Attack 101 "Shaheda" on January 23: how the air defense worked and where the drones broke through
24.01.2026When more than a hundred enemy drones are flying in the sky over Ukraine at the same time, every shot down means saving a basement, a hospital, a substation, and someone's life.
On the night of January 23, Russia launched 101 strike drones into Ukraine, attempting to disrupt the air shield with simultaneous attacks from different directions.1 The Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses were able to shoot down or suppress 76 targets, but at least 19 Shaheds and other drones hit 12 facilities, ranging from energy to residential buildings.1 2 This night showed not only the endurance of Ukrainian calculations, but also the scale of the challenge: Russia increased the number of drones to triple digits in a single raid, forcing Ukraine to live in a mode of continuous air alert.
Attack route: where did the Shaheds fly from?
According to the Air Force, drone takeoffs were recorded from several directions: the Russian regions of Kursk, Oryol, Smolensk (Shatalovo airfield), Rostov (Millerovo), Krasnodar Territory (Primorsko-Akhtarsk), as well as from temporarily occupied Donetsk.1 This geography allows the Russians to stretch Ukrainian air defense along an arc from north to south, forcing them to respond simultaneously to threats over the Kharkiv region, the central regions, and the south.1 2 Approximately 60 of the 101 UAVs were Iranian Shahed-136/131 attack drones or their Russian copies, the Geran.1 .
The flight routes are traditional for such attacks: drones fly low, using terrain, river valleys, and "shadows" from radar fields, trying to bypass the coverage areas of stationary air defense systems.2 3 Some targets are detected and shot down over border areas, while others break through to central regions – which is why air alerts “walked” around the country for hours that night, including Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, and Cherkasy regions.
Air defense results: 76 downed and suppressed targets
As of 08:00 on January 23, the Air Force reported that air defense and electronic warfare forces had shot down or suppressed 76 enemy drones out of 101 launched.1 It's not just about the Shaheds - the overall count also includes other types of UAVs, but it was the Iranian drones that formed the basis of the shock wave.1 This means that about three-quarters of all targets either failed to reach their objectives or were forced to descend/go off course.
At the same time, the Air Force directly indicates: 19 strike drones, despite the efforts of air defense, still hit 12 different objects on the territory of Ukraine.1 This is a consequence of both the massiveness of the attack and the limited resources of air defense: when there are more than a hundred targets in the sky at the same time, even an effective system cannot guarantee one hundred percent interception.2 3 That is why the Ukrainian command continues to emphasize to its partners the need for additional medium- and short-range complexes.
Where they arrived: 12 hit points across the country
The full list of 12 targets hit by drones is not being disclosed as of the morning of January 23 for security reasons. It is known that the strikes were carried out in at least Kyiv, Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk, Cherkasy, Poltava and, probably, Odesa regions - it was there that residential and energy infrastructure were hit on the night of January 23.2 4 In Kryvyi Rih, a drone strike was a prelude to a subsequent ballistic missile strike on a residential building, which the following day left 11 people injured, including three children.4 .
In Kyiv and the region, air defense worked particularly hard: city authorities reported shooting down most targets on approach to the capital region, but even in such conditions, debris and debris fields pose risks to civilians and infrastructure.2 6 In some regions, power lines and transformer substations were damaged, temporarily leaving thousands of subscribers without electricity and heat - against the background of an already difficult energy situation after previous attacks.
How the Air Force Worked: Multi-Layered Defense in Action
The night of January 22-23 once again showed what a multi-layered air defense system looks like in real time. The first level is the operation of radars and radio reconnaissance equipment, which record the launch of drones from different directions and transmit information to the Air Force control points.1 2 The second is stationary and mobile medium-range anti-aircraft systems (such as NASAMS, IRIS-T, Buk), which shoot down Shaheds at a distance from the main targets.
The third level is the close-range defense of large cities and critical infrastructure facilities: short-range anti-aircraft installations, mobile groups with MANPADS and large-caliber machine guns, as well as electronic warfare systems that jam drone navigation are operating here.2 3 . It was thanks to this multi-layeredness that it was possible to shoot down most of the 101 UAVs. But each downed drone means spent missiles, ammunition, and barrel life, and therefore another argument in favor of increasing both domestic production and international assistance.
Why 101 drones is not just a number, but also a signal of escalation
The number 101 in the Air Force’s tally is telling. It’s another step in Russia’s “quantitative breakthrough” strategy: instead of creating fundamentally new types of precision missiles, the Kremlin is building up a mass of cheaper drones, hoping that some of them will break through the saturated air defenses.1 2 For Ukraine, this means the need to build defense not only on "high-quality" Patriot-type systems, but also on the maximum number of short-range and electronic warfare (EW) weapons.
Analytical centers indicate: series of strikes with 70–100+ "Shaheeds" per night have become the new norm this winter, especially against the background of Russia's attempts to simultaneously strike with missiles3 7 This depletes Ukrainian air defense missile reserves, forces personnel to be under constant stress, and simultaneously strikes civilian infrastructure even when most drones have been shot down. The night of January 23 is an illustration of this logic at full power.
Energy context: attacks on CHP plants, oil depots, and networks
The January 23 attack did not occur in an empty field, but against the backdrop of a long campaign of Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy. Just the day before, drones and missiles hit facilities in Kryvyi Rih, Kyiv region, and other regions, and on the same day, Ukrainian drones in response set fire to an oil depot in Penza, Russia, showing that the energy war has become two-sided.4 8 Every "Shahed" that reaches a transformer substation or CHP is not only a local blackout, but also damage to equipment that is difficult and expensive to replace.
That is why the Air Force, commenting on the results of the night, emphasizes the effectiveness of air defense: 76 neutralized targets mean dozens of undamaged power lines, substations, boiler rooms and pumping stations.1 2 But the 19 drones that broke through are a reminder: no defense system, even the best, is absolute, and Ukraine is forced to simultaneously prepare for both energy strikes and rapid recovery after them.
What does this night say about the resilience of Ukrainian air defense?
From a formal point of view, the night of January 23 was a successful air defense operation: over 75% of all enemy drones failed to reach their targets.1 . But for Ukrainians who spent hours in shelters, listening to the roar of engines and explosions in the sky, it is also a test of endurance - of the state, the army, local authorities and each family separately. The resilience of air defense is not only in the number of drones shot down, but also in the ability of each link to do its job again and again, even when attacks become "routine."
International partners are closely monitoring such reports. Each successfully repelled raid proves that the systems transferred to Ukraine work and save lives – but each breakthrough, each hit on a thermal power plant or a house adds arguments to those in Kyiv and Western capitals who ask for even more systems and ammunition.2 7 In this arithmetic, the night of January 23 is the number that should translate into additional aid packages.
What's next: lessons from the January 23 attack
From an OSINT and trend analysis perspective, the 101 drone attack provides several important insights. First, Russia will continue its practice of massive “shaheed” strikes from various directions, combining them with missiles to stretch and wear down Ukrainian air defenses.3 7 Secondly, Ukraine is forced to invest not only in a "big shield" over the capital and megacities, but also in a regional defense network - mobile groups, electronic warfare, local radars, and the integration of air defense into a single system.
Third, the drone and air defense war is increasingly becoming a war of production and technology: whoever adapts faster, increases production, and finds new ways to make enemy UAVs “blind” and “deaf” will have the advantage.3 8 The night of January 23rd showed that Ukraine knows how to withstand the blow – but also that this blow is becoming stronger and stronger. And right now is the moment when decisions about air defense depend on what the next winter will be like.
Sources
- Censor.NET: "The Shahed attack on January 23: how did the air defense work?" - Air Force data on 101 launched UAVs, 76 downed/suppressed targets, and 19 strike drones that hit 12 targets each.
- Official Telegram channel of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: information on the launch directions of the "Shahedi" (Kursk, Orel, Shatalovo, Millerovo, Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Donetsk) and preliminary results of air defense work.
- Ukrainian national media: reviews of the night attack on January 23, clarifications on the regions where drones were shot down and hit.
- Censor.NET / other Ukrainian media: materials about parallel strikes on Kryvyi Rih and the consequences for housing development and infrastructure.
- The Kyiv Independent and other English-language resources: the context of Russian massive attacks by "Shaheds" in the winter of 2025–2026, the increase in the number of drones in each raid.
- Official messages from the Kyiv City Military Administration and other OVA: information about the work of air defense over Kyiv and the regions during the attack on January 23.
- Reports from ISW and other think tanks: assessing the evolution of Russian tactics in using Shahed in conjunction with missile strikes on Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure.
- International media (BBC, DW, etc.): materials about Ukraine's attacks on Russian fuel infrastructure (in particular, Penza) as an element of a bilateral "energy war."
