FT: Russian satellites intercept data from key European devices: a new front in the war in space

When Russian spacecraft "hang" next to European satellites for weeks, adjusting to narrow beams of communication, the war ceases to be purely terrestrial. It is no longer just about guns and missiles, but about the silence in orbit, where the undetected interception of signals could cost Europe control of its own infrastructure.

The British edition of the Financial Times, citing European intelligence agencies, reported that two Russian spacecraft — Luch-1 and Luch-2 — have been approaching the orbital positions of key European satellites over the past three years and have likely intercepted their communications.^{1 2} According to the FT's sources, Russian devices were "hanging" near at least a dozen important geostationary satellites that serve Europe, Britain, as well as much of Africa and the Middle East.^{1 2} Formally, these satellites are used mainly for civilian purposes - satellite television and communications, but they also carry government and some military data, often without proper encryption.^{1 2} .

The commander of the Bundeswehr Space Command, Major General Michael Traut, directly called Luch-1 and Luch-2 devices that “perform electronic reconnaissance” — that is, they record and analyze signals transmitted between ground stations and satellites.^{1 3} One European intelligence official told the FT that the devices were “almost certainly designed to enter a narrow signal cone”, where the beams of data from the ground to the satellite are as concentrated as possible.¹ This does not mean simply “listening to the airwaves,” but rather attempting to gain access to satellite control commands and confidential traffic that is still often transmitted unencrypted on older platforms.^{1 2} .

How Russian “space surveillance” works: the Luch-1 and Luch-2 maneuvers

According to the FT and regional reports, Luch-1 and Luch-2 have been displaying “repeated suspicious maneuvers” in geostationary orbit for at least three years.^{1 2 7} This looked like “stalking” — gradually approaching the orbital position of a specific European satellite, approaching at a relatively short distance and staying nearby for weeks.^{1 2} This behavior differs from standard orbit adjustments: the spacecraft does not simply "pass by", but purposefully lingers near the same object.

The targets were primarily communication satellites of large European operators, which provide television signals, Internet access, and secure communications for government agencies and some military users.^{1 2} The British and German military have previously warned about Russian and Chinese spacecraft "grazing" Western satellites, but now for the first time there has been an assessment that this is not just a technical "familiarity with orbit", but also about intercepting communications.^{5 8} .

Why satellite data is still vulnerable

One European intelligence official admitted in a comment to the FT that many of the European satellites that Russian spacecraft approached were launched at a time when encryption requirements were much lower.¹ Some of them do not have powerful computers on board capable of processing modern encryption algorithms, and control commands and service data are still transmitted in an open or partially protected form.^{1 2} This makes them an attractive target for those seeking not only to intercept signals, but also to understand the structure of protocols and the weaknesses of control systems.

According to experts, if Luch-1 and Luch-2 manage to “stand” in the signal cone between the ground station and the satellite, they can read not only the traffic content, but also service information: command routes, frequencies, time windows.^{1 5} Even if some of the content is encrypted, the metadata — who is communicating, when, with whom, and how often — is already valuable intelligence. And in some cases, where encryption is absent altogether, it can involve direct access to satellite control commands.

What exactly can Russia gain: from eavesdropping to orbit manipulation

Officials spoken to by the FT admit: Luch-1 and Luch-2 are unlikely to be capable of “jamming” or physically destroying satellites on their own.¹ They carry no obvious strike weapons and, judging by their orbital behavior, are geared toward reconnaissance rather than direct sabotage.^{1 2} . However, this does not make their activities any less dangerous. Intercepting official data allows Moscow to accumulate a wealth of information about how the European orbital infrastructure works — where its vulnerabilities are, how it reacts to overload, what protocols are used for orbit correction.

The British and German military warn that possession of such data opens the way for more aggressive actions in the future - from attempts to impose erroneous commands on the satellite to the use of other means (cyberstrikes from the ground or orbital platforms) to manipulate its trajectory.^{3 5} This is what underlies headlines like “Russia may collide satellites” that have already appeared in European media: it is not about an immediate threat, but about a potential that grows with the accumulation of technical information.³ .

The war in Ukraine as a catalyst for the "space front"

FT interlocutors directly link the activation of Luch-1 and Luch-2 with the full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the sharp aggravation of relations between the Kremlin and the West.^{1 2} . Since 2022, Russian cyberattacks and operations against satellite infrastructure have become an integral part of the war: from the hacker attack on Viasat's KA-SAT network in the first hours of the invasion to attempts to jam the satellite signal that provides communication to the Ukrainian military^{6 9} Now, this is being supplemented by the systematic "herding" of European satellites operating over the territory of Europe and Ukraine.

Think tanks that study cyberattacks against satellite networks are already classifying the attack on KA-SAT as “the most destructive cyber operation of the Russian war against Ukraine,” the consequences of which were felt not only in Ukraine but also in EU countries — in particular, in the operation of wind farms in Germany.⁶ Against this background, the orbital operations Luch-1 and Luch-2 look like a logical continuation of the same strategy: to collect maximum information about satellite systems that provide communications, navigation, and data relay for Ukraine and NATO.

The European response: from concern to the search for deterrence tools

European officials and military officials, commenting on the situation to the FT and other media outlets, admit that they are “extremely concerned” about the vulnerability of satellite systems and that Russia’s activities in space are becoming increasingly aggressive.^{1 5} Germany and the UK publicly warned about the threat of “orbital espionage” as early as 2025 and emphasized that Russia and China were systematically trying to gain an advantage in the space segment.^{5 8} Now that it has become known about the interception of data, the conversation is moving from the level of general warnings to the plane of specific questions: how exactly to protect satellites, how to respond to such actions, and what "red lines" in space Europe is ready to draw.

One possible response is to develop and deploy our own “inspection” satellites that can monitor suspicious activity in the immediate vicinity of European spacecraft.⁵ . Another is the modernization of old satellites or accelerated replacement with new platforms with built-in encryption and protection against spoofing (signal substitution). At the same time, lawyers and diplomats remind that so far, international rules for space activities — from the 1967 Outer Space Treaty to UN recommendations — are poorly adapted to the reality of “spy maneuvers” in orbit and cyber operations against satellites.^{5 8} .

Satellites between business and security: the weak link for civilian operators

A separate problem is that much of the satellite infrastructure critical to security is owned by private operators or consortia that have historically built their networks as a commercial product, not as a military asset.^{1 5} Many of the European satellites now used by governments and militaries were launched as platforms for satellite television, broadband internet and corporate communications. Cybersecurity and secure management were often a lower priority than coverage and cost of service.

Russian operations against Viasat and the interception of signals over Europe exposed this vulnerability: an attack on a private network at one point knocked out communications not only in Ukraine but also in a number of European countries, affecting critical facilities such as wind farms.⁶ Now, when it comes to the possible interception of satellite control commands, the question is even more acute: who will be responsible if, due to the underestimated risk of a private operator, a satellite with an important payload ends up under someone else's control or fails.

What does this mean for Ukraine?

For Ukraine, the threat of satellite interception is not an abstract topic in the media, but a practical risk. Communication at the front, control of unmanned systems, operation of energy infrastructure, as well as access to intelligence from partners depend on satellite channels.^{5 8} It is already known that one of Russia's first cyber operations on February 24, 2022 was directed specifically against the KA-SAT satellite internet, which was used by Ukrainian military units.⁶ The transition of Russian operations to the level of orbital reconnaissance means an attempt to close another “hole” in the information advantage of Ukraine and NATO.

In parallel, Ukraine is actively integrating into European space observation and data exchange programs, gaining access to Earth observation satellites and EU security services.^{5 8} . This increases our ability to see the enemy’s actions, but it also makes us part of the same infrastructure that the Russian Luch-1 and Luch-2 spacecraft are currently exploring. Therefore, the issue of protecting European satellites is simultaneously an issue of protecting the Ukrainian rear and front lines.

Where is the "war in space" heading: scenarios for the coming years

Security experts predict several basic scenarios for the development of the situation. The mildest is a "gray zone" in which Russia continues to use its surveillance and interception devices, but does not resort to open sabotage, fearing a symmetrical response from the West.⁵ In this case, the fight will be fought at the level of encryption, counterintelligence, and political pressure, with constant accusations at the UN and on platforms such as the EU-NATO.

A more severe scenario involves “hybrid attacks” on satellites: a combination of orbital maneuvers with cyberattacks from the ground aimed at disrupting the operation of individual systems.^{5 6} The Viasat example shows that even without physically damaging a satellite, it is possible to achieve a serious effect by disabling entire segments of communication. In the worst case, this involves attempts to impose incorrect commands on a satellite, which can change its orbit and create a risk of collision.

Finally, in the strategic perspective, analysts do not rule out the emergence of “weapons of the last argument” in orbit — from kinetic interceptors to means of “blinding” optical and radar satellites.^{5 8} Russia is already suspected of developing systems capable of attacking commercial satellite constellations like Starlink, which provided Ukraine with critical communications in the early months of the war.⁵ In this context, Luch-1 and Luch-2 look like scouts before a more overt buildup of forces in space.

What Europe and Ukraine need now

The crisis surrounding Russia's interception of satellite data poses several urgent tasks for the EU and Ukraine. First, to accelerate the modernization of orbital infrastructure: encryption of control commands, updating onboard systems of old satellites, stricter security requirements for private operators^{1 5} Secondly, to develop our own space surveillance and countermeasure capabilities in order to have not only political statements, but also technical tools of deterrence.

Third, integrate the space dimension into the sanctions policy against the Russian Federation: limit access of Russian structures to the components and technologies necessary for the development of such devices, and strengthen international control over the launch and behavior of Russian satellites.^{5 6} For Ukraine, this also means strengthening cooperation with the EU, NATO, and individual partners in the space sector — from data exchange to joint projects to build a new, more attack-resistant infrastructure.

Sources

1. Financial Times and its reprints: reports of Russian spacecraft Luch-1 and Luch-2 approaching European satellites and presumably intercepting their signals.
2. LIGA.net, Pro TV, Business Insider (Polish version): regional reviews of the FT material, details about the "suspicious maneuvers" of Russian satellites and the civil-military use of European devices.
3. The Mirror and other European media: comments by Major General Michael Traut, assessments of the threat to Europe's orbital infrastructure.
4. Analytical publications on the development of Russian Luch "inspection" satellites and their orbital behavior relative to Western communication devices.
5. Space-oriented media and think tanks in Europe: materials on the threat of satellite espionage by Russia and China, warnings from Germany and the UK.
6. Research into the 2022 KA-SAT (Viasat) incident: an analysis of the Russian cyberattack on satellite internet in the first hours of the invasion of Ukraine and its consequences for the EU.
7. International reviews on the militarization of space: assessments of the Russian Federation's potential to intercept, jam, and possibly destroy satellites in the context of the war against Ukraine.