO", Connections: The Quarterly Journal 15, no. 2 (2016): p, 116, doi: 10.11610 / connections.15.2.08

[XIII] Thomas P. Bossert, “I Was Trump's National Security Advisor. We're Being Hacked," The New York Times, December 17, 2020, p. 116, as of April 18, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/16/opinion/fireeye-solarwinds- russia-hack.html

[XIV] Bossert, “I was Trump's homeland security adviser. We are being hacked", 2020.

[XIV] Meg Kelly and Elise Samuels, Analysis | How Russia Turned Social Media into a Weapon, Caught and Escaped the Consequences,” The Washington Post, November 18, 2019, as of April 18, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politik/2019/11/18 / how-russian-weapons-social-media-caught-and-escaped-consequences /

[XVI] Kelly and Samuels, Analysis | How Russia turned social networks into a weapon, caught and escaped the consequences, 2021

[XVII] Kelly and Samuels, Analysis | How Russia turned social networks into a weapon, caught and escaped the consequences, 2021

[XVIII] David E. Sanger, “Obama Strikes Back at Russia for Election Hacking,” The New York Times, December 29, 2016, as of April 18, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/ us/politics/russia-election-hacking-sanctions.html

[XX] Sonam Sheth, “There is a serious caveat to the expulsion of 60 Russian diplomats from the US,” Business Insider, March 31, 2018, as of April 18, 2021, https://www.businessinsider.com/theres-a - huge-precaution-in-the-US-expulsion-of-60-Russian-diplomats-2018-3

[XX] Herbert Lin, "Attributes of malicious cyber incidents: from soup to nuts", Columbia Journal of International Relations, March 9, 2017, as of April 10, 2021.

[XXI] Erika Borghard, "The hacking of Russia was not a cyber war. This complicates US strategy,” Wired, December 17, 2021, as of April 18, 2021, https://www.wired.com/story/russia-solarwinds-hack-wasnt-cyberwar-us-strategy/

[XXII] "FACT SHEET: The imposition of costs on harmful foreign activity by the Russian government", White House, April 15, 2021, | PAGE |, as of April 18, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room / announcements-releases / 2021/04/15 / fact-list-imposition-of-costs-for-harmful-foreign- activity by the government of Russia /

[XXIII] "FACT BULLETIN: Imposition of costs on harmful foreign activity by the Government of Russia", White House, 2021.

[XXIV] "INFORMATION BULLETIN: The imposition of costs on harmful foreign activity by the Government of Russia", White House, 2021.

[XXV] Christopher Chivvys, "Understanding the Russian" hybrid war "and what can be done with it", Testimony before the Committee on Armed Forces of the US House of Representatives, March 22, 2017, as of April 10, 2021, https: / /www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT468/RAND_CT468.pdf)

[XXVI] Quinny Wong, "Here's How Social Media Companies Fight Election Misinformation," CNET, Nov. 7, 2020, as of April 18, 2021, https://www.cnet.com/news/heres-how-social -media -companies-fighting-elections-disinformation /

[XXVII] Niamh Yaraghy, "How should social media platforms fight misinformation and hate speech?" Brookings, April 9, 2019, as of April 18, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/04/09/how-should-social-media-platforms-combat-misinformation -and-hate -thing/