Phantom weapon. How Ukraine was losing its defense capability

We talk about guns all the time. We ask for weapons, we demand weapons, we rejoice in weapons, we know how to distinguish an armored personnel carrier from an MTLB and "Abrams" from "Leopard". But until very recently, you and I knew almost nothing about weapons. They didn't know how many of them there were in the country, how many there were supposed to be, and where the ones that were there had gone, he writes grnt.media.

Illustrative photo

Actually, Western journalists and bloggers have repeatedly asked Ukrainians this question: why do you constantly demand weapons? Where did yours go? Well, in addition to the fact that in such a war no weapon of its own would be enough for any average country, let's still try to understand: where did it go, our weapons?

Independence bought at the price of security. Why was Ukraine forced to kill its own tanks?

When the USSR collapsed, each of the countries received as a military and economic inheritance those enterprises and weapons that were placed on its territory. As a result, Ukraine got one of the largest military groups in Europe, nuclear weapons, a powerful fleet, an aircraft fleet, and a number of other modern (and not very) weapons.

Throughout the existence of our state, all these armaments were continuously reduced - so that we approached the beginning of the war, as they like to say in Viber chats, naked bosses. We talk a lot and quite expertly about the loss of nuclear weapons. But, in addition to the YAZ, there were many other weapons that we refused. Sometimes it was officially prescribed in international treaties and demands to Ukraine, sometimes it was part of agreements on economic support, and sometimes Ukrainian weapons became part of very murky schemes, which the first leaders of our state worked out.

On December 13, 1991, the newly elected President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk was proclaimed the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, which at that time included: 21 divisions (14 motorized rifle, 4 tank and 3 artillery), 8 artillery brigades, 1 special forces brigade, 9 air defense brigades, 1 separate army Air defense, 4 air armies, 7 combat helicopter regiments.

In total, there are 980 military personnel, 7200 artillery systems, more than 500 warships and vessels, 1500 combat aircraft, more than 1000 units of tactical nuclear weapons and 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Kravchuk should have looked quite formidable, but he probably didn't feel that way. Because a big army means a lot of money, and there was no money. Kravchuk armed himself with the "principle of reasonable sufficiency" and began reducing the army.

From the very beginning, the ZSU was created as a neutral, shortened and non-nuclear version of the USSR army. Back in 1990, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was adopted. Its signatory was the Soviet Union, but later the quotas were "distributed" among the republics of the USSR. For Ukraine, the limits applied not only to nuclear weapons, but also to personnel — a reduction in the number of troops to 450, tanks — to 4080, armored combat vehicles — to 5050, artillery guns with a caliber of more than 100 mm — to 4040, attack helicopters — to 330 , combat aircraft - up to 1080.

Where did the leftovers go? The personnel was partially disbanded, and some of the weapons (including nuclear weapons - until 1996) were transferred to the Russian Federation as the official successor of the USSR.

By the way, Russia also signed the Treaty on Conventional Forces, but suspended its participation in it in 2007. Exactly, a year before the attack on Georgia.

In the same year, 1991, Ukraine approved the Concept of State Defense and Construction of the Armed Forces. This document again emphasized non-blocking and neutrality.

The Armed Forces themselves were in disarray. The fact is that during the times of the USSR, the army was a powerful instrument of denationalization and transformation of individual Ukrainians, Belarusians, Georgians, and Kazakhs into "Soviet men." No one ever served where he was born and lived. In October 1990, the Granite Revolution began in Ukraine, and one of the demands of the protest was the adoption of a law that would not allow Ukrainian men to be drafted into military units outside the republic. But at the time when the USSR collapsed, the army still had a mixed contingent. Soldiers and officers had to make quick decisions about which state they would stay in and serve, who to take the oath of, and whether to take the oath at all.

Personnel perturbations, re-subordination of units, the return of some officers and the dismissal of others hampered the real process of creating the Armed Forces and increased entropy in a young state, stuffed to the brim with weapons. One can imagine how much anxiety this caused in the international community, and how, probably, pressure was put on the same Kravchuk, demanding an immediate reduction of armaments.

Actually, both Kravchuk himself and diplomats repeatedly mentioned this pressure. It was mostly about nuclear weapons, of course. But when they received a principled agreement from Ukraine to renounce nuclear status, international partners began to demand a reduction in conventional weapons, especially long-range missiles.

In 1992, the Verkhovna Rada ratified the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which determined the levels of armaments and military equipment for the countries of NATO, the former Warsaw Pact, and the former republics of the USSR. The number of the Ukrainian army has already been reduced to 400. 5300 tanks, 2400 armored combat vehicles and 477 combat aircraft were cut to metal and disabled. All these concessions, along with the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine and the destruction of launch sites, should demonstrate to Western partners how civilized and predictable a partner Ukraine is.

But this was obviously not enough.

In December 1991, the Joint Threat Reduction Program, developed with the participation of the US Department of Defense, began to operate in relation to Ukraine and other countries of the so-called CIS. This program provided for the destruction of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other types of weapons of mass destruction, the elimination of surpluses of conventional weapons, the introduction of mechanisms to control the proliferation of weapons, the promotion of disarmament, the transfer of military capabilities and technologies to peaceful channels, etc.

After the collapse of the USSR, the USA and the countries of Western Europe not only tried to deprive the former republics of the maximum amount of weapons, but also did everything possible to reduce the potential aggressiveness of the newly formed countries. Obviously, they were not so much afraid that a conditional Belarus would attack a conditional France, as that yesterday's "brotherly peoples forever" would begin to share resources and territories, and one sixth of the land would be plunged into bloody darkness.

By the way, such a development of events with the outbreak of hostilities was quite probable. The beneficiary was supposed to be Russia, recalled the First Minister of Defense of Ukraine Kostyantyn Morozov.

"Moscow expected to preserve a unified Soviet army as a last attempt to preserve at least some form of the Union. To do this, she took many measures: obsessively agreed with us on joint tasks, the system of conscription and recruitment, education, communication, support, etc. When they realized the irreversibility of Ukrainian politics, looting of warehouse stocks of material resources began. At the same time, the troops launched a frantic propaganda campaign against the Ukrainian oath, and the forces of opposition to the creation of our own army were activated. Anti-Ukrainian public organizations appeared, including among disloyal officers. These were serious challenges for Ukraine, in particular related to the risks of losing the newly declared independence," said Morozov.

Ukraine conscientiously fulfilled all conditions of disarmament stipulated by international agreements. At the same time, Russia — receiving funds for disarmament from the United States — was in no hurry. In March 2002, the United States stopped funding the Joint Threat Reduction Program for the Russians because of Russia's cover-up of its chemical and biological weapons. In other words, Moscow received money from the USA, nuclear and conventional weapons from Ukraine, but it probably managed to preserve a significant part of non-conventional weapons, which, according to international treaties, had to be destroyed. Incredible, isn't it?

Ukraine continued to follow the path of a peaceful state. Three years after gaining independence, the country joined the NATO programs, which provided that 12 million units of light weapons and 1,5 tons of ammunition and 133 portable anti-aircraft missile systems would be disposed of.

In addition to the destruction of weapons, these programs provided for close cooperation with NATO - joint training, cooperation, transition to new standards. And, of course, pro-Russian forces actively opposed this. Communists, socialists, fringe Russophiles traditionally staged pickets and tantrums in the mass media during joint exercises of Ukraine and NATO.

It seems especially funny today that these projects included not only disarmament and training, but also certain security guarantees from the Alliance. NATO has undertaken to consult with any partner of the "Partnership for Peace" if it feels a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.

As part of this program, by the way, Barack Obama - then a senator - came to Donetsk to witness the successful completion of disarmament. During his visit, the Ukrainians cheerfully reported on how mines are processed: explosives into industrial explosives, iron into scrap metal, and plastic into children's toys.

"Kolchugi", "Faina", Russian special services: total discrediting of Ukrainian "defense"

Today we know: Russia was preparing for the next war all the time. Unlike the rest of the world and our country, the Russian Federation was not going to disarm.

Given our current experience, it is easy for us to condemn the leaders of Ukraine for this relentless demilitarization. But in the 90s and XNUMXs, Europe lived with the firm conviction that there would never be another war. At least not in Europe. At least, not with the weapons that are available. Most theorists predicted potential wars as hybrid confrontations — economic wars, cyberwars, terrorist attacks, but not artillery duels, not carpet bombings, not kilometers of minefields. Weapons carried more and more threats, and they were not perceived purely as a tool of defense.

In a certain way, Ukrainian weapons also continued to pose a threat. Despite the fact that our country diligently fulfilled all disarmament agreements, there were enough old Soviet stocks to actively sell them to those countries that could not afford to buy high-quality and modern Western weapons. Including those countries where conflicts took place — Africa and the Middle East. And this also could not but cause concern of the world community.

Let's recall two bright international scandals with Ukrainian weapons - one real, and one hoax. Both stories significantly affected the international image of Ukraine and forced our Western partners to put even more pressure on the government, demanding further disarmament.

In 2008, Somali pirates seized the ship "Faina", which was transporting Ukrainian weapons to South Sudan. On board the ship was a cargo of 33 T-72 tanks, BM-21 Grad rocket launchers, firearms and other equipment officially intended for Kenya and unofficially for the Autonomous Government of South Sudan. Deliveries were carried out bypassing the resolutions of the European Union and the United Nations. And although not only Ukrainians participated in this operation, the weapons on board were actually Ukrainian, and they were shipped to the port of Mykolaiv.

This scandal broke out shortly after the "mail chain scandal", which at that time the world community had not yet had time to forget. In 2002, the United States accused Ukraine of supplying the Kolchuga radio-technical intelligence stations to Iraq. This information was confirmed by the tapes of the famous Major Melnichenko, an employee of the State Security Office, who allegedly made recordings in the office of President Leonid Kuchma. From these records it appeared that Kuchma personally approved the supply of weapons to Iraq.

After the leak of these data, the USA froze financial aid to Ukraine (it was about $54 billion in total) and threatened sanctions if the sale of "Kolchug" could be proven. Leonid Kuchma—compromised not only by the scandal with the intelligence stations, but also by the murder of Heorhiy Gongadze—became an international pariah. To a large extent, it was this scandal that forced Kuchma to choose the "eastern vector" of international politics. Putin and Russian satellites remained the only partners of President Kuchma, and therefore of Ukraine.

"Kolchugi" was never found in Iraq, but the lot was already cast — Kuchma was left alone with the countries of the so-called CIS, with no prospects of building progressive relations with the Western world. In July 2004, Kuchma removed from the military doctrine the thesis that joining NATO and the European Union is the ultimate goal of the Euro-Atlantic and European integration policy. Negotiations on the establishment of the EEA — a single economic space with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan — were in full swing. Operation "successor" was also launched - the then Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych was supposed to succeed Kuchma.

Today, most analysts agree that the "mail scandal" was a special operation of the Russian special services, organized with the aim of disrupting Ukraine's cooperation with NATO and ending the rapprochement between Ukraine and the United States. The plan worked. The main figureheads on the Ukrainian side were Viktor Medvedchuk, Oleksandr Moroz, and Major Melnychenko — Ukrainian figures who today can be said without a doubt as Russian agents.

Such scandals affected the fact that the image of official Kyiv on the international arena was hopelessly damaged, and from a conscientious partner in the eyes of the West, Ukraine turned into an uncontrolled corruption hole in the center of Europe. From whom it is necessary to take away as many weapons as possible, because they are not able to give advice with it.

Nuclear disarmament: why it was so easy to "disband" Ukraine

We jumped ahead in explaining the loss of many conventional weapons in the first decade of independence. Let's go back to nuclear weapons.

As we have already mentioned, after the declaration of independence, Ukraine emphasized its neutral and non-nuclear status. According to the recollections of Leonid Kravchuk and the first diplomats of Ukraine, Ukrainians simply had no other choice.

"In my memory, the positions of the United States and Russia on the Ukrainian issue rarely coincided. Well, it was the first and almost the only case when the USA and the Russian Federation acted as one front, - recalled diplomat Oleksandr Chaly. — Moreover, the United States was the leader in putting pressure on Ukraine. Russia played as number two. I do not rule out that if Ukraine, Belarus or Kazakhstan resisted, Russia would receive carte blanche from the West to use military force to remove or take control of the nuclear potential of the former Soviet Union republics." Most likely, this is the engaged opinion of a diplomat who has always been distinguished by pro-Russian views, but it reflects the expert discourse that prevailed at that time.

Historian Serhiy Plokhiy holds the same opinion. In many interviews, Plokhiy assured that the nuclear-free status ensured Ukraine's independence to a large extent.

"On the international arena, Ukraine's chances for recognition of independence and support for independence were closely related to the guarantees of Ukraine's non-nuclear status... The Ukrainian state could not face the joint front of the USA and Russia in the mid-90s either economically, politically, or from the point of view of consolidation nations — in one word, no," Plohiy commented.

Leonid Kravchuk mentioned this more than once: there would be no independence without giving up nuclear weapons. The world simply would not recognize the sovereignty of the new state, we would not have financial and institutional support, and within a few years of such independence the state would collapse.

It is difficult today to say whether this is not an exaggeration, and whether in a few years the world would not come to terms with the fact that there is a nuclear Ukraine. Perhaps the leaders of that time simply did not have enough subjectivity to defend their own position. But you can try to put yourself in their place: they had nothing to rely on, they had no experience of state-building, experience of real international negotiations and intrigues at the highest level, no self-confidence, and most importantly, no money and resources at all to to keep and maintain this weapon.

"We knew that we do not control the warheads. I didn't have a black suitcase: it was in Moscow. I could only talk on the phone with the commander of the missile army. He could fulfill or not fulfill my requests, not to mention commissions: it was unrealistic. Nuclear weapons were outside Ukraine's control," Kravchuk claimed.

In 1997-1998, the maintenance period for the nuclear weapons installed in Ukraine was to expire. Reproducing the nuclear cycle required incredible budgets and time, which Ukraine did not have.

Nuclear weapons were agreed to be handed over to Russia, in exchange Moscow had to supply fuel to Ukrainian nuclear power plants for several years. The United States provided funds for the deactivation of the launchers. The guarantor countries signed the Budapest Memorandum to guarantee the sovereignty of Ukraine. This document was not signed by Kravchuk, but by Leonid Kuchma. However, Kravchuk lived to the time when it became clear that the Budapest Memorandum is synonymous with irresponsible lies, and Ukraine is absolutely defenseless in the face of a nuclear-armed Russia. Although, of course, in the 90s it seemed that YAZ is more of a suitcase without a handle that can be sold profitably.

And there was something to sell. Ukraine inherited from the USSR the third largest nuclear weapons arsenal in the world in terms of power and number of warheads. 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles and launchers, 1514 to 2156 strategic weapons warheads, 2800 to 4200 tactical nuclear warheads, and 30 to 43 heavy bombers. The uncertainty in the number estimates is due to the fact that Ukrainian politicians themselves did not know for sure how many nuclear weapons were stored on the territory of the young state: it was a secret of Moscow. Yuriy Kostenko, who then headed the working group of the Verkhovna Rada on the preparation for the ratification of the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1), claims that in total, Ukrainian tactical and strategic weapons contained 67-85 tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 80-102 tons of highly enriched uranium .

This arsenal was worth an incredible amount of money. But these reserves were given for nuclear fuel for Ukrainian nuclear power plants, an agreement that was not worth the paper it was signed on, and international recognition of an independent Ukrainian state.

However, we are talking about strategic weapons. And tactical nuclear weapons were exported to Russia at the very beginning of independence. In December 1991, in Alma-Ata, Kravchuk, Yeltsin, Shushkevich and Nazarbayev signed the agreement "On Joint Measures Regarding Nuclear Weapons". This document regulated the transportation of tactical anti-aircraft weapons from the territories of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to Russia until July 1, 1992. The number of exported missiles is unknown.

Another important event took place in October 1993 — an agreement on technical and financial assistance to Ukraine for the destruction of nuclear weapons was signed. The launchers had to be deactivated, as well as that part of the arsenal that was out of service. The USA transferred $175 million to Ukraine for disposal. The work was to be carried out under the close supervision of American specialists so that not a single enriched atom was lost.

And although by the time the treaty was signed, most of the nuclear weapons had already been exported to Russia, the Americans still expected surprises from Ukraine. The fact is that, despite the framework agreements, Ukraine and Russia could not reach an agreement and continued the dispute. Moscow refused to compensate Ukraine for the cost of the missiles. The Russians claimed that they were not to blame for the uranium, since the nuclear arsenal already belonged to them. The Ukrainian side, on the other hand, demanded significant compensation for the denial of security. The negotiations went round and round until the Americans lost patience.

In 1994, when Ukraine was already preparing for the first real presidential election campaign (in which Kravchuk lost to Kuchma), Bill Clinton flew to Kyiv and met with the then President at the airport in Boryspil. Witnesses claim that he shouted at Kravchuk and demanded the signing of all necessary treaties, the immediate transfer and destruction of all nuclear weapons and related infrastructure, and also threatened a total international blockade of Ukraine. Before the upcoming elections, Kravchuk decided not to take any risks, and in three days in Moscow he signed a tripartite agreement on the final transfer of all nuclear weapons.

At the same time, Ukrainian diplomats managed to obtain, albeit insignificant, compensation. Russia had to provide Ukraine with heat-releasing assemblies for nuclear power plants, and also undertook to respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the neighboring state and promised to refrain from using force or economic coercion to change borders. The Russians agreed to all this - although, apparently, even then they were not going to abide by the agreements.

After the agreement was signed, Kravchuk returned to Kyiv, while Yeltsin and Clinton stayed in Moscow and celebrated the reduction of nuclear threats on camera. It was quite obvious who was the loser in this deal. Not so long ago, Clinton admitted that he was wrong and that he feels guilty for having forced Ukraine into these agreements. Perhaps this is exactly what he remembered - how he shouted at Kravchuk in icy Boryspil, so that later he would drink champagne with Yeltsin in Novo-Ogaryovo.

In order to better understand the conditions and how the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine took place, it is worth paying attention to the same process in other countries. We tend to think of our experience as unique—but it's not. In parallel with Ukraine, the same disarmament took place in Kazakhstan and Belarus. And if these processes are analyzed comprehensively, the situation becomes clearer.

Both Kazakhstan and Belarus were similarly influenced by the USA and Russia. In addition, both Kazakhstan and Belarus also suffered from nuclear influence, so the opinion of the general public in these countries was unequivocally on the side of nuclear disarmament.

Ukraine and Belarus were incredibly devastated by the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. But Kazakhstan suffered no less. All the time, while the USSR was developing and improving its nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan was the test site.

At the time of the collapse of the USSR (and Kazakhstan, let's recall, was the last republic to leave the USSR), 104 intercontinental ballistic missiles SS-18 "Satan" were stored on Kazakh territory, and each was equipped with 10 nuclear warheads. There were 40 strategic nuclear bombers capable of delivering 320 nuclear warheads to the target, as well as 650 units of tactical nuclear weapons. Thus, the total nuclear arsenal located on the territory of Kazakhstan exceeded 2 warheads. This arsenal was supposed to defend from the east — against nuclear China, Pakistan and India.

What is more important for our history, the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site was located on the territory of Kazakhstan. Soviet atomic weapons were tested on it for the first time. In total, between 1949 and 1963, 459 nuclear explosions were carried out at the test site, and 113 of them were atmospheric, that is, open. More than 500 residents of Kazakhstan were affected by the consequences of these explosions. Tests were conducted not only in Semipalatinsk - several nuclear explosions were carried out "for peaceful purposes" near Aktyubinsk in the 1970s and 80s and on the Mangyshlak Peninsula in the 1950s and 60s.

It seems that if anyone had the right to keep nuclear weapons, it was Kazakhstan. But Kazakh sovereignty was even more undermined than Ukrainian sovereignty in those years, and therefore for Nursultan Nazarbayev, the trade in nuclear status became, in fact, the only opportunity to gain independence.

Kazakhstan received significant investments from the United States due to its relinquishment of nuclear status. The funds were supposed to be spent on eliminating the consequences of the tests, neutralizing and removing a large amount of contaminated materials from the country. In addition, the US feared that Kazakhstan might share its assets with Iran, as these countries have always had close cultural and political ties. Therefore, the Kazakh arsenal was monitored even more closely than the Ukrainian one.

Despite this, Nazarbayev desperately bargained for compensation and security guarantees, which Russia did not want to give to Kazakhstan any more than to Ukraine. What's more, Kazakhstan followed Ukraine step by step — Nazarbayev demanded the same thing that was asked for himself in Kyiv. Russian reluctance to compensate Ukraine for the cost of weapons was also due to the fact that the Russians understood that any concessions would be multiplied by two tomorrow.

In the end, the results for the Kazakhs were about the same as for the Ukrainians — with the difference that Kazakhstan received additional funds from the sale of enriched uranium to the United States and contracts for future supplies. After all, Kazakhstan mines uranium, and this is one of the important articles of its export. This industry has also become a lever of pressure - the IAEA has set a condition that the Kazakhs will not be able to sell their uranium to anyone in the world unless they renounce their nuclear status. And so it happened. Kazakhstan signed the same Budapest memorandum and gave Russia all of its territory.

Belarus did the same - but very stupidly. In return, Belarus received no compensation, no investment in environmental cleanup or economic development. Shushkevich promised Yeltsin in vain to give everything at once in Bialowieza Forest. In 1994, Oleksandr Lukashenko came to power, and at the last stage of the disarmament process, he tried to stop everything by leaving the weapons. But Minsk received a strong diplomatic push from Russia and the United States, and in 1996, just as in Ukraine, the process of nuclear disarmament was completed in Belarus.

Loss of the fleet and the Russian flag over Sevastopol

But even the loss of nuclear weapons was not as shameful, inexplicable and optional as Ukraine's loss of the Black Sea Fleet. Deprivation of the nuclear status had its prerequisites, it had political expediency, intense international pressure was exerted on Ukraine, there was a consensus of political elites, including national-patriotic elites. What happened to the fleet? It was given to local collectors for microloans.

Before we begin this detective story, it's important to add some context.

After the collapse of the USSR, the leaders of the so-called CIS agreed to create the United Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States. This short-lived military union was conceived as a temporary formation. His main and, in fact, only task was to supervise the nuclear weapons of the USSR - until all of them became Russian. The forces themselves consisted of missile forces, and probably military intelligence units, which were supposed to closely monitor the movement of warheads through the territory of the former USSR.

But in 1992, Leonid Kravchuk unexpectedly agreed to include the Black Sea Fleet in the list of assets of the United Armed Forces of the CIS. No previous documents required this. Back in October 1991, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine recognized the fleet as Ukrainian — completely and entirely. However, it turned out that Kravchuk undermined the jurisdiction of the Black Forest, making it joint property — and therefore, property that can be divided. And this despite the fact that all nuclear weapons were removed from the fleet back in 1991.

The Black Sea Fleet accounted for about 10% of the total strength of the Soviet fleet and united more than 1300 units, units, divisions and institutions, as well as more than 70 thousand personnel.

There were 105 warships, 69 warships, 48 ​​special-purpose ships, 191 naval support vessels, 470 support boats and raiding vessels, 883 surface vessels with a total displacement of about 560 tons on the water.

Ground-based naval aviation consisted of 170 combat aircraft, 19 aircraft and 115 anti-submarine aircraft, 35 transport aircraft and helicopters.

65 hectares of land were secured under the Black Forest.

During the dispute between Ukraine and Russia, during the period of uncertainty, 788 ships were written off from the balance sheet of the Black Sea Fleet for various reasons. However, the conditions and circumstances of the decommissioning hint that all these vessels were simply transferred to other divisions of the Russian fleet. That is, even if an agreement could not be reached - Russia quietly stole ships from Sevastopol.

Since the collapse of the USSR, the Black Sea Fleet has become a stumbling block in relations between Ukraine and Russia. Both Kravchuk and Yeltsin made statements that the entire fleet undoubtedly and completely belongs to their states.

At the same time, Yeltsin managed to appoint Igor Kasatonov, the former commander-in-chief of the Black Sea Fleet of the USSR, as the commander-in-chief of the Black Sea Fleet, which immediately caused distrust on the part of Ukraine. Despite everything, Kasatonov was in no hurry to take the oath, knowing that the majority of the personnel was inclined to swear to Ukraine. In the end — believed to be due to procrastination by the Ukrainian side — the Russians swayed Kasatonov to their side, and he ordered him to swear an oath to Russia until the navy issue was resolved by politicians.

Ukraine's negotiating position became worse every week. The Russians not only captured the fleet, but also undermined the status of Crimea, in particular, due to the fact that they were able to lure Kasatonov in time. It is very difficult to negotiate from a position of strength when your entire fleet on the peninsula flies the flags of another state.

In December 1992, the State Duma of the Russian Federation was instructed to consider the issue of the Russian status of Sevastopol. And in 1993, the deputies adopted the resolution "On the status of the city of Sevastopol", in which they noted that the "hero city" belongs to the Russian Federation, since the city was not transferred to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954.

At the same time, the rhetoric that we later got used to began to sound loudly - that Russia's military might is impossible without the Black Sea Fleet, that Crimea is "originally Russian" and that it was "given as a gift by a drunken Khrushchev", and therefore drunk that Yeltsin should take back.

At the same time, for the first time, the map that will be used to beat many Ukrainian initiatives in the future, Ukraine's attempts to become a part of Europe, to build a transparent economy, and to protect itself from Russia's encroachments on Ukrainian sovereignty, appeared for the first time. Debts for gas.

In April 1992, Kravchuk and Yeltsin signed an agreement by which they agreed to introduce a moratorium on unilateral actions in matters of the fleet. But this happened already after Russia's unilateral actions, which is why Ukraine fundamentally found itself in a weak position. A few months later, the parties signed the Yalta Agreements, according to which the fleet was to be divided. The first game was lost. Ukraine, which had rights to the entire Black Forest located on its territory, officially agreed to share it.

Another agreement in Moscow dated June 17, 1993 confirmed the intention of the parties to divide the fleet according to the "50/50" formula. And already in August, the fateful negotiations took place in Masandra, during which the agreements regarding gas debts and the distribution of the Black Sea Fleet were combined into one package. The negotiating group was headed by Kravchuk, and Prime Minister Kuchma was his right-hand man. The parties agreed that 50% of Black Sea will belong to Russia, and Ukraine will transfer another part to Russia as payment for gas debts. Official Kyiv agreed to sell another part. The same applied to the infrastructure of the fleet. And yes, it was about clearly undervalued.

1993, only two years of independence have passed. Gas prices were quite low — but Ukraine's debts were already more than $800 million. Gazprom threatened to stop supplying fuel to Ukraine. Together with the threat of taking everything by force, this created additional pressure on the Ukrainian authorities.

But despite the fact that Kravchuk and Kuchma tried hard to pretend that they had no other choice, and that the prices were justified, their arguments did not sound convincing even in 1993.

After the negotiations, Kravchuk and Kuchma received a wave of - as they would say now - hate from the military themselves, and decided to slow down a bit, at least in terms of rhetoric. Kravchuk specified that he did not quite mean that, and that Ukraine may sell the entire fleet, or maybe not the entire fleet, this is still subject to negotiation. But the general atmosphere of defeat has already covered the Ukrainian military.

Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov said that there will be no sale - there will be a partition, after which all Russian ships should withdraw from Crimea. Shortly after this statement, Morozov ceased to be the Minister of Defense. The military were displeased. Threats were voiced to apply to the International Court of Justice against Russia due to fraud. The Marine Corps Command stated that the economic miscalculations of statesmen cannot be compensated by the sale of Ukrainian land and concessions that are contrary to state interests.

It was after this agreement that Western "Kremlin experts" began to talk about the fact that, it seems, the USSR will be restored: Russia was too cheerfully winning back principled positions in Ukraine one after another.

Kostiantyn Morozov himself recalled the Masandriv agreements: "I have always been a supporter of democratic control over the army. But in that case, the Ministry of Defense was deliberately removed from the preparation of the decision, and the Verkhovna Rada learned about it after the fact. It all happened during the meeting of the presidential delegations of Ukraine and Russia in Masandra on September 3, 1993. On that day, the state leadership preemptively handed over the Black Sea Fleet to the use of the Russian Federation based in Ukraine. Officials of the Moscow delegation behaved defiantly on Ukrainian soil, based on an allegedly solved problem, they humiliated Ukraine, while our statesmen sat silently. My formal objections were ignored. Later, they were called "personal opinion" and even explained as my "dislike for Russian brothers".

In June 1995, another important agreement was signed in Sochi, in which it was recorded that Ukraine will retain 18,3% of the Black Sea Fleet, and the Russian Federation - 81,7% of the number of ships and vessels recorded as of August 3, 1992. And this is without taking into account almost 800 ships already stolen by Russia.

While the negotiations were ongoing, provocations were constantly taking place. Yurii Meshkov, a separatist, ran amok in Crimea. There were statements by Russian politicians that the entire Crimea should be taken, there were abuses by the Russian military against the Ukrainian ones, there were attempts to hold a referendum on the peninsula on secession from Ukraine, there were attempts by the Crimean authorities to change the clock to Moscow time.

Against this background, Ukraine gave up not only the largest part of the fleet, but also the best one. The newest vessels, the largest, combat-ready and with high-quality equipment — they all ended up in the hands of Moscow. Russia still uses most of these trophies, of course, against us. And 2/3 of the Ukrainian fleet was soon excluded from the combat composition, and the ships were written off as having lost their tactical and technical characteristics.

Russia got not only ships, but also aviation, weapons, equipment, infrastructure and territories. The Russians actively used even those infrastructural facilities that were not specified in any agreements, and did not pay the proper rent for them - in fact, they occupied part of the territory of Ukraine as early as the early 90s.

Finally, the process of dividing the Black Sea Fleet, together with all the bases, warehouses, airfields and even kindergartens for the descendants of Russian officers, was completed in 1997 — on May 28, Ukraine and Russia signed the Agreement on the Status and Conditions of Stay of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation. This agreement, in particular, legalized the basing of the Russian fleet in Crimea for 20 years, until 2017. And, yes, the package with these concessions included agreements on gas debt payments.

Kuchma made excuses again. For example, in 2006, he explained the ridiculous prices for which the fleet was sold: "Today, it is good to think that it was possible to sign a different contract, to set a different rental rate. And remember the year 97, in which state the country was. The global crisis unfolded, and we too, in principle, were on the verge of default. Who then calculated the price of the Crimean land? It was necessary to make decisions based on the existing socio-economic situation. But the main thing is not even that. The issue of the Black Sea Fleet is one of the components of the Great Treaty with Russia."

By the time of the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, the Ukrainian Navy looked miserable. Out of 32 ships, 15 have already been lost. The future Minister of Defense Mykhailo Yezhel, who headed the Ukrainian Navy from 1996 to 2003, did everything to ensure that only a ghost remained of the fleet. Yezhel, by the way, is suspected of treason and is currently hiding in Belarus. He was an ambassador there for a while, and when a case was opened against him, he asked Lukashenka for political asylum.

Yezhel disposed of at least two frigates, two corvettes, a missile boat and a small landing craft. Many things were sold and written off. And we met the year 2014 with 1 frigate, 7 corvettes, 2 missile boats, 2 landing ships, 2 control ships, 2 naval, 2 base and 1 raid minesweepers and 75 auxiliary vessels and boats of the raid service. We have one naval aviation brigade, a coastal defense brigade and a separate brigade artillery group left.

Remembering how spineless and subjectless Ukraine's position was in security matters, especially in Crimea, you understand why Putin was so confident that he would take over the peninsula without any problems.

We sell the leftovers and live according to the residual principle

Throughout the existence of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, until the very beginning of the war in 2014, the Ukrainian army was only shrinking.

The armed forces were financed on a residual basis, property was written off or sold at the slightest opportunity, and the number of personnel was reduced. Development programs and strategies were written under this incessant reduction — they had to justify this negligence with economic necessity and political expediency.

The first Military Doctrine of Ukraine from 1993 announced its non-aligned and non-nuclear status. However, at that time, Ukraine still had numerous military forces, a fleet, a full-fledged combat aviation, and even did not give up all of its nuclear weapons. It followed from the doctrine that military capability is one of the main tasks of the young state, although it was not clear who exactly we were going to defend against.

The second Military Doctrine was adopted by President Kuchma in 2004, when he had already chosen Viktor Yanukovych as his successor, and the whole country was preparing for the presidential elections. Ukraine has already seen the Rose Revolution in Georgia and seen Russia's reaction. The threats should have been more obvious than in 1993. However, this doctrine turned out to be much less militant. "Ukraine does not consider any state to be its military adversary, but considers a potential military adversary to be a state or a group of states whose consistent unfriendly policy threatens Ukraine's military security," as an example.

The first version of the Kuchma doctrine also provided for Ukraine's course to join NATO — but within a few weeks the President deleted this point.

Even before that, in 1997, Kuchma approved the State Program for the Construction and Development of the Armed Forces until 2005. The document discussed the modernization of weapons and the reform of the system of military-administrative distribution. In fact, the reform again turned out to be a reduction in personnel and weapons and a change of names, and there was no money for modernization.

At the same time, new functional components of the Armed Forces were created: Deterrence Forces, Rapid Reaction Forces and parts of the state border cover. The number of the Armed Forces decreased to 320 servicemen and 100 civilian employees. The Ground Forces accounted for 40% of the personnel; Air Force — 24%; Naval Forces — 8%; military administration bodies, military educational institutions and institutions — 28%.

There is a well-founded opinion that the number of personnel is compensated by their motivation and training. But there were problems with this too. In a short time, the number of higher military educational institutions and military departments was halved - from 60 to 31. The Ministry of Defense decided to leave one basic university each for the training of officers: for the Air Force - the Kharkiv University of the Air Force named after Ivan Kozhedub, for the Navy - the Academy of the Navy named after Pavlo Nakhimov in Sevastopol. Officers of operational-tactical and operational-strategic levels were trained by the Armed Forces Academy in Kyiv. The land forces were left with two higher "mainstays" - the Academy of Land Forces named after Hetman Peter Sagaidachny in Lviv and the Odesa Military Academy.

Now that we are asking the whole world for aviation, and considering how effective a counteroffensive can be without airplanes, it would be interesting to know what happened to our airplanes? At the beginning, there were, let me remind you, 1080 units — and that was after the first reductions. In 2001-2005, the number of combat aircraft was reduced from 874 to 575, and 208 were left in combat. But even this aircraft was hardly used, and the pilots' flight time was 10-20 hours per year.

Where did the rest go? Airplanes were a good commodity, and Russia was happy to take them away — in return for the same gas debts. Barters were carefully organized by the famous EESU and the leader of one party that is still present in the Ukrainian parliament.

But we had our own industry, we made airplanes ourselves! What happened to the airlines? What were they doing? And they "did" mostly debts.

Even if we focus on the violations exposed by the law enforcement and control bodies (and they did not expose everything), then at the official level, for example, numerous financial abuses were discovered at the Kyiv factory "Aviant", which failed to report to the Ministry of Defense on the spending of 100 million hryvnias allocated to the An-70 military transport aircraft program. The same with An-148 — UAH 150 million simply disappeared. No planes, no money, no responsibility. The former general director of the Kharkiv Aviation and Industrial Enterprise, Pavel Naumenko, was even sentenced to 10 years in prison for embezzlement of state property in particularly large amounts — there the money did not turn into aircraft either. Against this background, it even becomes clear why Boguslaev was considered a hero in our country.

In parallel with the slender military doctrines and plans to obtain high-quality weapons of own production, there was an incredible and full of wonders world of Ukrainian arms exports.

It is extremely difficult — if not impossible — to track all transactions for the entire period of Ukraine's independence, even if we undertake to count only official contracts. According to the parliamentary commission that investigated this issue, in the years 1989-94 Ukraine sold $32,4 billion worth of arms — that is, $6,48 billion annually. The volume of arms sales by Ukraine exceeded the real capabilities of all world arms exporters, with the exception of the USA and Russia.

Then they also held the bar: only from 1994 to 1997, the Ukrainian State Export Control Service issued 6500 licenses for the export of weapons and military equipment, which were exported to 40 countries of the world by more than a hundred Ukrainian companies. Arms exports from Ukraine increased by 120-140% annually, making Ukraine one of the largest arms exporters in the world.

According to the parliamentary commission, the prices at which weapons were sold were artificially low. Many of these licenses were issued during the time when the government was headed by Pavlo Lazarenko. He personally followed the Export Control Service and once admitted that he received 10% of every transaction that went through his office.

By the way, an important fact: Valery Malev, the head of "Ukrspecexport" from 1998 to 2002, died under circumstances that strongly resembled a planned murder. And before Malev, his predecessor and the first "arms baron" of Ukraine, Borys Marusych, died in the same circumstances - in a car accident.

However, it is obvious: the profit from the uncontrolled sale of weapons was received by many Ukrainian officials and military personnel. It's a wonder we have anything left after that, right?

Until 1997, the Ukrainian arms market resembled a store with a neon sign "LIQUIDATION OF GOODS". At one point, Ukraine ranked second, after Russia, in terms of the volume of weapons sold in the world. Actually, the State Export Control Service of Ukraine appeared due to the fact that the Ukrainian authorities were persistently offered to slow down and somehow limit their armed barons. The USA allocated targeted investments to Ukraine for arms control, and already in 1998 the situation improved.

By the way, the Export Control Service has proven its effectiveness. During many scandals, one of which was the "mail chain", the work and data of the DSECU were strong arguments for the defense of Ukraine against unfounded accusations. However, legislation adequate to the global and domestic arms market appeared in Ukraine only in 2003 — after the adoption of the law "On state control over international transfers of military and dual-use goods." Ukraine was the first state in the CIS to become a participant in all international export control regimes without exception.

But this does not mean that the Ukrainian market has become transparent and predictable.

For example, in September 2004, the US imposed fines on a number of foreign companies, including the Zaporizhia Regional Foreign Economic Association, for selling military technology and weapons to Iran.

Since 1999, a number of Ukrainian companies have transferred to Iran objects or technologies that can be used to create weapons of mass destruction or to manufacture ballistic missiles. In Ukraine, they assured that the Kh-55 missiles - which is what we are talking about - were not sold to Iran, but were transferred to the Russian side as part of previous agreements, and the Russians had already sold them to the Iranians using Ukrainian documents and components.

Oleksiy Breus, head of nuclear programs at the Army, Conversion and Disarmament Research Center, mentioned the outflow of not only scientists from Ukraine (at the beginning of the 2000s, about a thousand scientists, in particular, 300 doctors of science), but also about 200 Ukrainian nuclear workers to work in Iran.

On the other hand, Ihor Semivolos, an expert at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, believes that Ukraine's cooperation with Iran was not as intense as some of our partners tried to show. "The story about cooperation between Ukraine and Iran is greatly exaggerated and mystified. This mostly concerns the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in the south of Iran. Ukraine took part in this project in the 90s, Ukrainian nuclear scientists actually went there. But it wasn't about some secret technology — from our side, it was turbine specialists. In 1998, Ukraine refused to participate in this project under pressure from the USA. In the States, they promised in return some new technologies and developments, investments in our economy, and so on. But after the Ukrainians left the project, in fact, nothing happened. We can say that these were empty promises," Semivolos comments.

In addition, there were also "African scandals", when Ukraine was accused of supporting the anti-government UNITA group in Angola with weapons, and Ukrainian pilots allegedly flew flights to deliver military equipment to the rebels. Ukraine was on the same list as the states that participated in the supply of weapons to militants in exchange for diamonds — Togo, Rwanda, Burkina Faso, South Africa, Morocco, and Bulgaria.

The Washington Times published a whole series of articles devoted to Ukraine's secret contacts with Muammar Gaddafi's government in the military-technical field. The Ukrainian side again denied the accusations. And although evidence was not provided again, the appearance of publications that Ukraine sells weapons to third world countries without control and bypassing sanctions greatly damaged the image of our young democracy with a red tint.

To a large extent, the "Kolchuzhny scandal", which was discussed at the beginning, became possible precisely because it had prerequisites.

The mastodon of Ukrainian "defense" Volodymyr Horbulin stated: as soon as Ukraine reached the mark of $400-500 million in arms sales, it immediately began to be accused of all "arms sins." "Ukraine has not conducted any illegal contracts for ten years. Ukraine is not involved as a state," said Horbulin, who in 2002 was the head of the State Commission on Defense-Industrial Complex. Horbulin claimed that in 1998, Ukraine's arms exports increased by 125% compared to the previous year, by 1999% in 145, and by 2000% in 103. Ukraine's main competitors on the market were Russia and Bulgaria, and Ukrainians suspected the Russians of lies and provocations with the aim of pushing Ukraine out of the market.

In addition to the sale of weapons and ammunition, the beginning of the new century was marked by several programs that provided for the destruction of Ukrainian weapons. In the mid-2000s, Ukraine's arsenals contained 760 tons of ammunition — and 000 tons were soon to expire. As part of its international obligations, Ukraine has implemented several weapons disposal programs. In 480, 000 antipersonnel mines were destroyed, and in 2003, an agreement was signed to destroy 400 MANPADS, 000 million small arms, and 2006 tons of ammunition.

In the end, Kuchma's era came to an end, and with it many machinations went into the past. However, it is impossible to say that arms trade has stopped and arms smuggling has stopped. The reduction of the army also continued.

Viktor Yushchenko, after coming to power, returned the accession to NATO to the strategic goals of Ukraine. In addition, the defense capability continued to decrease. In 2004-2005, the Armed Forces of Ukraine switched from a four-type structure to a three-type structure: the Ground Forces and the Navy remained, and the Air Force and Air Defense Forces formed a single Air Force. There were three air commands in Ukraine - "West", "South", "Center" and a smaller tactical group "Crimea". The "East" command was absent for some reason. Of the three operational commands, only two remained - Western and Southern, as if the border with Belarus and Russia was not considered a priority defense zone.

The number of the Armed Forces was also reduced - from 180 servicemen in 2005 to 139 in 2012. How to justify this, except for the eternal lack of money? Even during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma, the representatives of the national-democratic forces willingly voted for draft laws on the reduction of the army. It was believed that this is how Ukraine adapts to NATO standards — the principle of a not large, but well-trained army. In addition, Viktor Yushchenko was completely pro-Western and had a positive image among civilized partners. Apparently, after years of shameful humiliation and ignoring of the Ukrainian leadership by Western countries, he counted on the security assistance of allies.

By the way, at that time, the reduction and reform of the army was actively lobbied by the then Minister of Defense Anatoly Hrytsenko. At that time, he also motivated these steps by the need to bring Ukraine closer to NATO standards and the transition of the Armed Forces exclusively to a professional basis. But, as you can see, we did not join NATO, but we managed to reduce the army.

But it is worth remembering that even where Viktor Yushchenko could significantly influence the country's defense capability, he often assumed incomprehensible decisions. In 2007, against the background of the agreements with the Party of Regions, he appointed Raisa Bogatyreva as the secretary of the National Security and Defense National Committee — at that time, they joked that a certified gynecologist was in charge of national security in our country. And even earlier, Yushchenko entrusted the Security Council to a former communist, a bright representative of the Kuchmist era, Ivan Plyusch. For ten years, not only for Yushchenko, but also for his successor Yanukovych, the National Security Council became a body in which officials were imprisoned, whom it was a pity to dismiss.

One of the turning points for Ukraine's security prospects was the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest. In fact, the failure of the hopes of obtaining the Action Plan on membership became one of the biggest defeats for the Ukrainian army and Ukrainian diplomacy in the entire history of independence. The summit took place against the background of protests initiated in Ukraine by Yanukovych's Party of Regions; Tymoshenko's party, already mentioned, was also against Yushchenko's "hawkish" policy.

The decision to reject Ukraine remained on the conscience of the leaders of France and Germany, Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel - by the way, they still do not admit their guilt or Putin's influence on their own decisions. As an argument, Merkel cited not the state of the Ukrainian army at all, but the fact that the Ukrainian people are not ready for such a turn. Based on public opinion polls, the chancellor told Yushchenko at the time that the President was trying to drive the Ukrainian people where they did not want to go.

And in two years, Viktor Yanukovych became the President, who tried to turn the remnants of the Ukrainian army into a unit of the Russian army. And he almost succeeded.

During Yanukovych's time, the army was no longer prepared for defense, but for surrender. It would be naive to analyze the documents of this period - just look at the ministers of defense.

We have already mentioned Mykhailo Yezhel - he headed the Ministry of Defense from March 2010 to February 2012. Yezhel actively carried out the task of leveling all the reforms that took place in the Ukrainian army in preparation for the future accession to NATO. He actively alienated and sold army property, and he was engaged in the preparation and promotion of the "Kharkiv agreements", when the term of stay of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in Crimea was extended for 25 years - yes! — in exchange for a traditional "gas" discount.

The State Bureau of Investigation claims that Yezhel did not even agree with the government on the drafts of the "Kharkiv Agreements" and did not bother with legal expertise. A bloody fight took place in the parliament over these documents, opposition deputies set off smoke grenades. The brutal vote was then called the final surrender of Crimea. Naive, the real one was still ahead.

By the way, Leonid Kuchma himself, who was behind the "naval" agreements of 1993 and 1997, approved the "Kharkiv agreements" in 2010. "This is a bold move by Yanukovych as President. For Russia, Sevastopol is not just a city, but a symbol. The prolongation of the fleet's stay in Sevastopol will contribute to the harmonization of bilateral contacts, the return of relations with the Russian Federation to a real strategic partnership", - these are the thoughts, we emphasize, of the President of Ukraine twice about the Ukrainian territory.

But let's return to the ministers. From February to December 2012, the Ministry of Defense was headed by Dmytro Salamatin, a Russian citizen who moved to Ukraine only in 1999, and then somehow very quickly became a People's Deputy from the Party of Regions.

Currently, Salamatin is suspected of treason — he is accused of stealing property and reducing the state's defense capabilities. And this is quite funny, because he did not betray his real homeland. Salamatin's term of office is a continuation of the expropriation of property, and multimillion-dollar embezzlement, and disruption of export contracts, sabotage of the supply of contracted military equipment to the army - there were problems with everything, even with food.

Pavlo Lebedev became Salamatin's successor and the last pre-war head of the Ministry of Defense. He did not even hide the fact that he is Russian and considers himself a Russian soldier. By the way, he first got into the parliament not even through the "regionals", but as part of Yulia Tymoshenko's party. As soon as Lebedev disappeared from Ukraine in 2013, he immediately found himself in the Kremlin. And you can imagine how much this person knew about the Ukrainian army and how much it affected the defense capability of our country at the beginning of the war.

In 2013, less than 1% of GDP was allocated to defense in the budget. In previous years, five anti-aircraft missile brigades were destroyed, three brigades were reformed into regiments, and 12 anti-aircraft missile regiments were disbanded. At the end of 2013, the total strength of the Armed Forces was 120,9 servicemen and another 44600 civilian employees. In particular, the Ground Forces were reduced to 57 thousand people as of the beginning of the year. They had 686 tanks, 72 combat helicopters, 2065 armored combat vehicles, and 716 artillery systems with a caliber of 100 mm or more. The Navy was armed with 17 warships of various degrees of readiness. And the problems were not only with weapons - there were pitiful affairs with communications, engineering troops, transport, and medical services. All this was destroyed almost to zero. And if several tanks have to be shown at the parade, no one will ever ask about walkie-talkies.

Russia was preparing to take advantage of the weakness of the Ukrainian state. After Yanukovych fled, Russia began to realize its long-standing dream of seizing Crimea.

In February 2014, after the beginning of the Russian aggression, Acting Minister of Defense Ihor Tenyukh said during the meeting of the National Security Council: "We are not ready for a full-scale war. Today we have no army. It was systematically destroyed by Yanukovych and his entourage under the leadership of the Russian special services. Today, we will be able to assemble a military group of about 5 servicemen capable of carrying out a combat mission from all over the country. We can throw them into Crimea, but this will not solve the problem of Crimea. We'll just put them there. And what to do with the thousands of kilometers of the border and Russia's preparations for the invasion? If they come from the Chernihiv region in the morning, they will be in Kyiv by the evening."

Probably, Tenyukh exaggerated the scale of the disaster, because Ukraine was able to stop the next stage of the invasion. Nevertheless, the situation was really dramatic.

Since 2014, the army has ceased to be perceived by politicians exclusively as a financial burden, as a burdensome attribute of the state. Ukraine has been in a state of war for nine years - money has been allocated to the Armed Forces again, the armies are again paying great attention to trying to increase it and reform it again.

Unfortunately, abuses in the defense sector did not disappear even after the start of the war. Everyone who wants to know knows about it. And in the end, it is telling that abuse and corruption in the defense sector became one of the decisive arguments against Petro Poroshenko in the 2019 elections.

Putin, when launching a large-scale invasion, talked about the "demilitarization" of Ukraine. Demilitarization has been Russia's consistent plan of action for our country for decades, and everything really went according to plan until 2014. And in 2014, everything went awry for Russia, and instead of getting a weak-willed enclave that can be adsorbed for a decade, the Russians got resistance and an adversary that became stronger every year.

Today's war should teach us many things, including the fact that defense capability is the business of each of us, not just the mustachioed mossy defense minister or another Raisa from the National Security and Defense Council.

Having immersed yourself in the weapons scandals of the 90s, which most of us have never heard of, because they happened somewhere in the columns of the American and European media, you understand why the Russians so actively use the thesis that "Ukrainians are selling American weapons to the left." Because this is a familiar narrative to everyone in Europe and the US, they have been reading about it for decades in reputable publications.

It is difficult to realize that our survival today depends on the scandals and abuses of the past, on the disgusting and greedy swindlers of the Lazarenko or Yezhel clan. Some of the stories that influenced the formation of the image of our country are true, some are Russian provocations, and some are half-truths. Because very often Ukrainian weapons were secretly sold to bloody regimes by such people as Vadym Alperin - until recently a citizen of Ukraine and Israel, an authority in the Russian mafia, a friend of Trukhanov and an odious smuggler without any notions of patriotism or duty.

When the war ends, the Ukrainian army will be much stronger than it was before the war. But it is also necessary to ensure that this army remains combat-ready, prestigious, and meets the highest standards of transparency, and the image of Ukraine as an unscrupulous seller of everything from slingshots to nuclear technologies remains a thing of the past. Together with Kuchma, Tymoshenko, Bogatyreva, Yezhel, Salamatin, Yanukovych and the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation.

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