Belgrade: between Brussels and Budapest

Exclusive. As of April 3, 2025, Serbia is experiencing acute political crisis, which began at the end of 2024 and reached its peak in the first months of 2025. The main reason for the unrest was the tragedy of November 1, 2024 in Novi Sad, when the collapse of a concrete canopy at the railway station claimed the lives of 15 people. This event gave rise to mass protests, initially aimed at demanding the punishment of the guilty, but eventually turned into a broad movement against the government and President Aleksandar Vučić.

The protests, which began as student protests, quickly spread to various levels of society, including teachers, doctors, social service workers, and even agricultural producers. The key moment was the announcement of a general strike on January 24, 2025, supported by many public and commercial organizations. The demonstrations were accompanied by blockades of roads, bridges and key transport hubs, such as the Avtokomanda junction in Belgrade. The scale of the protests reached its peak on March 15, 2025, when, according to various estimates, 100 to 500 thousand people took part in the "15th for 15th" action.

Against the background of increasing pressure, Prime Minister Mylos Vuchevych resigned on January 28, 2025, which was perceived as an attempt by the authorities to reduce the intensity of passions. However, this did not stop the protesters, who continued to demand systemic changes, including the resignation of Vučić and the holding of transparent elections. In March, the parliament officially approved the resignation of Vucevych, and the president announced a quick decision - either the appointment of a new prime minister or early elections.

Serbian authorities, including Vučić, call the protests a demand for a "color revolution" organized from the outside, and accuse Western forces of trying to overthrow the "pro-Russian regime" and bring a pro-Western opposition to power. In response Vuchich initiated the creation of the "Movement for the People and the State" for the consolidation of his supporters. The situation is complicated by rumors about the use of a "sound cannon" by the police during the March 15 rallies, which the authorities categorically deny, and the opposition uses as a reason for escalation.

The crisis also has a foreign political context: the US imposed sanctions against the "Oil Industry of Serbia" (controlled by Russian companies), which increases pressure on Belgrade. Relations with Russia remain an important factor — Moscow supports Vučić, and he, in turn, avoids anti-Russian sanctions, despite Western appeals. At the same time, the situation is worsening in Kosovo and Bosnia, where the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Milorad Dodik, has faced prosecution, which adds to the tension in the Balkans.

At the moment, the crisis is far from being resolved. Protests continue, the opposition keeps its distance from political parties, and Vučić balances between concessions and attempts to retain power. Experts differ in opinion: some believe that early elections are inevitable, but do not guarantee stability, others see the risk of further destabilization of the region.

As of April 2025, Serbia's relations with Russia, Hungary, and China remain an important part of its foreign policy, reflecting Belgrade's multi-vector approach in a complex geopolitical situation. Let's consider each of these directions.

Relations with Russia

Serbia and Russia have deep historical, cultural and religious ties, strengthened by a common Slavic heritage and Orthodoxy. Against the background of the political crisis in Serbia, which began at the end of 2024, Russia continues to position itself as a key ally of Belgrade. Moscow supports Vučić in his confrontation with the protesters, whom the authorities accuse of demanding a "color revolution" under the influence of the West. Economic relations are based on the energy sector: "Gazprom" remains an important gas supplier, and Russian companies such as "Lukoil" retain their influence through the "Oil Industry of Serbia". Despite EU pressure, Serbia refuses to impose sanctions against Russia because of the war in Ukraine, which underlines Moscow's strategic importance for Belgrade, especially in the Kosovo issue, where Russia blocks recognition of independence at the UN. However, the volume of trade and investment with Russia has decreased due to global sanctions, which forces Serbia to seek a balance between traditional friendship and pragmatic interests.

Relations with Hungary

Serbia and Hungary demonstrate growing rapprochement, especially in recent years. Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary, and Aleksandar Vucic maintain close personal and political contacts, which strengthens bilateral ties. Energy cooperation is a key aspect: in 2023, the countries agreed on the construction of an oil pipeline connecting them for the supply of Russian oil, bypassing EU sanctions restrictions. Hungary also invests in Vojvodina, where a significant Hungarian minority lives (about 200 thousand people), supporting infrastructure projects there. Both countries share a skeptical attitude towards the liberal values ​​of the EU and oppose pressure from Brussels, which brings their positions closer together. In April 2025, there are rumors about a possible military alliance between Belgrade and Budapest, although this has not yet been officially confirmed. Such a partnership could strengthen their position in the region, but the risk will complicate relations with NATO and the EU, of which Hungary is already a member.

Relations with China

China has become an important economic and political partner for Serbia, especially within the framework of the "Belt and Road" initiative. Xi Jinping's visit to Belgrade in May 2024 confirmed the strategic nature of relations. China is actively investing in the infrastructure of Serbia: the construction of roads, railways (for example, the high-speed line Belgrade-Budapest) and industrial facilities is in full swing. In the military sphere, Beijing supplied Serbia with HQ-22 anti-aircraft missile systems in 2022, which caused concern in the West. China also supports Serbia in the Kosovo issue, not recognizing its independence, which makes it a valuable ally in the international arena. Economically, China is replacing Russia as the main eastern partner of Serbia, offering more resources and technologies. However, this causes tension with the EU, which sees the Chinese presence as a threat to its interests in the Balkans.

General context

Under the leadership of Vučić, Serbia strives for a multi-vector policy, balancing between Russia, Hungary, China and the West. Russia provides political and energy support, Hungary — regional partnership and common interests in the confrontation with the EU, and China — economic opportunities and technological progress. This approach allows Serbia to maintain its independence in decision-making, but complicates its path to European integration, as the EU requires greater consistency with its policies, including sanctions against Russia and limiting China's influence. Against the background of the internal crisis and external pressure, Serbia continues to maneuver, using its connections to strengthen its positions both within the country and in the region.

Joseph Hayych, CAI-Podgorica, for Newsky